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FOREWORD
This study has been prepared for distribution by the M.I.T. Center for
Space Research. It is expected that further revisions will be madein the
study to take account of continuing negotiations on an arms control treaty
for outer space in the fall and winter of 1966. It is hoped that readers
of this study will send commentsand criticisms to the author, whether on
matters of detail or general perspective, so that they maybe considered
in preparing the final draft.
The author wishes to acknowledgehis thanks to the M.I.T. Center for
Space Research for making possible this publication and for generous
research support under NASAGrant NsG-496; through the Department of
Political Science, in the academicyear 1965-1966; to the Graduate School,
Boston University, for continued support in 1966-1967; to a numberof
colleagues at M.I.T., Harvard University, and Boston University, who have
helped in the planning and conduct of the research, especially Lincoln P.
Bloomfield and EugeneSkolnikoff. Officials from a numberof U.S.
government agencies have madeuseful suggestions--from the Arms Control
and DisarmamentAgency, the Departmentof Defense; the Legislative Reference
Service, Library of Congress; the National Aeronautics and SpaceAdminis-
tration, and the Department of State. For their encouragementand
cooperation the author wishes also to thank a numberof persons associated
with the Policy Studies in Science and Technology, GeorgeWashington
University; the RandCorporation; and the United Nations. A numberof
librarians have been most helpful, including those of the Widener and
Russian Research Center libraries of Harvard University; the Christian
Science Monitor; U.N. Outer Space Affairs Group; but particularly the Space
Center Reading Room, the Dewey, and the Center for International Studies
libraries at M.I.T.
Walter C. Clemens, Jr.
October, 1966
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INTRODUCTION
Three steps toward space arms control in 1963 encouraged Adlai E.
Stevenson to declare that, in the half dozen years since man discovered
how to escape from his earthly environment, "there has been enough social
progress to sustain the hope that outer space will not be chaotic...1 The
progress made in those few years, he predicted, "if pursued, could make
this the first age of exploration not in the name of national glory but in
the name of man himself."
The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations based his assessment in part
on the resolution adopted by the General Assembly in October 1963, welcoming
the expressions by the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United States of America of their
intention not to station in outer space any objects
carrying nuclear weapons of mass destruction. 2
Second, Stevenson had in mind the treaty prohibiting the testing of nuclear
weapons in outer space, in the atmosphere, and under water; _ third, he
referred to a General Assembly Declaration of Legal Principles Governing
4
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space.
Stevenson went so far as to assert:
In short, we have rejected the political philosophy which
made the last age of discovery an age of national conquest
and conflict, and projected a political philosophy which
promises to make this new age of discovery one of
cooperation and benefit for all mankind. In outer space,
if you please, our sense of social responsibility and our
capacity for social invention are not doing badly in
response to the qchallenge laid down by the inventions of
our scientists. _
istatement to the First Committee of the General Assembly, December 2, 1963,
U.N. Doc. A/C.I/PV.1342, pp. 6-13.
2General Assembly Resolution 1884 (XVIII): Stationing Weapons of Mass
l_struction in Outer Space, October 17, 1963, adopted by acclamation.
3The treaty was initialed in Moscow on July 25, 1963; signed on August 5,
1963, by the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and
United States; and entered into force on October lO, 1963.
4General Assembly Resolution 1962 (XVIII); unanimously adopted by the General
Assembly on December 13, 1963; it had been submitted to that body by the U.N.
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space prior to Stevenson's speech.
5Stevenson's address of December 2, 1963, o_. cir.
iv
!
Ambassador Stevenson was correct: Much progress had been made. For
once, political planning was not doing "badly" in response to technological
change. But the future remained open-ended. The great powers could revise
their expressions of intent, if only because U.N. resolutions command but
moral authority. It was still possible in 1963 and it remains possible in
1966 that the arms race may be extended into outer space, even though--like
World War II--this would be a conflict "nobody" wanted or even expected.
The present study focuses on what has been the central problem of
arms control for outer space: the launching of missiles through outer
space and their deployment in outer space .1 For about five years, 1955-1960,
Western negotiators urged what we call here "preventive" arms control, the
outlawing of medium- and long-range rockets that would pass through outer
space en route to their terrestrial target. Before they were widely de-
ployed, it was technically if not politically feasible to agree not to
deploy them. After they were accumulated in large numbers, however,
attention turned to another possible prophylactic measure: the banning
of bombs stationed in orbit or on celestial bodies.
Although the main emphasis here is on direct military applications of
space, particularly _-ith respect to weapons of mass destruction, these must
necessarily be dealt with in the framework of other military and political
problems of outer space. Hence, reference _-'-made to other _-_........._ _ _-" ....._
applications such as anti-satelllte weapons and anti-missile defenses; to
nuclear testing in space; to military support activities such as reconnais-
sance and communications; to negotiations regarding scientific cooperation
in space; and to negotiations to establish international legal institutions
governing space exploration.
But the main concern has been with measures of arms limitation. To be
more precise, the topic has been "arms control" rather than "disarmament, "
since to date there seem to have been no weapons stationed in outer space.
To be sure, if negotiations ever turned seriously to the elimination of
land- and sea-launched missiles that pass through space, we would be dealing
II_finitions of outer space still vary. For a wide spectrum of viewpoints,
see Legal Problems of Space Exploration A Symposium, prepared for the
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, U.S. Senate by the Legislative
Reference Service, The Library of Congress (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1961).
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with disarmament. Furthermore, for some years Soviet negotiators insisted
that space arms controls be conditioned on terrestrial disarmament. History
has shown, however, how supremely difficult it is to dismantle weapons once
they are developed and deployed, particularly in comparison with the relative
feasibility of non-deployment, either by tacit or explicit agreement.
The story of space arms control efforts replicates in microcosm many
of the general characteristics of post-World War II negotiations on the
limitation of armaments. The Western powers have typically proposed
limited measures of arms control that seem pragmatic and feasible, steps
that would make the world safer if not free from the threat of war. The
Soviet Union has tended to reject these proposals, not only because they
frequently entailed on-site inspection, but because they might manipulate
the balance of power to Western advantage. Instead the Kremlin tended
to advocate an "all or nothing" approach. Since 1955, however, and
especially in 1963-196_, Moscow has espoused what it terms "partial dis-
armament," particularly where Washington has relaxed its demands for on-site
inspection. Increasing Soviet realism, the decline of ideology and cold war
hatreds,the greater possibilities for verification through national (home-
based) inspection systems, the accomplishment of effective mutual
deterrence, the rise of Communist China--all these factors have facilitated
U.S.-Soviet arms control accords in _atcr _pace as we_ as _ _ .....
Another striking parallel between negotiations on space weapons and
terrestrial armaments is their high political content. Both sides have
used the negotiations as a sounding board for a number of political goals.
In periods of tension, Realpolitik and disarmament "gamesmanship" have pre-
vailed, one or both sides emphasizing their own military power as a
bargaining tool to command concessions or, alternatively, underlining their
own virtue as the champion of peace and the other's obstinate refusal to
make reasonable concessions to reach a compromise accord. When the super-
powers have sought to relax or to control tensions, however, they have found
it convenient to talk about space cooperation and, as in 1963, to look for
an arms control accord that would help stabilize incipient detente.
This book is neither a pure narrative history nor an explicit array of
policy guidelines. The immediate and overriding objective is to trace the
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efforts from 1955 to the present to ban weaponsfrom outer space, and to
analyze the forces conditioning these endeavors. But there is a sub-
ordinate, "policy" motive: to search the historical record for information
and insights that may be useful in further efforts to control weapons in
space. Particular attention is therefore given to the utility of the
196B U.S.-Soviet understanding, formalized only in a U.N. resolution, and
to the milltary-political advantages and disadvantages, as they appear in
1966, to a treaty prohibiting certain military functions in outer space.
While the book attempts to argue the rationality and desirability of arms
control in space, it says nothing for or against the political or scientific
merits of space exploration in general, relative to other possible areas of
endeavor and investment.
A study of arms control and outer space necessarily touches on a wide
range of diverse subjects. Few of these can be developed systematically
here, and it may well be that some readers will be disconcerted with the
simplified and cursory treatment of topics such as space law and space
technology. Nevertheless, the central theme of the book may constitute
a kind of case study or a functional problem with relevance to a number of
of separate concerns--the theory of arms control, the history of conflict
and cooperation in East-West relations, the study of the interaction between
domestic and foreign policy (in both the Soviet Union and the United States),
the "analysis of international bargaining, and the study of scientific-
technological change and public policy.
Although Ambassador Stevenson's eloquent appraisal seems in retrospect
to have overstated the progress made In the control of military-space
technology, the impression remains that the major space powers have shown
unusual restraint in deciding whether to escalate their military competition
beyond the earth's atmosphere. No doubt economic costs and technological
difficulties have played an important role. But it may also be true,
perhaps only subconsciously, that the leaders of states long accustomed to
driving frenetically for military and political power, have perceived that
they are confronted with a novel opportunity and a great responsibility:
the chance to preserve the heavens from the scourge of war and military
competition, just as scientists seek to avoid polluting the planets with
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terrestrial bacteria. Alternatively, if Moscowand Washington assumethat
man's competitive instincts will remain intense, they mayalso sense that
competition in space mayprove to be a practical realization of William
1James' call for a "moral equivalent" to war.
Howeverthat maybe, the prospect remains in 1966 that preventive arms
controls may yet be established to deny someif not all military activities
from outer space, and that international legal institutions maypreserve
outer space from being divided into heavenly colonies of nation-states. At
a minimumit is hoped that this study will provide a survey of roughly the
first decade of work toward these goals, a record infused3 it would seem,
with more promise than pessimism.
l"competition" in Russia maybe rendered as konkurentsiia or as sorevnovanie.
The first term connotes competition in the sense of a zero-sum game: what
one party _rlns, the other loses; the second term implies the friendly
rivalry, say, of athletes. When Soviet spokesmen speak of "peaceful
competition" between diverse social systems, they employ the second term.
viii
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I. ATTICS TOCURBICBM'S, 1955-1960
While they could not predict its consequencesin detail, Western and
Soviet leaders recognized by the mid-1950's that the impending space age
would revolutionize military strategy and world politics. Western govern-
ments took the lead in urging that a regime of preventive arms control be
established for outer space. For several years before and after the first
successful tests of an IC_M in 1957, proposals were advanced that would
have curbed the deployment of medium-and long-range missiles. After such
weaponshad been emplaced in large numberson land and sea, however, nego-
tiations turned to other aspects of space arms control, in particular, as
we shall see, in Chapter II, to the banning of bombsin orbit. 1
The S_ace Race and the Arms Race
The failure of efforts since 1945 to halt the accumulation of nuclear
and thermonuclear weapons led by 1955 to what both Moscow and the West
acknowledged to be a "clandestine weapon problem." Before long-range
missiles were also procured in numbers beyond the capacity of effective
control, Western statesmen suggested that agreement be reached denying the
use of outer space to weapons of mass destruction.2 This sentiment was
echoed by Russian leaders. As we shall see, however, Moscow refused to
limit Soviet space capabilities unless the West agreed to disband its
overseas bases. Only through limitations on the assets of both sides, the
Kremlin argued, could symmetry and security be achieved.
The negotiations naturally reflected the expectations of all parties
regarding the technol0gical-military balance--present and future. While
U.S. statements emdeavored to downgrade Soviet space achievements, and
iThe best general survey of negotiations from 1945-1960 is Bernard G.
Bechhoefer, Postwar Ne6otiations for Arms Control (Washington: The Brookings
Institution, 1961). The history of the 1954-1964 negotiations, with an
emphasis on Soviet policy, is covered in Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Walter C.
Clemens, Jr., Franklyn Griffiths, Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet
Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament 2 1954-1964 (Cambridge, Mass.:
The M.I.T. Press, 1966), where a bibliographical essay and bibliography may
be found, pp. 291-323.
2See e.g., comments by Harold E. Stassen and Commander Allan H. P. Noble,
United Nations Document DC/SC. I/PV. 141 (July 25, 1957), PP. 4, ii; Henry
Cabot Lodge, Documents on Disarmament_ 1945-1959 (2 vols.; Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1960), II, 901; President Eisenhower, ibid.,
II, 939; Secretary of State Dulles, ibid., II, 942.
although the Soviet initial lead does not appear in retrospect to have been
so significant_ both Moscowand the =._estseemedto believe that the Soviet
Union _rould achieve a head start in long-range rocketry over the United
States. A RANDCorporation report had forecast as early as 1946 that an
earth satellite would "inflame the imagination of mankind," because space
i
exploration provided an index of both military and scientific advancement.
But while the Soviet Union began an intensive and systematic rocket program
in 1945_ the United States did not give substantial support to missilry
until 1951. Only in 1954-1955did Washington assign high priority to
development of intermediate- and long-range missiles--decisions spurred
in part by intelligence reports on Soviet progress in this field. 2
Already in 1954 world scientists meeting in Romecalled for the
construction of earth satellites for the International Geophysical Year
(IGY) 1957. In 1955 both Moscowand Washingtonannounced their willingness
to build satellites. In April of that year the Soviet Union nameda special
commission of scientists to direct her satellite program. U.S. intelligence
reports in November1956 indicated the Soviet Union could put up a satellite
any time after November1957.3 In June and September1957, Moscowre-
iterated its intention to launch a satellite in connection with the IGY.
The New York Times on October l, 1957, carried on its front page an article
headlined "Light May Flash in Soviet's 'Moon'"; but three days later, when
the "moon" became a fact, public and governmental opinion in the West
reacted with surprise.
l"Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship," May 1946.
See Vernon Van Dyke 3 Pride and Power: The Rationale of the Space Program
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. ]2.
2Van Dyke, op. cit., pp. i0-ii; for a criticism of the previous adminis-
tration and a defense of U.S. space policy under his own, see Dwight D.
Eisenhower, Wa_ing Peace_ 1956-1961 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday &
Company, Inc., 1965), pp. 204 _assim; for a useful survey, see Lester A.
Sobel (ed.), Space: From Sputnik to Gemini (New York: Facts on File,
Inc., 1965).
3Eisenhower, o_. cit., p. 206.
3President Eisenhower recalled:
The size of the thrust required to propel a satellite
of this weight came as a distinct surprise to us.
There was no point in trying to minimize the
accomplishment or the warning it gave that we must take
added efforts to ensure maximum progress in missile and
other scientific programs.
The launching of artificial satellites from the Tyuratam Range in
Kazakhstan on October 4 and November 3, 1957, made the Russian word s_utnik
(travelling companion) almost a household term in the West. But the
military implications were the more significant in light of the announce-
ment by TASS on August 26, 1957, that the Soviet Union had completed a
successful test of an ICSM, and that no part of the wor]d was any longer
immune to attack. The U.S. Defense Department reported on August 30,
1957, that the Soviet Union had tested at least four and possibly six
IC_M's in tests ending in June 1957.
President Eisenhower, however, in a news conference on September 3, 1957,
expressed doubt that Moscow had developed an effective ICSM. He said
missiles had to be produced "in sufficient numbers and sufficient
reliability to be worthwhile tactically." He predicted that "for a long
time the long-range missile is not going to provide the best means of
delivering an explosive charge ." In the same vein, Secretary Dulles stated
on October 8 that Sputnik I represented "a good scientific achievement, "
but expressed doubt that it won Russia more than a propaganda• advantage.
It soon became public knowledge, however, that a report by the "Gaither
Committee" to the National Security Council stressed the vulnerability of
the United States in the face of Soviet missile advances. While President
Eisenhower refused to disclose its precise contents at the time, he later
wrote that the committee reported the Soviet Union had been producing
ballistic missiles with a 700-mile range for over a year; and that by late
1959 the Soviet Union could possibly launch an attack against the United
2
States with 100 ICe's.
The first U.S. attempt to launch an ICBM ended in failure on June ll,
1957, when an Atlas missile went out of control and had to be destroyed.
lIbid., p. 205.
2Ibid., p. 220-222.
On November 7, 1957, in the first of a series of nationwide talks on science
and defense, the President conceded "the Soviets are quite likely ahead in
some missile and special areas, and are obviously ahead of us in satellite
development .... " He asserted, ho_ever_ that the "overall military strength
of the Free World is distinctly greater than that of the Communist
countries." More specifically, Eisenhower asserted the United States was
"well ahead of the Soviets in the nuclear field both in quantity and in
quality" and intended "to stay ahead." He claimed that U.S. test missiles
had already travelled successfully more than 3,500 miles. The ring of U.S.
bases around the Soviet Union made an intermediate-range missile, for some
purposes, as good as an intercontinental one. Similar claims were re-
iterated by Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald A. Quarles on November 18.
But the Administration took a series of measures designed to accelerate
U.S. space and missile programs, managed, however, so as to have a "sound
,,i
defense and a sound economy.
Western Initiatives: Preventive Arms Control
Owing in part to Russia's anticipated lead in rocketry, the West took
the initiative in attempting to limit the use of outer space for propulsion
of military rockets from one part of the globe to another. The French
engineer-diplomat Jules Moch seems to have been one of the first to express
anxiety on this point in arms control negotiations. Significantly, this
expression of concern coincided with two other developments: (i) the U.S.
decision to assign a high priority to long-range rocketry; and (2) a
major turning point in the history of the post-war negotiations: Moscow's
disarmament proposals of May lO, 1955. The new Soviet position, Western
diplomats admitted, went some distance toward acceptance of principles
long advocated by the Western powers. Moch, however, challenged the
underlying principle and the details of the Soviet proposal for "international
control." Moscow's May lO position advocated:
llbid', PP- 224-225.
control posts at large ports, at railway junctions, on
main motor highways and in aerodromes. The task of
these posts shall be to see to it that there is no
dangerous concentration of military land forces or of
air or naval forces.
The International Control Organ would "have permanently in all states
signatories to the convention its own staff of inspectors having, within
the bounds of the control functions they exercise, unimpeded access at all
times to all objects of control."
Moch countered that "fixed control is a necessary, but not a sufficient
condition for security." The international inspectorate had to be free to
survey the entire country, not just certain parts of it. A basic reason
stressed by the British as well as the French delegate was that within two
years-- i.e., by 1957 --control posts at airfields would be inadequate to
1
prevent surprise attack by missiles and other modern delivery systems.
In 1955 Soviet negotiators did not respond directly to Western
arguments about the special significance of long-range missiles. An internal
contradiction permeated the Russian proposal of May lO. On the one hand
the Kremlin suggested a system of international control; on the other hand
it stated that "there are possibilities beyond the reach of international
control for evading th_s control and for organizing the clandestine manu-
facture of atomic and hydrogen weapons, even if there is a formal agree-
ment on international control." How did Soviet diplomacy propose to over-
come this dilemma? The Russian negotiators expressed the ostensible judgment
of Soviet strategic doctrine: Even in conditions of modern warfare aggression
cannot be effected by wonder weapons alone; aggression would still require
concentrations and movement of large military formations "through important
communication centers, ports and airfields."2 Second, Moscow held, it was
simply naive to demand absolute freedom for international inspectors. "The
failure of all past attempts to solve the problem of control," Soviet dele-
gate Sobolev argued, was "the consequence of an unrealistic approach...
_hich_ did not take into account the present state of international
relations..3
IDC/SC.I/PV.57, pp. 20-21; PV.59, PP. 39ff.
2 /sc.1/Pv.47, pp. 25-9.
3DC/SC.I/PV.56, pp. 37-42.
The spirit of Genevadissipated in 1955-1956and arms control
negotiations languished while the United States Governmentcontinued a
reevaluation of its arms control policy that terminated only in November
1956. As Washingtonbeganwhat it called an "intensified effort" in 1957,
U.S. spokesmenfocused muchof their attention upon safeguards against
surprise attack and--one aspect of this problem--arms control in outer
space.
AmbassadorLodge told the General Assembly in January 1957 that U.S.
policy sought "to ensure that research and development activities con-
cerning the propulsion of objects through outer space be devoted ex-
clusively to scientific and peaceful purposes." The United States was
concerned not only with "intercontinental missiles" and "long-range
unmannedweapons," Lodge indicated, but also with "earth satellites" and
"space platforms." As a first step to ensure that outer space would be
....... j for peace, Washington proposed that the testing of such objects
be brought under "international inspection and participation" in "fair,
balanced, reliable systems of control." Thesemoveswould be part of a
progressive installation of inspection systems which would provide against
the possibility of great surprise attack."l The sameobjectives were re-
iterated by Presidential Assistant Stassen at the DisarmamentSubcommittee
in March and by Secretary of State Dulles in a radio and television
address in July 1957.2
The Soviet Union seemedto negotiate seriously on someaspects of arms
control in 1957, particularly on the issue of a nuclear test ban. But
Moscow'sposition on long-range rockets appeared designed to protect what
both sides deemedto be a Soviet advantage. The Soviet proposals of
March 18, 1957, provided for general disarmament in two stages, the first
to be carried out in 1957-1958 and the second in 1959. No limitations would
be placed on guided rockets until the second stage, when:
1Documents on Disarmament_ 1945-1959, II, pp. 733-734.
2U.N. Doc. DC/SC.1/PV.88 (March 19, 1957), p. 30; Documents on Disarmament t
1945-1959, ii, p. 832.
Simultaneously with the elimination of atomic and
hydrogen weapons...international control shall be
instituted over guided rockets in order to ensure
that all types of such rockets which are suitable
for use as atomic and hydrogen weapons shall be
used exclusively for peaceful purposes. 1
In another proposa_ directed primarily toward reduction of conventional
forces, Moscow proposed on April 30, 1957 that states make a "solemn under-
taking to renounce the use for military purposes of atomic and hydrogen
weapons of all types, including aerial bombs, rockets carrying atomic and
hydrogen warheads, irrespective of range, atomic artillery, etc.'2
Clearly, if the West _anted to thwart the threat of Soviet IC_M's, the
Kremlin was also concerned to inhibit the bombs that could be dropped by
the Strategic Air Command and the tactical nuclear weapons being introduced
in NATO forces.
Detailed discussions of space arms control did not begin in the U.N.
Disarmament Subcommittee until July 25, 1957, when the Western delegations
suggested that a technical committee be established to study the design
of an inspection system to ensure that the sending of objects through outer
space would be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes .3 Moscow
countered by reiterating the relevant portions of the Soviet comprehensive
disarmament proposals of March 18 and the April 30 proposal to renounce the
use of all nuclear weapons including rockets. 4 But the West continued to
advocate the creation of a technical committee and in August 1957 submitted
a working paper calling for its establishment within three months. 5
iDocuments on Disarmament_ 1945-1959, II, p. 755.
2Ibid., II, p. 783.
_.N. DOc. DC/SC.1/PV.141 (July 25, 1957), P. 4.
4U.N. DOc. DC/SC.1/PV.141 (July 25, 1957), PP. 15-16.
5August 29, 1957; see Documents on Disarmament_ 1945-1959, II, p. 871.
Soviet Rejoinders: The Need for a Quid Pro Quo
Moscow's diplomatic posture was enhanced by its successful testing of
an ICBM and the launching of sputniks I and II in 1957. First Secretary
Khrushchev stated on October 7 that the Soviet Government would be willing
to subject earth satellites and unmanned missiles to international control
under a U.S.-Soviet agreement. He told James Reston of The New York Times
that there would be no difficulty over control of missiles or of any other
modern weapons if the United States and Soviet Union agreed on peaceful
coexistence. The fuller context of his remarks to Reston demonstrated,
however, that Moscow would readily rattle its rockets for foreign policy
objectives. Khrushchev accused the United States of trying to stir up war
over Syria and declared Washington was seeking to get Turkey to launch an
attack. In words aimed not only at Ankara, Khrushchev declared, "If the
rifles fire, the rockets will start flying." The First Secretary stated
+_o+_._some "v._. statesmen did not _^I_=.-.........ve _ __ reports about the
successful Soviet testing of an ICBM. He went on:
Now that we have successfully launched an earth
satellite, only technically ignorant people can doubt
this. The U.S.A. has no intercontinental ballistic
rocket, otherwise it wovld also have easily launched
a satellite of its own..L
The following month Khrushchev boasted that the Soviet Union could launch
as many satellites as it wished, and added: "It is only necessary to
2
replace the hydrogen warhead _f an IC___ with the necessary apparatus.
The U.S. State Department immediately rebuffed Khrushchev's bid for
bilateralism in space negotiations. Officials stated on October 8 that the
United States would join "multilateral" space-missile control talks but
would not participate in any "bilateral study" between Washington and
Moscow. John Foster Dulles declared later in the day that the United States
would be willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union in an international
study of ways to control space missiles and satellites, but he too rejected
the suggestion that they be controlled through bilateral agreement. He
added that any U.S.-Soviet study of satellites should be undertaken outside
1The New York Times, October 10, 1957; Pravda, October ll, 1957.
2Pravda, November 19, 1957, cited in Arnold L. Horelick, "The Soviet Union
and the Political Uses of Outer Space," in Joseph M. Goldsen (ed.), Outer
Space in World Politics (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher,_),
p. 45.
the disarmamentnegotiations under way at the United Nations. The U.S.
position was elaborated at the General Assemblywhen, two days later, along
with other partial measuresof disarmament, AmbassadorLodge reiterated
the U.S. interest in establishing a technical committee to deal with space
1arms control.
Overriding the negative vote of the Soviet bloc, a General Assembly
on November14 passed a resolution on disarmament generally endorsing
positions favored by the West, including the project of a joint study of
an inspection system to ensure that the propulsion of objects through outer
2
space would be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.
The Soviet Union was denied parity with the United States and could be
outvoted in the United Nations. But Moscowcontinued to take a forward nego-
tiating posture, buttressed by the sameevents that led MaoTse-tung to
assert in 1957 that the "East wind is prevailing over the West wind."
Thus, Premier Bulganln wrote to President Eisenhower on DecemberlO, 1957,
criticizing plans for "intensification of the military preparations of the
NATOmembers." Bulganin's main concern seemedto be with tactical nuclear
weaponsand with Western theories of limited war. If the West persisted in
stepping up the arms race, he warned, "who can guarantee...that it will be
the NATOmemberswho are the winners in such a competition?"
The Soviet Premier maintained that the step-up In NATOmiii_ry
planning was taking place in an
atmosphere of artificially created nervousness and fear
with respect to the imaginary "threat" from the U.S.S.R.,
and, in the effort to create such an atmosphere,
particularly wide use is being made of references to the
latest scientific and technical achievements of the Soviet
Union.
iDocuments on Disarmsm_nt_ 1945-1959, II, p. 902.
2General Assembly Resolution 1148 (XII): Regulation, Limitation, and
Balanced Reduction of all Armed Forces and Armaments; Conclusion of an
International Convention (Treaty) on the Reduction of Armaments and the
Prohibition of Atomic, Hydrogen, and other Weapons of Mass Destruction,
November 14, 1957; passed by a vote of 56-9-15.
I0
Bulganin cautioned:
I must frankly say to you, Mr. President, that the
reaction of certain circles in your country and in
certain other NATOcountries regarding the recent
accomplishmentsof the U.S.S.R. in the scientific
and technical field, and regarding the launching,
in connection with the program of the International
Geophysical Year, of the Soviet artificial earth
satellites in particular, appears to us to be a
great mistake.
Bulganin concededthat "the launching of artificial earth satellites bears
witness to the great achievement of the U.S.S.R., both in the field of
peaceful scientific research and in the field of military technology."
At the sametime he argued that
it is well knownthat the U.S.S.R. has insisted and
still insists that neither ballistic missiles nor
hydrogen and atomic bombsshould ever be used for
pu_rposesof destruction, and that so great an
achievement of the humanmind as the discovery of
atomic energy should be put to use entirely for
the peaceful development of society.
The Soviet Union, Bulganin averred, "has no intention of attacking either
,,i
the U.S.A. or any other country.
Bulganin's letter proposed nothimg regarding outer space, but it
called for an agreement not to use nuclear weapons and the cessation, as
of January i, 1958, of all nuclear tests for a period of at least two or
thr_e years. Further, he proposed that Britain, the United States, and
the Soviet Union refrain from stationing nuclear weapons in West or East
2
Germany.
Eisenhower's reply on January 12, 1958, turned down the suggestion for
an atom-free Central Europe on several grounds, among them, the fact that,
in Bulganin's own words, "the range of modern types of weapons does not know
of any geographical limit." The President rather focused on what he said
was a choice perhaps even more momentous than the decision a decade earlier
as to whether atomic energy would be used for peaceful purposes only.
iDocuments on Disarmament t 1945-1959, II, pp. 919-920.
2Bulganin explicitly endorsed the Rapacki Plan for an atom-free area in
Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Ibid., II, pp. 924-925.
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The issue in 1958, he said, "relates to the use of outer space.... There
are about to be perfected and produced powerful new weaponswhich, availing
of outer space, will greatly increase the capacity of the humanrace to
destroy itself." Eisenhower proposed that agreement be reached to use
outer space for peaceful purposes only. Heappealed for an end to the
testing of missiles in outer space and for a halt in the production of "such
weaponswhich would use or, more accurately, misuse, outer space..." More
generally, the President called for a cessation of the production of all
1
nuclear weapons.
Eisenhower's message was developed further by Secretary Dulles at a
news conference on January 16, 1958. Dulles called for an international
agreement, to be inspected by the United Nations, to ensure that any object
made for outer space would be for peaceful purposes rather than military.
He denied that the United States was merely trying to stop the Russians'
space program when they were ahead. In ten years the relative situation as
of 1958 would be "quite unimportant." Although the Soviet Union currently
led the United States in satellites, Dulles said, in missilry "the relative
status of our arts is a good deal of an enigma. ''2
The Soviet Union in 1958 came to formulate more precisely the _uid pro
quo it would demand in exchange for limitations on its ICSM program. In a
speech at Minsk on January 20, 1958, Khrushchev declared that the West would
have to agree to ban nuclear weapons and nuclear tests, and dismantle its
overseas bases before the Soviet Union would agree to discuss the peaceful
uses of outer space 3 A letter from Bulganin to Eisenhower on February 1
made the same point. In a letter to Bertrand Russell dated March 5, 1958,
and published in the Ne__EwStatesman, Khrushchev elucidated the Soviet
position:
iIbi____dd.,II, pp. 938-939.
21-bi___dd.,II, pp. 942-943.
3The New York Times, January 26, 1958, p. 3.
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We agree to discuss the control of cosmic space--
which is in fact the question of intercontinental
ballistic rockets. But it must be examined as
part of the general disarmament problem, including
the question of prohibiting nuclear weapons and
winding up the U.S. military bases surrounding the
Soviet Union.
Khrushchev explained that Moscow linked the question of overseas bases and
the peaceful use of outer space. The Soviet Union
now possesses the means of combatting the United
States of America, should the latter unleash war
upon us. The Soviet Union also had these means before
in the shape of intercontinental bombers, but the
ballistic rocket is, of course, an improved weapon.
The United States, Khrushchev charged, wanted "the prohibition of the
intercontinental ballistic rocket in order to put itself in a more ad-
,,i
vantageous position, should war break out.
This _--"-
_uS_u W_S reflected in a major Soviet proposal submitted to the
U.N. Secretary General on March 15, 1958, a document to which Soviet writers
and spokesmen have returned many times (citing it in 1966 as the origin
of the movement to demilitarize and neutralize outer space by international
agreement). The document bore the cumbersome title: "On the Banning of
the Use of Cosmic Space for Military Purposes, the Elimination of Foreign
Military Bases on the Territories of Other Countries, and International
Cooperation in the Study of Outer Space." The Soviet statement began by
citing the need to outlaw nuclear weapons and direct science toward peace.
It termed the joint studies being conducted under the International
Geophysical Year programme "a wonderful example of international cooperation."
As for President Eisenhower's proposal to ban ICBM's, however, Moscow found
that he ignored "other highly important aspects of the problem." The United
States hoped to rely upon the bombers and the short- and medium-range rockets
already in its arsenal, many of which were to be supplied to U.S. military
bases on foreign territories. Washington wanted to prohibit Soviet ICBM's
which "could be used...only by way of retaliation against targets in the
icited in Soviet Space Programs: 0rganization_ Plans_ Goals_ and Inter-
national Implications, Staff Report for the Use of the Committee on
Aeronautical and Space Sciences, U.S. Senate, (Washington, D.C. : U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 160-161.
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territory of the United States .... "
The Kremlin's statement continued:
One cannot fail to see that in raising the questions
of banning the use of cosmic space for military
purposes, the United States is making an attempt,
through a ban of the intercontinental ballistic rockets,
to ward off a retaliatory nuclear blow through cosmic space
while maintaining its numerous military bases on foreign
territories, intended for attacking the Soviet Union
and the peaceful States friendly to it with nuclear
weapons. Before the appearance of the intercontinental
rocket, many persons in the United States had counted
on American territory being relatively safe, believing
that the whole weight of the retaliatory blow in case
of war would fall on the allies of the United States on
whose territories American military bases are situated.
A Role for the United Nations
The Soviet note of March 15, 1958 to the Secretary General set down
four elements of what Moscow regarded as a balanced program of disarmament
and international cooperation, the third and fourth aspects of which directly
involved the United Nations:
1. A ban on the use of cosmic space for military purposes
and an undertaking by States to launch rockets into
cosmic space only under an agreed international
programme.
. The elimination of foreign military bases in the
territories of other States, primarily in Europe,
the Near and Middle East and North Africa.
3- The establishment within the framework of the United
Nations of appropriate international control over
the implementation of the obligations set forth in
paragraphs 1 and 2 above.
A fourth provision called for the establishment of a U.N. agency for inter-
national cooperation in the study of cosmic law. It would have four functions:
(a) to work out and supervise an agreed international p_ogramme for launching
intercontinental and space rockets with the aim of studying cosmic space;
(b) continue on a permanent basis the cosmic-space research being carried
out within the framework of the International Geophysical Year; (c) serve
as a world center for the collection, mutual exchange, and dissemination of
information on cosmic research; (d) coordinate national research programs
on space and help in their realization.
Moscow suggested that its proposal be discussed at a summit conference
so as to "reach agreement, at least in principle." But the same document was
also submitted simultaneously for consideration by the next U.N. General
Assembly. The Kremlin promised that agreement on the key points of its
proposal "would break the disarmament deadlock...promote an easing of
international tension...and the development of broad international
,,1
cooperation ....
The essential points of the Soviet proposal of March 15, 1958 were
reiterated by Khrushchev in a letter to Eisenhower on April 22; in a Soviet
memorandum of May 5 entitled "Proposals as to Questions to Be Considered at
the Conference with Participation of the Heads of Government"; a declaration
by Khrushchev at the Warsaw Pact meeting of May 24; in a nine-point list
of measures in the field of disarmament transmitted to the General Assembly
on September 9; and in a draft resolution advanced by Moscow at the United
Nations on November 7, 1958.
Articles supporting the March 15 Soviet initiative appeared in the major
Soviet law journal in July and in Izvestiia in September 1958. 2 The latter
article spelled out further the rationale for Soviet insistence on the simul-
taneous liquidation of overseas bases and the banning of cosmic space for
military purposes. Even short- and medium-range rockets, the article said,
"can leave the limits of the earth's atmosphere and fly through cosmic space.
The liquidation of military bases will create, consequently, an additional
guarantee that cosmic space will not be used for military purposes .... "
Thus, the peaceful character of shorter range as well as of intercontinental
rockets would be assured.
The Soviet Union reacted defensively to U.S. initiatives in outer space.
Early in September 1958, Ambassador Lodge submitted a memorandum requesting
the General Assembly to declare itself on "the separability of the question
iDocuments on Disarmament_ 1945-1959, II, pp. 973-977.
2A. Galina, "On the Question of Interplanetary Law," Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo
i Pravo, No. 7 (July 1958), pp. 52-58; A. Galina, "For Equal Collaboration
in the Peaceful Use of Cosmic Space," Izvestiia, September 17, 1958, p. 5.
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of the peaceful uses of outer space from that of disarmament. The
Izvestiia commentary on September 17 declared that the American plan was
"barren of the main condition of international collaboration stemming from
the basic principle of international law, namely, the principle of equal
and mutual benefit." The article concluded by quoting Khrushchev's
response to a suggestion that Moscow share information with the United
States on its rocket launchers:
The Soviet Union is ready to share information with
the U.S.A. in this area, to show, yes, and not only
to show, but at the same t_.e to sink in the sea all
ballistic rockets, in order to secure firm and
lasting peace ....But all of this under conditions of
disarmament...of peaceful competition...ol peaceful
coexistence for all countries ....
The United States and nineteen other countries followed on November 13,
1958, by submitting a draft resolution at the United Nations calling for the
2
establishment of a committee to study the peaceful uses of outer space.
Already on November 7 the Soviet Union had put forward a draft resolution
reproducing the four key points of the Soviet proposal of March 15. On
November 18, however, the Soviet Union dropped its insistence that peaceful
uses of space had to be conditioned on terrestrial disarmament. Moscow
introduced a resolution omitting the first three points of its March 15
proposal--those having to do with arms control in space and on earth--but
calling for the establishment of an International Committee for Cooperation
in the Study of Cosmic Space for Peaceful Purposes, the fourth element in the
proposal of March 15. The November 18 draft resolution, however, omitted a
key function suggested in March: that the committee work out and supervise
an agreed international programme for launching intercontinental and space
rockets. Instead the November 18 document provided only the coordinating
activities suggested for the U.N. agency in the March 15 proposal. 3
The partial convergence of the Soviet and Western positions, however,
did not lead even to a working relationship, for the Soviet Union insisted
iThe Christian Science Monitor, September 3, 1958, p. 3-
2U.N. DOc. A/C.I/L.220.
3Documents on Disarmament_ 1945-1959, II, pp. 1228-1230.
16
that the U.N. space committee be composed of four Soviet-bloc and four
...... _,,..,.,.,. _,J.,..L_..C J..t_U_J.O...L s_a_s, WLI..L.LC ULI_ w_b ,r.I_..LLL OEX5 for"
other criteria. The General Assembly finally passed a resolution on
December 13, 1958, establishing an ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses
1
of Outer Space. Eighteen states were to be represented, including the
U.S.S.R., Poland, and Czechoslovakia. But the Soviet bloc voted against
the resolution and proceeded to boycott the committee when it convened,
as did two of its other members, India and the United Arab Republic.
A year later, following Khrushchev's visit to the United States, the
Soviet Union agreed to a General Assembly resolution establishing a permanent
2
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Twelve member-nations
belonged to the anti-Communist alliances; seven adhered to the Soviet bloc;
and five were nonaligned. Almost two years passed, however, before the
Soviet Union agreed to attend a meeting of the committee, for Moscow still
contended that the panel was weighted in favor of the West. When the
committee finally met on November 27, 1961, the Soviet delegate demanded
that equal representation be given to Communist, Western, and neutral
countries. A compromise resolution on the work and structure of the
committee was passed unanimously by the General Assembly on December 20,
1961, and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space proceeded to
meet in mid-March 1962. 3
Thus, the operation of a special U.N. committee to deal with peaceful
uses of outer space foundered from 1958 to 1962 on procedural and consti-
tutional issues. This impasse did not however prevent individual nations
from raising the issues of outer space and arms control in other nego-
tiating forums. The United States, for example, persisted in September
1959 in efforts to separate the peaceful uses of outer space from the
broader problems of disarmament. 4 The Soviet Union, however, in
Khrushchev's address to the United Nations on September 18, 1959, came
iDocuments on Disarmament: 1945-1959, II, pp. 1304-130_.
2U.N. Doe. A/Res. 1472 (XIV), December 17, 1959.
3See Soviet Space Programs, pp. 167-169.
4Documents on Disarmament_ 1945-1959, II, p. 1446.
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down for general and complete disarmament. The new Soviet proposal offered no
special provisions on outer space except to stipulate that all nuclear
weapons and missiles would be destroyed in the third stage of the program
(while overseas bases would be eliminated in the second stage, a sequence
less generous to the West than previous Russian schemes) .1
Khrushchev in America: Moonlighting
Khrushchev's disarmament speech at the United Nations was one of the
highlights of his U.S. tour which gave rise to what was briefly known as
the "spirit of Camp David." The Soviet leader's arrival in Washington came
immediately after Russia's second lunar rocket, Lunik II, impacted on the
moon on September 12, 1959. Khrushchev presented Eisenhower with a replica
of the metal Soviet pennant that had been placed in the Lunik payload. His
speech at the Washington airport on September 15 offered a curious mixture
of upsmanship, implicit threats, and outstretched hand. He began by
assuring that his delegation came "with open heart and good intentions,"
and that the Soviet people desired "to live in peace and friendship with
the American people ." But he went on:
Before our visit with you, Mr. President, Soviet
scientists, engineers, technologists, and workers
gladdened us by the sending of a rocket to the moon.
Thus, a road has been laid from the earth to the
moon, and a container ._mighing 390 kilograms with a pennant,
on which is inscribed the coat of arms of the Soviet Union,
is now located on the moon. Our earth has become somewhat
lighter, and the moon has become some hundred kilograms
heavier. I am sure that this historical accomplishment of
Soviet peaceful science gladdens not only the Soviet
people, but all those to whom peace and friendship be-
tween peoples are dear ....
iIbid., II, p. 1472. The United Kingdom's proposal made one day before
Khrus-----hchev'senvisioned that in stage II there would be "agreement on a
system to ensure the use of outer space for peaceful purposes," but put
off to stage III a "ban on the use of outer space for military purposes."
Ibi____d.,II, p. 1451.
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Khrushchev did not avoid condescension:
We don't doubt that the remarkable scientists,
engineers, and workers of the U.S.A. who work in the
conquest of space will also place their pennant on the
moon. The Soviet pennant as an old inhabitant of the moon
will greet your pennant, and they will live in peace and
friendship, as must live in peace and friendship all
peoples living on our common mother earth who so
generously rewards us with her gifts. 1
The following day, September 16, Khrushchev jokingly parried a question
at a press conference as to whether it had been a coincidence that a Soviet
moon hit the moon on the eve of his trip to the United States. Replied
Khrushchev, "That is a simple, but I would say, a pleasant coincidence."
He denied, however, that the Soviet Union would make any claim to the moon.
The idea of such a claim could arise from a capitalist but not a socialist
mentality, the Soviet leader declared. The U.S.S.R. regarded the landing
on the moon as "our conquest," he continued, but maintained that by "this
'our' we understand the countries of the whole world; that is, we under-
stand this as your accomplishment and the accomplishment of all people
living on earth..2
Although Khrushchev made much of the Soviet space program during his
U.S. trip, he spoke only once of missiles, and then to _rn of the conse-
quences should the United States reject peacef-1 coexistence and persist
in cold war:
If you are not ready for disarmament and w_nt to go on
with the arms race, we accept that challenge, for we
now have the necessary strength and all the possibilities
to create modern weapons, as for the output of our
rockets, they are on the assembly line .3
The Soviet legal authority E. A. Korovin commented on Khrushchev's
disarmament proposal in an article "On the Neutralization and Demilitarization
of Outer Space" published in December 1959. Korovin maintained that the
Soviet GCD plan accorde_ with "the principles of socialistic humanism."
1Khrushchev also noted that the U.S.S.R. had recently begun construction of
an atomic ice-breaker. He stated: "We know, Mr. President, that the idea
of the peaceful use of atomic energy is close to your heart, and note with
pleasure, that in this area your goals correspond with ours." Mir bez
oruzhiia--mir bez voin (2 vols.; Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1960), II, pp. 85-86.
2Ibid., II, pp. 98-99.
3The New York Times, September 21, 1959. See also Arzold Horelick and Myron
Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 56-57.
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American proposals for prohibiting the military use of outer space,
however, were said to "aim not at disarmament, but at a redistribution
of armaments, moreover, one that is unilaterally advantageous for countries
that do not have long-range rockets." Korovin wrote that it was "not the
space rocket as such that endangers the security of mankind, but the
nuclear warhead which may be delivered by a space rocket, a rocket of any
possible range, a military aircraft, etc." For these reasons, he concluded,
banning "the use of military space rockets must coincide in time with the
dismantling of military bases in foreign countries and the banning of
,,1
atomic weapons.
By 1960 the event Western officials purported to fear In the mid and
late 1950's had come to pass: Both sides had begun not only to produce
but to deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles. Faced with an accom-
plished fact, Western arms control proposals now shifted to another area
in which strategic deployment might still be avoided: the orbiting of
weapons of mass destruction.
lInternational Affairs (Moscow), December 1959, PP. 82-83. Korovin's
conclusion seemed not to take into account the fact that Khrushchev's
proposal placed the liquidation of overseas bases prior to the destruction
of atomic weapons and military rockets.
2O
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As ICBM's became an operational hart of each m_perpower's inventory,
Western negotiators took the lead in proposing another kind of preventive
arms control: a ban on the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction. Again
they recalled the moral of atomic spread: action should be taken before
such weapons come into being and proliferate so widely as to preclude
effective control. The West continued to urge that outer space be used
exclusively for peaceful purposes, but the emphasis shifted to the specific
measure that seemed most feasible: the prohibition of bombs in orbit.
The 1960 GCD Plans: First Sta_e Controls vs. First Sta_e Destruction
The first Western proposals for a ban on bombs in orbit came in
early 1960. Newspaper reports indicated the West hoped that agreement
might be reached on this measure prior to the summit meeting scheduled for
Paris in May 1960 .i Whether this hope was seriously entertained or wh._t_e_.
it was leaked to the press in order to embarrass the Russians is uncertain,
for a negative Communist reaction was predictable.
Although the Western negotiators ostensibly hoped for an agreement on
2
outer space as a separate measure, their proposals were embodied in the
framework of a plan for general and complete disarmament (GCD) which the
five Western nations presented to the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament
on March 16, 1960 B Britain's David Ormsby-Gore explained the preventive
arms control rationale :
Today it Is unquestionably possible to put very large
weights, which could embrace nuclear weapons, into
orbit around the world. It is not yet possible to bring them
back to earth at a precisely selected spot.
He warned that the pace of scientific development might soon master the
problems involved in deorbiting such a weapon.
Then we shall have reached a point of no return. We
passed one such point in 1947 when we missed the
golden opportunity to ensure that nuclear energy was
not used for any but peaceful purposes.
iThe New York Times, March 17, 1960, pp. i, 3.
21bid.
3Text in Verbatim Records of the Meetings of the Ten-Power Disarmament
Committee (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Cmnd. 1152,
Miscellaneous No. lO, 1960) pp. 921-923.
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If agreement could be reached to ensure that nuclear weapons are never
put into orbit, then, "even when the scientists devise the means of
bringing orbiting bodies back to a predetermined point on the earth, the
fact need cause us no alarm. ''l
The Western GCD plan called for eight joint study projects to be
"undertaken immediately," the first two having to do with outer space.
Measures were to be studied that would assure
compliance with an agreement that no nation shall
place into orbit or station in outer space weapons
of mass destruction, including provision for on-site
inspection.
And second:
compliance with an agreement on prior notification
of missile launchings, according to predetermined
and mutually agreed criteria, and on declarations
to the International Disarmament Organization of
locations of launching sites, and places of manufacture,
of such missiles•
Upon "ouccessful completion" of the relevant preparatory studies,
the following measures were to be undertaken "as rapidly as possible":
stationing in outer space vehicles capable of mass
destruction to be effective immediately after the
installation and effective operation of an agreed
control system to verify this measure.
B. Prior notification to the International
Disarmament Organization of proposed launchlngs
of missiles according to predetermined and
mutually agreed criteria, and declarations of
locations of launching sites, and places of
manufacture of such missiles, with agreed
verification including on-site inspection of
launching sites and of such missiles.
As an "ultimate goal," to be achieved in a later stage, the Western plan
stipulated the need for "measures to ensure the use of outer space for
peaceful purposes only. ''2
llbid., p. 34.
2Documents on Disa_nt_ 1960 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961),
PP. 69-71; for an explanation of how these measures fit into the larger GCD
sequence, see Verbatim Records of the Ten-Power Disarmament Committee, pp. 28-33.
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Thus, the first of the two measuresproposed by the West represented
a new twist in space arms control: a prohibition against placing weapons
of massdestruction in orbit or on celestial bodies. The second measure,
prior notification of missile launchings, seemeddirected against military
rockets, whether or not they would go into orbit or fly directly to some
target. In both cases the underlying principle of "inspection first,
disarmament later" could hardly have been expected to be acceptable to
Moscow.
The New York Times reported that outside the conference room,
Communist comment on the plan was along these lines:
The West keeps insisting that it wants to maintain the
balance of power at every disarmament stage. But it
proposes quick action in the space field, where the Russians
believe they have the preponderance of power because they
can thrust heavier weights into space than can the West.
The Western proposal would shift the balance of power
unless St were accompanied by offers where the West feels
strong.
J.
Some Western sources, however, doubted whether the Soviets were so
confident as they appeared. Some held that "the Russians could put
greater weight into space than the United States but...the United States
might be ahead In the second part of the problem--the instrumentation
needed to guide a bomb from space to a target. ''2
In retrospect it seems likely that the most obnoxious feature of the
Western proposals for Moscow was their salient emphasis on on-site
inspection of launching sites prior to measures for the substantial
reduction of nuclear or conventional armaments. Since 1955 Moscow had
rejected Western proposals for "open skies" unless they were enacted
parallel with or even subsequent to actual disarmament. (Overflights of
Soviet territory by U-2 reconnaissance planes for several years prior to
the May 1960 summit meeting had already helped to demonstrate the West's
interest in strategic intelligence regarding Soviet missile production and
deployment. )
iThe New York Times, March 19, 1960, pp. 1-2.
2Ibid., p. 2.
The Soviet counterproposal was put before the Ten-Natlon Co._ittee
on June 7 (following the collapse of the Paris summit meeting) .i Earlier
the five Communist nations on the Committee had merely endorsed the Soviet
proposal of September 1959 calling for the destruction of all nuclear
weapons and missiles in the third stage of general disarmea_nt. 2 Now,
ostensibly in response to Western views, the Commnist-bloc called for
total nuclear disarmament in the first stage. While this change in the
timing of disarmament accorded with French preferences, it was unacceptable
to Washington or London. As the U.S. delegation later put it, "the Soviet
proposal would have required the free world to commit itself as a first
step to destroy within a matter of months its essential means of
collective self-defense. ,,3
In stage I of GCD Moscow now proposed that:
All means of delivering nuclear weapons will be
eliminated...their manufacture will be discontinued
and they will be destroyed. Such means include:
--strategic and tactical rockets, pilotless
aircraft of all types, and all military
aircraft capable of delivering nuclear
weapons.
Surface ships, submarines, and artillery "as well as all other means"
capable of being used as delivery systems for nuclear _rheads ?_mre also
included.
Second, the Soviet plan provided for the withdrawal of all foreign
troops and the liquidation of all foreign bases.
Third:
From the very beginning of the first stage and until the final
destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons, the
placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of any special
devices, the leaving of their territorial waters by warships
and the flying beyond the limits of their national territory
by military aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass
destruction, will be prohibited.
iThe Soviet proposal had been circulated to heads of state on June 2, 1960.
See Documents on Disarmament I 1960, pp. 107-108.
2See the statement of "Basic Principles" submitted by the Communist
delegation on April 8, 1960, Verbatim Records of the Meetings of the Ten-
Power Disarmament Committee, pp. 923-924.
3Official Rm1_-t of +.heT1_1+_a States Delegation to the Conference of tb_
_Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, U.S. Department of State Press Release,
August 5, 1960, No. 430, p. 6.
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Four th:
The launching of rockets will be carried out exclusively for
peaceful purposes and in accordance with predetermined and
mutually agreed criteria, and will be accompanied by agreed
measures of verification, including inspection at the launching
sites.
As a seventh step:
...launching sites, with the exception of those maintained
for peaceful purposes, will be destroyed under the supervision
of the international control organization.
Further:
International inspection teams dispatched by the control
organization will have the right to carry out a thorough
examination of rocket devices to be launched for peaceful
purposes, and to be present at their launching.
The first stage was to be completed within one to one and one-half
years.
Thus, Moscow shifted the elimination of strategic delivery vehicles
from the third to the first stage of general disarmament, and with it,
measures to ensure that outer space would be used exclusively for peaceful
purposes. The change of sequence was not however very helpful from the United
States standpoint. Arms control in outer space was too important a
matter to defer until the third stage of disarmament, but it was also too
urgent to hinge upon agreement on a system of GCD that destroyed all
strategic delivery vehicles in stage I. Like the nuclear test ban, arms
control in outer space _as a measure that warranted separate and immediate
attention, apart from the idyllic day when general disarmament would
commence. The revised Soviet GCD proposal of June 1960 was notable for the
extensive on-site controls it gave to the international inspectorate. But
if no agreement were attained on the sweeping measures proposed by Moscow,
limited arms controls on outer space and other areas would be foreclosed
or by-passed.
A revised U.S. proposal submitted on June 27, 1960, again called in
the first stage of GCD for a prohibition of the placing into orbit or
stationing in outer space of vehicles carrying weapons of mass destruction.
The proposal differed little from the Western proposal of March 163 except
that it called for some strategic arms limitations in stage I. Actual
reductions of strategic delivery vehicles would not take place until
stages I and II, but someagreed quantities of such weaponswould be
stored on states territory under IDCOsupervision in stage I. I
President Eisenhower attempted in September1960 to create some
momentumtoward dealing with outer space as a separate measureof arms
control. Addressing the U.N. General Assembly he noted that agreement
had been reached in 1959 to declare the continent of Antarctica "off limits"
to military preparations. "Wecould extend this principle to an even more
important sphere," the President stated. And he endorsed again the idea of
preventive arms control: "National vested interests have not yet been
developed in space or in celestial bodies. Barriers to agreement are now
lower than they will ever be again."
Before the "point of no return" had been passed, the President
proposed agreement on four points:
1. that celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation
by any claims of sovereignty.
2. that the nations of the world shall not engage in warlike
activities on these bodies.
3. that--subject to appropriate veriflcation--no nation will put
into orbit or station in outer space weaponsof mass destruction. All
launchings of space craft should be verified in advance by the United
Nations.
4. that international cooperation should take place in the peaceful
uses of outer space--meteorology, communications, and exploration--under
the United Nations .2
_he Soviet Union, however, seemedto take an increasingly intransigent
position in arms control negotiations in 1960-1962. This stance, it has
been argued,3 was primarily the result of Moscow's fear that a reverse
missile gap was being created that would weakenthe strong diplomatic
bargaining position the Kremlin enjoyed since Sputniks I and II in 1957.
1Documents on Disarmament_ 1960, pp. 129-131.
2Documents on Disarmament t 1960, PP. 225-226. The President's basic theses
were reiterated by Ambassador Wadsworth at the Geneva Conference of Nuclear
Weapons Tests on October 19. Ibid., pp. 321-322. Canada's Prime Minister
Diefenbaker added to Eisenhower's message to the United Nations that
frequencies for communications with space vehicles should be allocated on the
basis of rational and agreed bases. Address to the General Assembly on
September 26, 1960, ibid., p. 250.
3Bloomfleld, Clemens, Griffiths, op.cit.
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Hence, the Soviet Union broke off test ban negotiations in 1961 and
resumed nuclear testing in order to explode warheads several times larger
than any tested by the West. Although U.S. strategists generally argued
that such warheads were not more useful than larger numbers of smaller
bombs, the Kremlin seemed to use the tests as part of a campaign to
redress the psychological balance of terror in favor of Soviet strategic
power. On the other hand, although Moscow showed little interest in
specific and limited arms control measures in 1960-1962, it continued to
argue, contra Peking, the utility of general disarmament as a way of
disarming imperialism, boosting economic progress, ensuring peace, and
promoting wars of national liberation. Thus, in June 1960 the five
Communist nations walked out of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, but
Moscow reiterated its GCD proposal at the General Assembly in September,
quoting Lenin out of context as saying that "disarmament is the ideal of
__m ..and _+_ng +_ w_o+,_ proposal e_ seeking "_+_
,,i
without disarmament.
The New Frontier and Outer Space
There was both continuity and change in U.S. policy toward outer space
as the Kennedy administration replaced General Eisenhower's in 1961. The
new government in Washington attempted to counter the challenge of the
Soviet space program on three distinct levels. First, it determined to
make a massive inves_nent to give the United States "a clearly leading role
in space achievement, which in so many ways may hold the key to our future
on earth." In a May 25, 1961, address to the Congress on "urgent national
needs" the President said the United States would place a man on the moon
before the end of the decade.
Recognizing the head start obtained by the Soviets with
their large rocket engines, which gives them many months
of lead time and recognizing the likelihood that they
will exploit this lead for some time to come in still
more impressive successes, we nevertheless are required
to make new efforts on our own. For while we cannot
guarantee that we shall one day be first, we can
guarantee that any failure to make this effort will
make us last. 2
1Documents on Disarmament t 1960, pp. 231, 24_.
2Documents on Disarmament t 1961 (Washington:
1962), pp. 158-159.
Government Printing Office,
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The main break with the Eisenhoweradministration was "quantitative,"
but it had qualitative importance. The space budget was increased by
50 percent in 1961, and the following year it exceeded all the pre-1961
space budgets combined.1
Ona second level, the President invited the Soviet Union to Joint
cooperative programs in outer space. His initial State of the Union
address affirmed his intent to "explore all possible areas of cooperation
with the Soviet Union and other nations 'to invoke the wonders of science
instead of its terrors'." Kennedywent on:
Today this country is ahead in the science and technology
of space, while the Soviet Union is ahead in the capacity
to lift large vehicles into orbit. Both nations would
help themselves as well as other nations by removing these
endeavors from the bitter and wasteful competition of the
cold war.
The President invited all nations including the Soviet Union to join the
United States in cooperative programs for weather prediction, satellite
communications, and probes of distant planets, and to share this knowledge
so as to improve farm technology, wipe out disease, and increase scientific
_oope_o+_on+_._,,+ ÷_ world. 2
At the June 1961 meeting with ChairmanKhrushchev in Vienna, President
Kennedyoffered a suggestion more radical than any previously proposed by
the United States. He raised the question of a joint U.S.-Soviet expedition
to the moon. Khrushchev replied that the United States could better afford
to go to the moonfirst and then the Soviet Union would follow. In any
event the Soviet leader dismissed the importance of scientific coordination
on launchings which, in his view, were undertaken primarily for prestige.
Furthermore, he added, cooperation was impossible because Russia did not
want her rockets observed.3
1Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1_65), p. 526.
2State of the Union Address, January 30, 1961, in Documents on Disarmament t
pp. 19-20.
3Sorensen, op. cit., pp. 527-529; see also Alton Frye, "The Proposal for a
Joint Lunar Expedition: B_ckground and Prospects," Santa Monica, Calif. : The
RAND Corporation.
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In the samevein, Khrushchev told Cyrus Sulzber_er o_' The New York Times
in September 1961 that the United States had _de a "sensible proposal" in
suggesting that "an international agency be set up for cooperation in space
exploration." But in practice, Khrushchev continued, it would be impossible
to implement the U.S. proposal without reaching an agreement on disarmament.
The thing is that exploration of space is inseparable from the
use of intercontinental ballistic missiles. If we accept real
cooperation in the study of outer space we shall have to dis-
close the secrets of the production and working of rockets.
But no country will agree to this if its security is not
guaranteed, and such guarantees can be obtained only through
an agreement on disarmament .... Let us hope that we come to
such a reasonable solution. 1
The third level on which the Kennedy administration attempted to deal
with the problems of outer space was by continuing the efforts begun under
President Eisenhower to establish a ban on the deployment in space of
weapons of ma_s dest__iJction. In a major speech to the U.N- C_nera! Assembly
on September 25, 1961, Kennedy called for the extension of the rule of law
"to man's new domain--outer space." He saluted the "brave cosmonauts of
the Soviet Union" and declared that outer space must not become an arena
of the cold war. To this end, he said,
We shall urge proposals extending the United Nations Charter
to the limits of man's exploration in the universe,
reserving outer space for peaceful use, prohibiting weapons of
mass destruction in space or on celestial bodies, and opening
the mysteries and benefits of space to every nation.
He also reiterated the United States' intention to propose cooperative
2
efforts in weather prediction and satellite communication.
On the same day the United States submitted a substantially revised
version of her proposal for general and complete disarmament. It provided
for more actual disarmament in its first and second stages than the U.S.
proposal of March 1960. As for outer space, the objectives to be achieved
remained essentially unchanged:
iThe New York Times, September 8, 1961, p. ii.
2Documents on Disarmament_ 1961, pp. 470-471.
The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of
weaponscapable of producing mass destruction shall be
prohibited. States shall give advance notification to
participating States and to the ID0 _nternational
Disarmament0rganization_ of launchings of space vehicles
and missiles, together with the track of the vehicle.
The meansby which these goals would be monitored, however, were not spelled
out as in 1960, whenthe ban on spaceweaponswas to be preceded and
accompanied by on-site inspection of missile launchers. The control
features of the September 1961 proposal were rather discussed in a separate
chapter dealing with the International Disarmament Organization, which was
to
provide for the establishment of such bodies as may be
necessary for working out the details of further measures
provided for in the programme and for such other expert
study groups as may be require_to give continuous study
to the problems of disarmament.
Thus, the possibility existed that the United States might relax her
inspection requirements for space arms controls. But it was impossible to
determine whether only the wording or the substance of the U.S. position had
altered.
Limited Accords and Power Politics
Despite the generally dim auguries for arms control inherent in
Moscow's resumption of nuclear tests, the United States and Soviet Union
announced on September 20, 1961 a "Joint Statement of Agreed Principles
for Disarmament Negotiations." Among these principles was a provision for
the "elimination of all means of delivery of mass destruction"--a stipulation
that clearly included high-powered military rockets. Another agreed
principle was that the ID0 and its inspectors "should be assured unrestricted
access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective
verification." An exchange of letters issued the same day, however, put
the Soviet Union on record as "resolutely opposed to the establishment of
,,2
control over armaments.
IIbid., PP. 477-479.
2Documents on Disarmament_ 1961, pp. 441, 443.
30
A second area of general U.S.-Soviet agreement emergedafter Moscow,
on November27, 1961, ended its boycott of the U.N. Committeeon the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Soviet diplomats continued to complain
that the committee's composition was skewedto favor the West, but a
series of U.S.-Soviet consultations in December1961 resulted in agreement
on adding several states to the committee membership. More important, it
produced agreementon a draft resolution on international cooperation in
space which embodiedmost of the measuressuggested by U.S. spokesmenin
Novemberand December1961,I and someadumbrated in the Soviet proposal of
March 15, 1958.2 The Soviet bloc then joined the rest of the General
Assembly in unanimously endorsing this resolution on December20, 1961.
The documentdeclared that the General Assembly
i. (Calls upo_ States launching objects into orbit or
beyond to furnish information promptly to the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
through the Secretary-General, for the registration
of launchings;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to maintain a
public registry of information furnished in accordance with
paragraph 1 above ....
It is also commended to states "for their guidance in the exploration" of
outer space the following principles:
(a) International law, including the Charter of the
United Nations, applies to outer space and celestial
bodies;
(b) Outer space and celestial bodies are free for
exploration and use by all states in conformity with
international law and are not subject to national
appropriation .... 3
iSoviet Space Programs: Organization I Plans t Goals_ and International Impli-
cations, Staff Report prepared for the Use of the Committee on Aeronautical
and Space Sciences, U.S. Senate (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1962), pp. 166-167.
2See above, Chapter I. For an excellent survey, see Lincoln P. Bloomfield,
"Outer Space and International Cooperation," International Organization, XIX, No.
3 (1965), pp. 603-621, esp. 609-613.
_.N. Resolution 1721 (XVI), Documents on Disarmament, _96_, pp. 738-741.
The resolution also declared that the United Nations should provide a "focal
point" for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.
It invited the U.N. Outer Space Committee to "study and report on the legal
problems which may arise from the exploration and use of outer space." And
it called for an exchange of information on meteorology and communications
satellites, to be channeled through the U.N. Secretariat in cooperation with
the World Meteorological Organization, UNESCO, the International Tele-
communication Union, and other international bodies.
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The prlnci_le of registering space launchings had been suggested in
U.S. disarmament proposals since 1960. And there was a suggestion In the
March 1958 Soviet proposal for "an agreed international program for
launching intercontinental and space rockets," to be supervised by the
United Nations. The 1961 General Assembly resolution, unlike the Soviet
proposals to that time, called for notification apart from the realization
of any arms control measures. Moscow's attitude toward this measure became
somewhat clearer in March 1962 when Soviet delegate Morozov told the U.N.
Outer Space Committee that the Soviet Union would submit reports to the
United Nations on satellites and rockets "on the basis of mutuality. "l
On March 26 the Soviet Union submitted information on sixteen space flights,
including those of Gagarin and Titov, for inclusion in the U.N. public
registry. 2 But Western officials have frequently expressed disappointment
over the omissions, delays, and paucity of information transmitted in
subsequent Soviet reports. 3
Thus, the first aspect of President Kennedy's three-pronged
approach to the problems of outer space seemed to bear fruit. The inten-
sification of the U.S. space efforts seemed to spur Soviet interest in some
cooperative projects. Sorensen has written that "it was not until after
the orbital flight of John Glenn _February 20, 1962J that the Soviet Union
.4
for the first time showed any interest in space cooperation. True, in
May 1961 Premier Khrushchev, upon receiving Kennedy's congratulatory
iThe New York Times, March 21, 1962, p. 8. Already in 1957 and 1960 Soviet
representatives to meetings of the International Geophysical Year and the
International Council of Scientific Unions had participated in resolutions
recon_aending that states make detailed reports on spaceship launchings.
See Richard W. Porter, "A Comparison of the United States and Soviet Space
Programs," paper presented to seminar on Soviet space activities held by
George Washington University, Washington, D.C., March 30, 1965, mimeo., 3-5.
On ±\pril lO, 1962, a directive of the U.S. Department of Defense made
information on all military satellites classified. (The New York Times,
April 18, 1962, p. 14.) The Air Force gave little or no information on
the satellites it launched on February 27 and April 17, 1962.
2The New York Times, March 27, 1962, p. ll.
3Porter, loc. cit.
4S°rensen, oP. cit., p. 528.
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messageon the first Soviet mannedflight, had replied to the President
stating:
Like you I hope the U.S.S.R. and the United States of
America will work together in conquering space,
regarding this as part of the grea_ task of
establishing a world without arms.
But in February 1962 Kennedystated that "we have seen no evidence that we
would be able confidently in the last 12 months' that U.S.-Soviet cooperation
would take place. The President felt, however, that Glenn's flight madethe
prospects for such cooperation brighter. 2 On February 21, 1962, one day
after Glenn's flight, Khrushchev proposed in a congratulatory messagethat
both countries pool efforts to explore outer space. Kennedy responded on
Y_rch 7 with a five-point proposal for joint U.S.-Soviet space projects, to
which Khrushchev replied positively on March 21, adding still other projects
for discussion. 3
Khrushchev was careful to maintain a tough posture even while extending
his _d te.._-rd _o+_ _th _ TT_+_ _+o+_ _ _ .... _^--
.... _vv_ _ _v_
probably felt compelled to remind the U.S. President that the Soviet Union's
readiness for l_mited cooperation in space was in no sense capitulation to the
United States. While Western spokesmen now began to talk of a missile gap in
reverse, and attributed Soviet interest in space cooperation to Moscow's recog-
nition of Western capabilities in space, Khrushchev and his marshals now took to
boasting of another achievement of Russia's space technology: the "global
rocket." Indeed_ the Soviet Premier spoke at an election rally of this new
weapon only days before his _rch 20 letter to President Kennedy. Khrushchev
told his audience that "in recent years the Soviet Union did not let pass from
its hands the initiative in the search for a solution of the disarmament prob-
lem." But, he went on, the United States leadership did _ot comprehend the
dangers in modern war. _merica was becoming increasingly vulnerable, he said,
because Soviet "scientists have created a new intercontinental missile which
they call 'global.' This missile is invulnerable to anti-missile weapons.
(Applause)" Khrushchev declared that U.S. efforts to defend against a
iThe New York Times, May i, 1961, p. 30.
2Ibid., February 22, 1962, p. IO.
3See Soviet Space Programs, pp. 169-170; texts of correspondence in Arnold W.
Frutkin, International Cooperation inSpace (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 121-126.
Soviet strike over the North Pole were futile, for the
newglobal rocket can fly around the world in any
direction and deal a blow at any set target.
(Applause) The exampleof the flights of the
cosmic ships Vostok I and Vostok II proves the
accuracy of the calculations. (Applause)
U.S. defense efforts had been and would be of no avail, for "global
rockets can fly from the oceans or other directions where warning
facilities cannot be installed." They could not be spotted in due tlme to
take counter measures. Even if the U-2 flights had in fact identified
Soviet launching sites, Soviet missiles "can now fire from those positions
not across the North Pole but in the opposite direction. (Applause)"
The Soviet Premier took pains to reaffirm Russia's technological
prowess:
Our cosmic ships were the first to encircle cosmic
space. It is no longer the Russia of bast shoes. It is
the Russia of the 20th century, the Russia which has
advanced science and technology. (APplause)
But the thrust of this long speech was to justify the Soviet position
on general disarmamentand a nuclear test ban on which negotiations had
begun again in Geneva.1 And someof Khrushchev's virulence seemsto
2have been directed against Kennedy's recent warning that the United
States would resumenuclear testing if Moscowdid not accept a test ban
with on-site inspection. 3
Couching soft words among hard, Khrushchev's March 20 letter to
Kennedy reiterated Moscow's view that peaceful cooperation depended upon
progress toward disarmament:
...the scope of our cooperation in the peaceful
exploration of space, just as the scope of the
directions themselves, along which such cooperation
will be possible, depend to some extent on the
settlement of the disarmament problem. Prior to
achievement of agreement on general and complete
disarmament both eur countries would still be limited
in their possibilities to cooperate in the field of
ipravda, March 17, 1962; Radio Moscow, March 16, 1962.
2For Kennedy's statement of March 2, 1962, see Documents on Disarmament,
196____2(2 vols.; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), II, pp. 66-75.
30stensibly in order to clarify the concept of "global rocket" for its
readers, the Soviet weekly 0gonek asked (Continued on page 34)
3(Continued from page 33)
the following questions of G. I. Pokrovskii, the well-known military-
science writer professor, and Major General: What is a global rocket?
Howdoes it differ from ordinary rockets? Pokrovskii's answers appeared
in the March 25, 1962, issue of O__onek(No. 13, Pp. 30-31).
"Every ballistic rocket movesin a plane that passes through our
planet's center of gravity. Onceinjected into orbit, a satellite
revolves exclusively in its plane, independent of the shape of its orbit:
circul_r, elliptical, or even incomplete, i.e., less than one revolution.
"Thus, it is possible to go from one point of the terrestrial sphere
to another only along the two trajectories that lie in the sameplane:
over the shortest distance and over the longer one--more than a half
circumference. Rockets capable of overcoming distances that exceed half
a circumference and of enveloping the entire 'globe' of the earth are
called global.
"During the last few years there have been set up in the United
States of America two air defense belts protecting the country from the
Arctic. The first of the belts--preliminary detection and warning--
extended from Alaska through Greenland and Iceland to England.
According to its creators' intention, this belt, like a large rain umbrella,
was to have reliably protected the U.S.A. from nuclear rocket retaliation
which was supposedto comefrom the north. The second defense belt,
erected on the U.S.A.-Canadian boundary, was meant to neutralize military
aircraft and rocket forces crossing the boundary.
"Now, with the appearance of global rockets, the huge sumsof money,
wrung from the pockets of the average American, have proved to be 'money
spent in vain,' as U.S. Secretary of DefenseMcNamara cknowledged,* and
U.S. territory has proved to be absolutely defenseless from the south, the
east, and the west.
"The geography of the North American continent is such that the creation
of a defensive 'umbrella' south of the U.S.A. is out of the question.
Defense from the south is also complicated by the fact that the character
of the southern neighbors of the U.S.A. differs fundamentally from the
compliant character of the northern allies of the U.S.A., who are prisoners
of NATO.
"It is also not difficult to construct a series of orbital planes that
intersect the earth across the Pacific or the Atlantic Oceanwhere it is
practically impossible to realize early detection of a flying device, and
even more so to take defensive measures.
"One more feature of the global rocket should be noted: apart from
the high precision of striking a terrestrial target, it possesses the
capability of carrying a superpowerful nuclear weaponof great weight."
A check by RANDCorporation analysts of McNamarastatements prior to the
Pokrovskii article revealed no such acknowledgment. See Translations of
Political Interest_ 1962-1963, ed. Horst Mendershausen (Santa Monica,
California: Rand Corporation Memorandum RM-3078-PR , January 1964), p. 31.
The 0genek article, translated by F. J. Krieger, appears in this
collection, pp. 31-32.
the peaceful use of the outer military missiles and
spaceships, which are launched for peaceful purposes,
are based on the sameachievement of science and
technology.
Although space rockets require morepowerful boosters than military
rockets, "the principles of designing and production are the samefor both
military and space rockets." In conclusion, Khrushchev stated that the
prospects for cooperation "including joint development of spaceships for
reaching other planets--the Moon,Venus, Mars, will be considerably greater
whenagreement on disarmament is reached. ''l
The 1962 GCD Plans: Toward a Narrower Ga_
The GCD proposal presented by Moscow in March 1962 at the Eighteen-
Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva differed little from the Soviet
proposal of June 1960. All nuclear weapons carriers, whether tactical or
strategic, would be eliminated in the first stage. But a new paragraph
(in Article 5) was more explicit than the 1960 document in describing the
context in which space research would be permitted:
For the peaceful exploration of space the production
and testing of appropriate rockets shall be allowed,
provided that the plants producing such rockets, as
well as the rockets themselves, will be subject to
supervision by the inspectors of the International
Disarmament Organization.
And Article 15 reiterated the provision of the 1960 proposal that
inspection teams from the ID0 would carry out an on-site check of every
2
rocket launching. Despite these stipulations for international control,
however, the Soviet plan still remained unacceptable to the West for
many reasons, one of them being the requirement for all-out nuclear
disarmament within one or one and one-half years.
The United States presented its own outline for a treaty on general
disarmament on April 18, 1962. The outline was essentially an elaboration
of the previsions advocated at the United Nations in September 1961.
1The New York Times, March 22, 1962, p. 18, as quoted in Soviet Space
Programs, p. 342.
2Documents on Disarmament t 1962, I, pp. 107, ll3.
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Thus, spelling out in more detail the outer space measures to be enacted
in stage I, the April don..... + obligated the _'--_^-'_ _^........ _ agree to
four points :
(1)...not to place in orbit weaponscapable of
producing massdestruction ....
(2)...to support increased international cooperation
in the peaceful uses of outer space in the United
Nations or through other appropriate arrangements....
The third point required the signatories to provide advance notification to
the other signatories and to the ID0 together with the track of the space
vehicle or missile. 0nly under this third point was there a provision for
inspection:
_In_ accordance with arrangements which would be set
forth in the annex on verification, the International
DisarmamentOrganization would conduct pre-launch
inspection of space vehicles and missiles and would
establish and operate any arrangements necessary for
detecting unreported launchings.
A fourth point provided that the ID0 would also monitor agreed limitations
on the "production, stockpiling and testing of boosters for space
,,l
vehicles.
Thus, some ambiguity persisted as to Washington's views regarding
on-site launcher inspection as a condition for a prohibition on the
orbiting of weapons of mass destruction. Apparently the United States
envisaged the ban on bombs in orbit and the advance notification procedure
as integral parts of a package program for outer space. If so, a
prohibition of deployment of certain weapons in space would be conditional
upon Moscow's acceptance of launcher inspection. If, however, Washington
decided not to link the two measures with one another (or with other
aspects of its GCD program), there was again the possibility--inherent
also in the U.S. proposal of September 1961--that the prohibition might
iDocuments on Disarmament_ 1962, II, p. 360.
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be agreed to without on-site controls. I
Foreign Minister Gromyko commented on the U.S. proposals in a report
to the Supreme Soviet on April 24, 1962:
In submitting their proposal on missiles, the United
States representatives are evidently not in a
humorous mood, but their position is not very
different from one that was the butt of Mr. Rriand's
wit.
The French Foreign Minister, Gromyko recalled, had observed sardonically
during the interwar negotiations that London seemed to maintain that its
Admiralty built battleships only to catch herrings in the English Channel.
Similarly, Gromyko suggested,
the United States representatives are saying, as it
were, that they are not partial to Soviet rockets,
which travel too far and hit their targets too
accurately; they must be destroyed, but United States
atomic bomber bases scattered over the whole world
should be retained. For what purpose? FOr
meteorological observations?
Gromyko stated that U.S. negotiators at Geneva were raising "with daily
increasing insistence the question of the need to prohibit the use of
outer space for military purposes." Washington's insistence on this
matter had become more intense, said Gromyko, following Premier
Khrushchev's statement "concerning the construction of a global missile
in the Soviet Union." Gromyko declared that the Soviet Union favored the
prohibition of the military use of outer space. He noted that the Soviet
draft treaty on GCD contained "a special provision stipulating that the
launching of rockets and space devices shall be carried out exclusively for
peaceful purposes. However, this is not a matter which can be settled in
isolation from other disarmament measures." The United States representatives
1Secretary of State Rusk in addressing the Eighteen-Nation Conference in
March 1962 had cited two kinds of arms control that could be put into effect
without delay--a cut-off in the production of fishionable material for
weapons use and a transfer of such material to peaceful purposes. But he
also said that there existed "another area where action cannot be long
postponed." He urged that the U.S.-Soviet cooperative efforts in space
that were being developed as a result of correspondence between Kennedy
and Khrushchev be extended into the field of disarmament. He then proposed
the ban on bombs in orbit and the advance notification procedure outline
in the U.S. plan for GCD. Documents on Disarmament_ 1962, II, p. 193.
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at Genevawere raising this entire question again "in order to worst
intercontinental and global missiles and deprive the Soviet Union of the
most powerful meansof defense and of retaliation against an aggressor."
Washington's position, Gromykowarned, was not "calculated to promote
agreement" on disarmament.1
In July 1962 the Kremlin organized a Congress for General Disarmament
and Peace in Moscow. Premier Khrushchev addressed the convocation,
defending the Soviet and attacking the United States draft proposals for
general disarmament tabled at Geneva. He took particular pains to rebut
recent U.S. claims that the balance of power had shifted to favor the
West. Not only were such claims dangerous, said Khrushchev, they were
also groundless.
In order to secure her security the Soviet Union has
been forced to develop over the last few years nuclear
weaponsof 50, 100, and more megatons, intercontinental
rockets, a global rocket which is practically invulnerable
to defense and an anti-missile rocket. The ruling groups
of the United States which do not possess similar
powerful military weapons, have no reason at all to say
that the correlation of forces has changed in their favor.
Only by destroying and thus paralyzing all meansof nuclear delivery
systems from the very outset, said Khrushchev, could a solution be found
to the problem of disarmament. Moscowwould take this step, even though
it possessed "the world's most powerful global and intercontinental
missiles .... .2
Despite the apparent intransigence of the Kremlin's position on
general disarmament, its negotiating stance was altered in several ways
in the summer and fall of 1962 to bring it more in line with Western
proposals .3 The most significant change occurred on September 21 when,
in a speech to the General Assembly, Foreign Minister Gromyko endorsed
the "nuclear umbrella" idea that had been expounded by U.S. scientists
iDocuments on Disarmament_ 1962, II, pp. 431-452.
2N. S. Khrushchev, Vseobshchee i ___lnoe razoruzhenle--garantiia mira i
bezopasnosti vsekh _arodov (Moscow:_spolitizdat-------------71962), pp. 6--_--_.-
3See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Second Annual Report to
Congress_ January 12 1962-December 31; 1962 (Washington, D.C., 1963), P. 14.
For a potentially significant change in Moscow's position on the test ban
issue in late August 1962, see Bloomfield, Clemens, Griffiths, op. cir.,
pp. 185-186.
at a Pugw_sh Conference in Moscow two years earlier, some of whom had
subsequently joined the Kennedy administration. Gromyko stated that his
government was willing to have the Soviet Union and United States
retain in their territory until the end of stage I of GCD an agreed, limited
number of ICBM's, anti-missile missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles in the
1
ground-to-air category. Soviet spokesmen generally refused to discuss
2
this point in more detail until the West officially agreed to it in principle.
On March 27, 1963, however, the Soviet delegate elucidated that Moscow would
permit inspection of missile launch pads as part of a comprehensive dis-
armament program. 3 And the Kremlin went on in September 1963 to propose
that the two superpowers retain a nuclear umbrella until the end of the
4
third and final stage of general disarmament.
Moscow's acceptance of the nuclear umbrella principle in September 1962
was part of a series of concessions by both sides on a range of arms
control issues that took place in the weeks preceding the Cuban missile
crisis. Both the West and the Soviet Union showed considerably greater
flexibility in their negotiating stance on nuclear test ban in late
August-early September 1962. 5 Peking has also revealed that it received
word from Moscow on August 25 that the Kremlin had responded "affirmatively"
to a secret proposal by Secretary Rusk for an agreement on the non-
6
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
A revised version of the Soviet draft treaty incorporating this and other
changes in the Soviet position since _rch 1962 was circulated by the U.N.
Secretariat on September 24, 1962 as U.N. Document A/C.I/867.
2ENDC/PV.8B, November 26, 1962, p. 22.
3_oc/PV.ll4, March 27, 1963, pp. B9-40.
4Documents on Disarmament I 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1964), p. 516.
5See Bloomfield, Clemens, Griffiths, op. cit., pp. 185-186.
6See Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "The Nuclear Test Ban and Sino-Soviet
Relations," Orbis, X, No. 1 (Spri'_ 1966), pp. 154-159.
4O
This exchangeof views between Moscowand Washingtonwas paralleled
by still other movesin quiet diplomacy, one uf w,1-_ p;_oved uu be
crucial in setting the stage for an accord reached in 1963 on the
stationing in space of weapons of mass destruction. In the weeks before
the Cuban crisis Washington indicated to Moscow its interest in banning
the orbiting of such weapons, even without on-site inspection of launching
sites. This fundamental change in the U.S. position was the more pro-
nounced because it came shortly after London presented a working paper to
the Eighteen-Nation Conference which adhered to earlier Western positions
on the need for on-site controls. The U.K. document, entitled a "Preliminary
Study of Problems Connected with the Elimination of Rockets as Nuclear
Delivery Vehicles," posed two alternative courses in order to assure "against ag-
gressive developments in space": (i) either "all space projects should
be brought as soon as possible under some comprehensive organization for
international collaboration", or (2) failing this, the International
Disarmament Organization would have to subject all satellites
and spacecraft to inspection at all stages of design and launching, a
task which would require a "very large number of additional inspectors. ''l
In view of the British study and the large range of other matters
under negotiation, all moving in counterpoint to the mounting Cuban crisis,
the shift in the U.S. position on Banning bombs in orbit seems to have
received little attention in 1962, although Moscow returned to it in the
latter part of 1963.
iThe U.K. paper emphasized the difficulty in distinguishing between
military rockets and rockets intended for the peaceful exploration of
space. It also noted the possibility of hidden stockpiles, concealed
launching sites, and clandestine production of missiles. The problems
that would confront the IDO were suggested by the fact that over i00
satellites had been launched up to mid-1962, 50 of which were still in
orbit. Sputnik IV, weighing i0,000 ibs., had an estimated life of
2-3 years. Midas II (5,000 ibs.) had an estimated life of 8-15 years.
Documents on Disarmament 2 1962, II, 701-705.
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III. THESOVIET-U.S."UNDERSTANDING,"1963
The Strategic Backdrop
The 1962 shift in the U.S. position on the need for on-site inspection
of a ban on bombs in orbit came in the wake of a reappraisal of the overall
strategic balance that Washington concluded favored the United States--not
the Soviet Union. The shift coincided with major policy statements
indicating that Washington deemed it dangerous, costly, and superfluous
to extend the deterrence systems of either superpower into outer space.
Thus, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric declared on
September 5, 1962:
Today there is no doubt that either the United States
or the Soviet Union could place thermonuclear weapons
into orbit, but such an action is just not a rational
strategy for either side in the foreseeable future.
We have no programme to place any weapons of mass
destruction into orbit. An arms race will not
contribute to our security. I can think of no
greater stimulus for a Soviet thermonuclear arms
effort in space than a United States commitment to such
a programme. This we will not do.
He warned, however, that the United States "will, of course, take such
steps as are necessary to defend ourselves and our allies, if the Soviet
,,i
Union forces us to do so.
Similarly, discussing the U.S. position on peaceful and scientific
cooperation in outer space before the First Committee of the General
Assembly in December 1962, U.S. representative Gore declared that "even
though it is now feasible, the United States has no intention of placing
weapons of mass destruction in orbit unless compelled to do so by actions
of the Soviet Union." While noting that the U.S. draft treaty on general
disarmament included a provision against the orbiting of weapons of mass
destruction in space in the first stage of disarmament, Gore said nothing
about such a provision as a separate measure. He stressed, however, that
even while negotiations continued on the actual elimination of nuclear
weapons and delivery systems,
iDocuments on Disarmament t 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1964), p. 537.
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it is especially important that we do everything
now that can be done to avoid an arms race in outer
space--for certainly it should be easier to agree
now not to arm a part of the environment that has
never been armed than later to agree to disarm parts
that have been armed.
The United States therefore expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would
"likewise refrain from taking steps which will extend the arms race into
,,I
outer space.
One indicator of the seriousness of the Gilpatric and Gore statements
was the cancellation by the Defense Department in December 1962 of plans
for immediate development of "Project Saint"--a program for an interceptor
satellite capable of finding and inspecting a potentially hostile space-
craft. Already three years in the making, Project Saint was scheduled for
test flights in 1963, but was now to be reoriented for longer-term
objectives. The Defense Department was reported to believe that the
threat of offensive uses of satellites was undefined and remote; and
that the offensive mission of a bomb-carrying satellite could be
accomplished more easily and cheaply by ground-based weapons. The Air
Force, it was said, had now acquiesced in this evaluation. When its
Project Saint had begun in 1960, the aim was to produce a maneuverable
satellite capable of making a rendezvous with a satellite, inspecting it
by electronic means, and neutralizing or destroying it if necessary.
Under the revised program this capability would not be realized until at
least 1968, the earliest date a positive military threat was expected
2
from enemy satellites.
The rationale for U.S. restraint was spelled out more clearly by
another military analyst quoted in The Christian Science Monitor as it
reported the Gilpatric speech:
iDocuments on Disarmament s 1962 (2 vols.; Washington:
Office, 1963), II, p. 1122.
2The New York Times, December 4, 1962, p. i.
Government Printing
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Any space-based weapon one can devise today comes
out to be more expensive, more complex, less
reliable, and harder to maintain than an equally
effective and destructive earthbound weapons
system such as a nuclear-tipped ICBM. 1
Perhaps there were two audiences intended for these pronouncements
from Washington. One was the domestic audience of military, congressional,
and industrial leaders criticizing the administration for lagging behind
the Soviet Union in the military applications of space. There had been
mounting pressure on the administration to step up its military space
program (then costing $1,500,000 annually in addition to the $3,500,000
earmarked for NASA), particularly from the Air Force. Deputy Director of
Air Force Operations Major General John K. Hester told a congressional
committee that "radar surveillance support for space systems such as a
satellite inspector or space counterweapon system will require a world-
wide system to detect, track, and catalogue all objects in space."
Similarly, Air Force research director Lt. General James Ferguson told
the House Space Committee that the Soviet Union could put a nuclear warhead
into orbit without its being detected by the United States. Ferguson
_+°+_ that ,._ow_... had -_^_-_'" demonstrated its intei_st in the military
uses of space. He calculated that a space vehicle in orbit with a
warhead could attack in half the time needed by an ICi_4. Senator Cannon
of Nevada declared it was a "wholly fallacious and fearsome misconception"
to believe that Moscow would refrain from entering a space arms race if
Washington did the same. It was only a matter of time, he contended,
until military spaceships engaged in dog fights as aircraft did in World
War II. 2 In August the same Senator had urged a six-point program to
speed up military space development, including increased emphasis on the
manned DynaSoar vehicle and acceleration of the Titan III missile to lift
military payloads. "The emergence of the nuclear bomb and the ballistic
missile," he asserted, "has completely disrupted the balance between time,
.3
space and destructive power.
iSee The Christian Science Monitor, September 6, 1962.
2Ibid.
3The New York Times, August 20, 1962.
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A second audience addressed by Gilpatric and other administration
spokesmen was in Moscow. While the Kremlin preached genes! d_s_rm_ment
and made some conciliatory moves toward partial measures in 1962, it also
continued to exploit its space program for military-threat purposes, for
example, warning of the military implications of its orbiting of
"heavenly twins .,.i More important perhaps were the mounting indications
in 1962 of Soviet interest in the direct military applications of outer
space. Khrushchev's boasts of a "global missile" in March were paralleled
and followed by a number of articles in the Soviet military press warning
that the Pentagon was engaged in an intensive program of space weaponry
against which the Soviet Union had to take "corresponding measures."
Two articles by Lieutenant Colonel V. V. Larionov in Red Star in
March 1962 indicated not only that the Soviet Union had to take corres-
ponding measures against the preparations of the U.S. imperialists to
use space for military purposes; they also stressed that Soviet space
technology for launching satellites and ballistic rockets was far
superior to American--a clear suggestion that the Soviet Union could
achieve pre-eminence in this field.2 In the second article Larionov
noted that discussion in the press of "various countries" emphasized
"the growing implications of cosmic means of combat." He continued:
It is considered that the conquering of outer
space is unfolding a new sphere of activity for
strategy, and significantly broadens its
possibilities for the achievement of strategic
results independent of the outcome of conflicts
in the atmosphere, on the ground, or at sea.
Soviet strategy, Larionov declared, recognized that in the 1960's the
possibilities of solving strategic-technological problems had broadened.
In connection with this, it is recognized in
military strategy tb_t cosmic armaments will
become first of all a means for resolving
strategic problems, since its action cannot be
connected with any specific ground, sea or air
theater of military operations.
iSee _The Christian Science Monitor, September 6, 1962.
2"Missiles and Strategy," Krasnaia Zvezda, March 18, 1962; "Outer Space
and Strategy," Krasnaia Zvezda, March 21, 1962.
• 45
While the Soviet Union held a commanding lead over the United States in
payload-booster capability and U.S. defenses were powerless against
global rockets,
it must be clear to the Soviet reader that the stormy
temple of scientific and technological progress
requires continuous attention...Therefore, even though
today one cannot yet speak of a complete conquest of
outer space as a new and fully-mastered sphere of
military operations, one must clearly see the
prospects that are opening in the field of military-
technical e_ulpment and military strategy _n
relation to/ those aggressive plans hatched by the
ruling circles of the leading imperialist states. 1
In September 1962 the same ideas appeared, only somewhat muted, in
the treatise Militar_ Strate_ edited by Marshal Sokolovskii, to which
Colonel Larlonov was a major contributor. The book contended that the
United States was developing several space bombardment systems which
Washington planned to launch into orbit "when war threatens, in order to
deliver nuclear blows on targets in socialist countries at a command from
earth. ''2 The imperialists "subordinate space research to military
purposes and...plan to use space to accomplish their aggressive purpose--
a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union and the other socialist
l"outer Space and Strategy," loc. cit.
2These systems were said to include a bombardment satellite equipped with
space-to-earth missiles; piloted space bombers (DynaSoar); piloted
bombers for operations at great heights; and an orbital bombardment system
for the destruction of ground targets. V. D. Sokolovskii (ed.), Soviet
Military Strategy, Translated and with an Analytical Introduction by
Herbert S. Dinerstein, Leon Gourd, Thomas W. Wolfe (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. :
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 426. In another part of the book,
(Pp. 176-179), however, a discussion of U.S. plans for military space
vehicles planned for 1960-1975 treats them as "strategic" weapons, but
lists only "support" systems such as Samos except for one potential
bombardment system: the DynaSoar project (which was cancelled in late 1963).
An updated discussion of the U.S. space program, including other alleged
bombardment space systems, appeared early in 1963. See Major General B.
Teplinsky, "Pentagon's Space Programme," International Affairs, No. 1
(January 1963), pP. 56-62.
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countries ." Consequently,
Soviet military strategy acknowledges the need to
study the use of space and space vehicles to rein-
force the defense of the socialist countries ....
It would be a mistake to allow the imperialist camp
to gain any superiority in this area. The im-
perialist must be opposedwith more effective weapons
and methodsof using space and defense.I
It seemslikely that Khrushchev was confronted by a faction urging him to
2go further or faster in developing space weapons. It mayhave been that
the decision to send missiles to Cubawasmotivated in part by a desire
to deflect such pressures. In any event Washington's assurances that the
iSokolovskii, op. cit., pp. 426-427.
2Although the causal and even the sequential evidence is not entirely clear,
an apparent clash between a "military space lobby" and more conventional
" _ " " kir_ _-- _moaeluulsts see to ---" on and -^- _.._n _^.>_+. _.. _o_
suggested in research by Herbert L. Sawyer at the Fletcher School of
Diplomacy. Khrushchev himself may have led the latter group. On
August 7, 1961, at the height of the Berlin crisis, Khrushchev argued that
defense expenditures had already been raised, but that the resources
devoted to military purposes were now sufficient: "Our rocket technology...
is going well, and therefore it is unnecessary for us to set aside additional
resources _or this purpose_. Also, we are paying the necessary attention
to other aspects of military technology." (N.S. Khrushchev, Kommnnism--mir,
i schast'e narodov _ vols.; Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1962_, I, p. 344.)
The same month, however, an article in a military journal warned that, as
part of the general threat of aggressive imperialism, the U.S. space program
was being oriented for military purposes. "This circumstance," the article
contended, "forces the Soviet Government to divert some of the efforts
directed toward the development of rocket technology to the creation of new
kinds of armaments." (Lt. Col. V. Liutyi, "Put' v kosmos," Voenno-
istoricheskii zhurnal, No 8 _ugust 1961_, p. 36.) In the same spirit, it
is possible that the Larionov articles in March 1962 clashed with Khrushchev's
views: while the Premier sought to rely on the existing global rocket
capability, and w_s ready for some peaceful cooperation with the United
States, Larionov warned of the Pentagon's aggressive intentions and suggested
that Soviet military space programs should be developed beyond the global
rocket. In a quite different vein an unsigned article published in the
journal of the Academy of Sciences in April 1962 commended Khrushchev (by
name) for his moves toward cooperation with the United States in space.
Such cooperation, it held, was "necessary" and "would lessen the risk of the
military utilization of space." ( Godovshchina kosmicheskogo poleta
cheloveka," Vestnik adademii nauk SSSR, XXXII, No. 4 _April 196_, p. 14.)
United States did not intend to put offensive weapons systems in space
could serve in part to countervail the impression created by statements
from military and industrial leaders calling for a more aggressive U.S.
space program.
After the Cuban crisis there continued to be signs that Moscow was
working on weapons systems in space. In February 1963 the Chief of the
Soviet Strategic Missile Forces, Marshal Sergei S. Biriuzov, hinted at a
possible Soviet development of a bombardment satellite. He declared that
the success in the development of Soviet arms and
their high quality, reliability, and precision are
witnessed also by the rockets used in the exploration
of the cosmos. It has now become possible, at a
command from earth, to launch rockets from a
satellite at any desired time, and at any point in
the satellite's trajectory. 1
In March Biriuzov was designated Chief of Staff of Soviet Armed Forces, a
position which he held until his untimely death in 1964. 2
Although Washington did not consider it necessary or desirable to
place bombs in orbit, Defense Secretary McNamara testified in January 1963
that the Soviet Union "may now have or soon achieve" the ability to put
bomb-carrying satellites into orbit. T_hile he did not consi__er it logical
for Moscow to pursue such a course, McNamara stated that "_e cannot ignore
the possibility of that kind of a threat arising in the future, and we must
make the necessary preparations now to counter it if it does develop." He
declared that the North American Defense Command was already cataloguing
all objects in space, and that work was continuing on the satellite in-
spector project to determine the nature and mission of orbiting objects. 3
iRadio broadcast, February 25, 1963. Between "solution of a problem" and
deployment there could of course be a long road. As for the accuracy of
Soviet long-range rockets tested in the Pacific in _y 1963, a Russian
Naval Commander told TASS that "our rocketeers scored a bull's eye."
(Reuters dispatch from London on _y 29, 1963.)
2His actual appointment may have been made weeks before the announcement.
Western experts believed that his replacement of Marshal Zs/_harov, though
the latter was age 65, might portend increased Soviet emphasis on rocketry.
Biriuzov also claimed in February that the Soviet Union had solved the
problem of destroying enemy rockets in flight. (The New York Times,
March 29, 1963.)
3The Christian Science Monitor, January 31, 1963.
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Gilpatric's September1962 statement mayalso have aimed at
inhibiting Moscowfrom attempting a space spectacular that might amount
to a "quick-fix" to redress the Soviet bargaining posture which had been
undermined by U.S. long-range claims of a four-to-one American lead in
long-range delivery systems. The Kremlin had often attempted to enhance
its political position by dramatic moves, not always reflecting the
substance of existing military strength, but designed at any rate to
register the maximumrespect for Soviet prowess. Indeed, at the very
momentof Gilpatric's speech, Moscoww_s clandestinely attempting to
emplace IR_M's in Cubaas an inexpensive and rapid meansof overcoming
the U.S. lead in ICBM's. While military analysts concededthe substantial
change the Cubanmissiles would have brought in Moscow's strategic posture,
President Kennedywas apparently more concerned about their psychological
and political impact.1 At a minimumthe Kennedyadministration mayhave
..... I- 3- I ........
_u_lu u_ the Gilpatric and _ statements, and thu reorientation of *_-
Saint Program, to assure the Kremlin that the United States did not plan
to carry the arms race Into space--at least not for the time being or
unless provoked to do so by Soviet moves.
Soviet representative Morozov responded immediately to Gore's statement
at the United Nations on December 3, 1962. Morozov concentrated primarily
on rebutting the U.S. position on various legal issues on cooperation in
outer space. As for the specific problem of arms control, Morozov declared
only that all delivery systems for nuclear weapons had to be prohibited in
the first stage of general disarmament. This attitude was certainly a
continuation of the Soviet line that arms control in space could not be
settled apart from terrestrial disarmament, but Morozov's statement amounted
to a retraction of Gromyko's proposal in September allowing a limited
nuclear umbrella to be maintained by the two superpowers in the first
stage of disarmament. 2 More likely, however, it was probably just an
inaccurate, oversimplified statemer_t of the Kremlin's current position.
1See Sorensen, op. cit., pp. 678 ff.
2_cuments on Disarmament I 1962, II, p. 1133.
The Spirit of Moscow and the Moon
While some progress was made on bilateral U.S.-Soviet cooperation in
1
space science, and while negotiations on a test ban began to move from
dead center, the winter of 1962-196 3 saw little or no narrowing of the
Western and Soviet positions on the legal aspects of cooperation in outer
space. A U.N. General Assembly Resolution of December 14, 1962, went
so far as to express regret that the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space "has not yet made recommendations on legal questions connected
with the peaceful uses of outer space." The resolution could only recom-
mend that the Committee return to the drafting table and consider the draft
declarations and agreements proposed by the Soviet Union, the United States,
the U.A.R., and the United Kingdom. 2
Perhaps the most comprehensive space arms control proposal ever pre-
sented was outlined in a draft treaty put forward by Mexico before the
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on June 21, 1963. Its broad terms
implied that, although Mexico may have consulted with Washington and
Moscow in advance, the draft's provisions were probably unacceptable to
either superpower. Article I would have ruled out not only weapons of mass
destruction but all other weapons in space, including anti-satellite and
anti-missile defenses:
Every military measure, among others, such as the
placing in orbit and the stationing in space of nuclear
weapons or weapons of mass destruction or of vehicles
capable of delivering such weapons, is prohibited.
Tests of such weapons, or of any other warlike device
for military weapons, are likewise prohibited, as is
also the stationing or placing in orbit of bases for
launching weapons of any type whatsoever.
The same article did, however, permit "employment of military personnel
or equipment" for scientific or other peaceful purposes in space--a
fundamental requirement for the continuation of either the Soviet or the
U.S. space programs as then organized.
iSee, e.g., The Christian Science Monitor, December 7, 1962 and March 23,
1963; The New York Times, May 23, 1963.
2Ibi____dd.,II, pp. 1232-1233.
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Article III required that the signatory states report to each other
through the United Nations _'any act or activity carried out for the
purpose of the peaceful utilization and exploitation of outer space, and
likewise the launching of any device, and the specifications of that device."
Disputes under the treaty were to be settled solely by peaceful means,
but Article V established a sweeping enforcement authority that seemed to place
initial responsibility upon individual states--a delegation to which Moscow in
particular might react with sensitivity. Each contracting power would be obliged
to make appropriate efforts, compatible with the
Charter of the United Nations, to ensure that no one
shall carry out in outer space or on celestial bodies
any activity contrary to the...Treaty. I
The Mexican proposa3 was too radical for acceptance by Moscow or
Washington; in any case it was eclipsed as world attention shifted to the
tripartite negotiations on nuclear testing. A major move on space arms
control and arms control generally was the signing of the Moscow Treaty on
August 5, 1963, prohibiting_ nuclear testing "in the atmosphere- be yon_ _¢_
limits, including outer space; or underwater...."2 Both superpowers seemed
anxious to find other areas of accord as well. Moscow had dropped its
insistence of an East-West non-aggression pact as a condition for the test
ban, but Washington and London pledged that they would at least consult
their other NATO allies on the possibility of such a pact. The United
States raised with Moscow the possibility of nonproliferation measures, but
the Kremlin showed little immediate interest. 3 Senator Joseph S. Clark,
among others, suggested that "the international exploration of outer space
should be the second step toward world peace after the Senate acts on the
limited test ban treaty. ''4 Moscow also seemed interested in this possibility.
Moscow's interest in space cooperation and arms control arrangements
with Washington was manifested in several ways. But first there was some-
thing of a false alarm. 0nly July 23, 1963, British astronomer Sir Bernard
Lovell wrote to Dr. Hugh Dryden at NASA that he had just spent from
June 23 to July 15 in the Soviet Union as a guest of the Academy of
iDocuments on Disarmament_ 196 3 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964)
PP. 239-242.
2Documents on Disarmament_ 1963, p. 292.
3For background, see Bloomfield, Clemens, Griffiths, oF. cit., pp. 189-193;
Sorensen, op. cit., p. 743.
4The Christian Science Monitor, August i03 196 3.
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Sciences. Lovell reported that an agreement had been reached for
cooperation between his Jodrell Bank radio telescope facilities and the
deep space tracking station in the Crimea. He went on to relate that M. V.
Keldysh, President of the Academy of Sciences, had told him the Soviet
Union rejected "(at ].east for the time being)...plans for the manned
lunar landing." Three reasons were given by Keldysh: (1) there _as no
immediate solution to the problem of protecting cosmonauts against
radiation; (2) there appeared no economically practical _ay to put
sufficient equipment on the moon to guarantee a safe return from a manned
landing; (3) the scientific problems involved could be solved more cheaply
and quickly by unmanned, instrumental lunar program. In response to
Lovell's objections, however, Keldysh allegedly
replied that the manned project might be revived if
progress in the next few years gave hope of a
solution of their problems, and that he believed the
appropriate procedure would be for scientists to
formulate on an international basis (a) the reasons
why it is desirable to engage in the manned lunar enter-
prise and (b) to draw up a list of scientific tasks
which could not be solved by experimentation alone.
Lovell assured Keldysh that his views would be conveyed to British and
1
U.S. authorities.
Despite the obvious ambi_Jities in Lovell's report, so',_ejournalists
and public officials (in Arnold Frutkin's phrase) rode this horse in two
opposite directions at the same time: they took it as (i) a sign the
Soviet Union had given up her plans for a manned moon flight and (2) a
feeler for cooperation and with the United States in such a flight. 2
NASA director James E. Webb replied firmly to Lovell that "if the Soviet
Academy of Sciences is indeed interested in the matters you describe in
your letter, we will look forward to the possibility of further explor-
ations by Dr. Hugh Dryden and Academician Anatoli Blagonra_Jov as to i_eiJ
views and desires. ''3
iText in Frutkin, op. cit., pp. 127-129; also in The Congressional Record,
August 9, 1963, P. 13903.
2Frutkin, o_. cit., p. 108.
3The Christian Science Monitor, August i0, 1963.
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Although subsequent discussions between Dryden and Blagonravov led
to U.S.-Soviet accord on other matters of space eoopers:t_on, the Soviet
1
side does not seemto have raised issues of the kind suggested by Lovell.
Nor did the Kremlin respond positively to President Kennedy's address at
the United Nations on September 20, 1963, calling for a joint U.S.-Soviet
lunar expedition.2 Rather, on October 14, 1963, Keldysh gave a news
conference in Prague at which the Czech radio reported that he
refuted the statement made by Bernard Lovell...that
according to the President of the U.S.S.R. Academy of
Sciences...the Soviet Union has abandoned, at least
for the near future, its aim to land a man on the moon.
Keldysh w_s quoted as saying:
Professor Lovell obviously came to his conclusion
himself, as we have never said this. The tasks of making
a safe manned landing on the moon are without doubt very
exacting and demand great preliminary research. We
therefore cannot say precisely when we will realize
this task. 5
The perfect squelch was provided several weeks later, when Khrushchev
himself denied that the Soviet Union had ever "deferred," "postponed,"
or "withdrawn" her competitive landing program. Rather, he indicated
the Soviet Union would send a man to the moon when preparations were
4
complete to ensure his safety.
The possibility remains, of course, that Keldysh or other Soviet
officials did convey to Lovell the message which he reported to NASA.
Moscow may have sought to raise U.S. hopes about detente with the Soviet
Union and, perhaps as a consequence, to slacken the U.S. space effort.
(The Lovell letter coincided with Congressional debate on the
$5,500,000 space authorization bill, which included plans to put U.S.
astronauts on the moon by 1970.) It is also possible (though not likely)
iDryden discussed the matter of a joint lunar expedition with Blagonravov
during the week before Kennedy's U.N. speech, and was tolc by the Soviet
Academician that the subject might be discussed after instrumented landings
had been achieved. (Frutkin, op. cir., p. ll3.)
2For President Kennedy's proposal, see below, pp. 55-57.
3Cited in Frutkin, op. cit., pp. llO-111.
4Space Daily, November 7, 1963, p. 217; The Christian Science Monitor,
November 8, 1963.
that Soviet scientists and/or politicians were more interested in space
cooperation at the time of Lovell's visit than whenKeldysh commented
on the Lovell letter in October. But a literal reading of Lovell's
messageto Dryden in July does not describe a Soviet interest in a moon
flight with the United States. At most, it attributes to Keldysh a
suggestion for an international conference to discuss the utility of a
mannedlunar expedition. To be sure, Moscowwas aware that the U.S.
Congress repudiated Kennedy's call for a U.S.-Soviet moonprobe by
writing into the NASAauthorization bill for fiscal 1964 a provision
that the moneycould not be used for a lunar expedition with any other
nation without Congressional approval. Even without this rebuff,
however, it seemsunlikely the Kremlin was ready in 1963 for the
political and technical consequencesinherent in cooperative space
expeditions with the United States.
A more substantial if less sweeping indicator of Soviet interests
in space cooperation was the announcementon August 16, 1963, that
negotiations between Dryer and Blagonravov had led to U.S.-Soviet
accord to cooperate in projects involving weather and communications
satellites. Meteorological forecasting was to be facilitated by a round-
the-clock weather "hot line" scheduled for early 1964, while radio trans-
missions were to be bounced off a passive _.CLAUU_±xuOn s_llit_
launched by the United States in 1964.1 Agreement in principle on these
matters had been reached in the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence after
the first U.S. manned space flight in February 1962. Details had been
worked out in negotiations in March and May 1963. Final U.S. approval
came on July 8 and Soviet approval on August 1--four days before the
formal signing of the test ban treaty, but several days after it was
initialed on June 25, 1963.
The "spirit of Moscow': associated with the test ban treaty probably
helped to overcome whatever political or technical obstacles impeded the
agreement on space cooperation. That Moscow wanted the accord in large
measure for political reasons is suggested by the fact that the Soviet
1The New York Times, August 17, 1963.
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Union has turned out to be extremely laggard in fulfilling her part of thei
Dryden-Blagonravov agreement. The 1962-1963accords were facilitated also
in that they, as Frutkin has pointed out,
provide for coordination rather than integration of
effort...for a kind of arm's length cooperation in
which each side carries out independently its portion
of an arrangement without entering into the other's
planning, design, production, operations, or analysis.
The accords dealt with instrumentation for basic science, not of basic
rocket and spacecraft technology. No classified or sensitive data were
to be exchanged. 2 Hence the projected level of intrusion into Soviet
security system was relatively low.
By far the most important indication that the Kremlin sought to find
in outer space agreements a means of strengthening the "spirit of Moscow"
was the question which a Soviet official put to a U.S. delegation visiting
Moscow in August 1963. The official asked whether in fact the United
States meant to stand by its suggestion, made privately roughly one year
earlier, that Washington would agree to a ban on bombs in orbit without
provisions for on-site launcher inspection. Assured that the United
States continued to hold to this position, the Kremlin acted with dispatch.
The major address by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to the General Assembly
on September 19, 1963 declared: "The Moscow Treaty has banned nuclear
tests in space. Now we have another question on the agenda." Outer space,
Gromyko stated, must "never become another springboard for war, destruction
and death." The Soviet Union and United States, he went on, "are
persistently working to solve even more complicated problems in this field."
ipart of Moscow's difficulty stems from the fact that its space program in
meteorology and communications has lagged that of the United States. A
cynical interpretation holds that the Kremlin sought to reduce through
cooperative projects the American lead in these areas. On the other hand
the Soviet side showed itself anxious in later 1964-early 1965 to conclude
a cooperative agreement in space biology--an area where Soviet pre-
eminence was recognized.
2Frutkin, o_. cit., pp. i00-i01.
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Further:
Being willing now to take steps...to prevent the
spread of the armaments race to outer space, and
desiring to create the best possible conditions
for the utilization and exploration of outer space
to the benefit of all nations, the Soviet Government
deems it necessary to reach agreement with the United
States Government to ban the placing into orbit of
objects with nuclear weapons on board.
Although Moscow would later endeavor to take credit for initiating this
measure, Gromyko stated:
We are aware the United States Government also takes
a positive view of the solution of this question.
We assume also that an exchange of views on the banning of
the placing into orbit of nuclear weapons will be con-
tinued...on a bilateral basis. It would be a very good
thing if understanding could be reached and an accord
concluded on this vital question. The Soviet Government
is ready. 1
While Gromyko spoke of a ban on bombs in orbit as a separate measure, his
speech also went some distance toward making the Soviet GCD proposal
more compatible with the security I_quirements of both superpowers. A
limited nuclear umbrella could now be retained by Moscow and Washington
not only through the first stage, as Gromyko proposed in September 1962,
but until the end of the third stage. From the very outset of the second
stage, moreover, "control should be instituted over the remaining rockets
as well as over their nuclear warheads ..2
The limited test ban, meanwhile, continued to be debated by the U.S.
Senate, which advised ratification only on September 24, 1963. 3 President
Kennedy observed on September 9 that "the treaty is being so chewed up in
the Senate and we've got to make so many concessions to make sure it passes,
that we've got to do something to prove to the world we still mean it. If
we have to go to all this trouble over one small treaty, people are likely
to think we can't function at all--unless I can dispel some doubts in New
York. ,,4 Thus, according to Schlesinger, the progress of the test ban debate
1Documents on Disarmament t 1963, pp. 522-523.
2Ibid., p. 516.
3The President ratified the treaty on October 7 and it entered into force
on October lO, 1963.
4Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1965), p. 919.
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confirmed Kennedy's decision to speak for a second time before the U.N.
General Assembly. Schlesinger himself suggested that the President again
propose a joint moonshot, a notion to which Kennedygave quick approval
after hurried consultation with NASA,the Defense and State Departments,
and the Arms Control Agency.1
The President's U.N. address followed by one day that of Andrei
Gromyko. "Surely," Kennedytold the General Assembly,
we should explore whether the scientists and
astronauts of our two countries--indeed, of all
the world--cannot work together in the conquest
of space, sending someday in this decade to the
moonnot the representatives of a single nation
but the representatives of all our countries.
Although the interests of economyand of mankind called for such cooperation,
Kennedynoted, manyobstacles had to be crossed: allies had to be consulted,
for their interests had to be protected; detailed negotiations would also
be needed; most important, a new approach to the cold war was required--
"a desire not to 'bury' one's adversary but to compete in a host of
peaceful arenas, in ideas, production, and ultimately in service to all
mankind."
Kennedyreferred specifically to Gromyko's space arms control proposal
of the previous day. Gently recalling that the measure in question was
initiated by the United States, the President said he was "encouraged"
by the Soviet Moscow's "affirmative response." Kennedy called for renewed
negotiations to "work out a practicable arrangement" to "keep weapons of
,,2
mass destruction out of outer space.
llbid., pp. 919-920; Sorensen, o_. cit., p. 743.
Several days before Kennedy's speech the director of the Manned Space-
Craft Center, Dr. Robert R. Gilruth, stated that a joint lunar expedition
was impractical for technical and security reasons. (See The New York Times
report on the U.N. speech, September 21, 1963, p. i). According to one
official, however, Gilruth had not been appraised of Kennedy's forthcoming
proposal. (Frutkin, op. cit., p. 112.)
Schlesinger states that James E. Webb was consulted on the proposal
for a joint moon expedition, but does not say if NASA, like other
departments consulted, also offered "no objection."
2Documents on Disarmament I 19632 PP- 528-529. Kennedy reiterated the
U.S. interest in a joint lunar expedition in a speech at the University
of Maine on October 19, 1963. (Ibid., p. 543.)
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Kennedy was silent on two other steps advocated by Gromyko: the
nuclear umbrella concept and a suggestion that the heads of government
meet in Moscow in 1964 to continue disarmament negotiations. Rather, the
President offered another "agenda of further steps" stressing safeguards
against surprise attack, non-transfer of nuclear weapons, and an inspected
comprehensive test ban.
The President's speech was applauded by Mr. Gromyko, who later
commented that its tone had been "conciliatory," which he deemed to be a
"good sign." Gromyko reserved comment on Kennedy's specific proposals,
1
but he indicated that Sovlet-U.S. negotiations would continue.
Several days later Gromyko stated that it was "quite possible"
the current round of East-West talks would produce an agreement forbidding
the orbiting of nuclear weapons in space. He believed that Soviet and U.S.
views coincided "in substance on this question." He was much less opti-
mistic however about agreement on other arms controls such as the exchange
2
of observers in Central Europe and non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.
The Soviet-U.S. Understanding: Legal Aspects
On October 3 Soviet, U.K., and U.S. negotiators in New York announced
their agreement in principle to prohibit the orbiting of nuclear weapons
in space. Diplomatic sources indicated that the announcement was made
principally at the suggestion of the Earl of Home, Britain's Foreign
Secretary, to give the tripartite talks an air of progress. 3 Important
questions remained to be resolved before the agreement in principle could
4
be translated into a more formal understanding. In what form would the
accord be expressed? To what extent would it be open for the adherence of
other states? What obligations would it entail?
iThe New York Times, September 21, 1963, pp. i, 6.
21bi___d.,October 3, 1963, P. i.
3Gromyko and Rusk were the other negotiators. Despite the cordial
atmosphere, they found themselves hard put to find common ground on most
other outstanding East-West issues. See The New York Times, October i0,
1%3.
4_ne text of the agreement in principle, if there was a text3 was not made
public.
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Four major alternative means of formalizing the accord were considered:
unilateral but simultaneous declarations; a bilateral statement by Moscow
and Washington; a treaty, bilateral or multilateral; a General Assembly
resolution that recorded in some way the intent of the Soviet Union and
United States.
The spectrum of choice _as narrowed by five factors: First, the
United States and probably Russia as well wanted to continue their satellite
programs for military reconnaissance and weather control. Second, neither
superpower could be sure what future technological or other determinant
of the military balance might later affect their judgment about the utility
of weapons in space. Third, a ban without inspection _as by definition
unenforceable and, for that very reason, would constitute an undesirable
precedent in U.S. perspective. Fourth, the reaction of the U.S. Senate to
a space treaty might be even less enthusiastic than that body's discussion
of the test ban and the wheat deal _th tl_ Soviet Union. Fifth, in
consequence of these complications, acceptable treaty language would be
1
very difficult to draft.
These factors led the United States to propose to Moscow the fourth
alternative listed, i.e., a U.N. resolution taking notice of Soviet and U.S.
declarations of intent. Soviet diplomats, it is reported, did not object to
this format or offer another. Khrushchev like Kennedy may have been reluctant
to seek his government's formal ratification of another arms control treaty
with the main adversary. Moscow could easily observe, in any event, the
difficult passage of the test ban treaty through the U.S. Senate. The
Kremlin's interest in improving relations with the Kennedy administration
would have made it counterproductive to create more internal difficulties
for the executive branch in Washington.
Isee The New York Times, issues of October 5, i0, 16, 17, 1963; and
Sorensen, op. cit., p. 743, where the "enforceability" and Senate "consent"
problems are emphasized as bearing on the President's decision not to seek
a formal treaty.
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Negotiation between William C. Foster and Nikolai T. Fedorenko produced
an accord on the terms of a draft resolution on October 15, 1963.1 The
document was co-sponsored by all members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament
Committee except France; it was passed by acclamation in the First
Committee on October 16; and by the General Assembly itself on October 17.
The resolution made two main points:
First, it welcomed
the expressions by the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United States of America of
their intention not to station in outer space any
objects carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of
weapons of mass destruction;
Second, it called upon all states
(a) To refrain from placing in orbit around the earth
any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds
of weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons
on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer
space in any other manner;
(b) To refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way
participating in the conduct of the foregoing activities. 2
_What obligations resulted from this resolution? It was not a legally-
binding treaty but had only moral force, strengthened by the fact that it
was unanimously adopted. The first part took note of expressions of intent
by two governments; the second part was more hortatory, calling upon all
states to refrain from certain activities. The second part, therefore, had
even less compelling character than the first. To be precise, no "ban" or
"prohibition" was reached. President Kennedy himself, in referring to the
"agreement in principle" reached on October 3, said there was no real
agreement, but only a "coincidence of views," which he welcomed. 3 An address
by the director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency stated that
iThe New York Times, October 16, 1963.
2General Assembly Resolution 1834 (XVIII): Stationing Weapons of Mass
Destruction in Outer Space, October 17, 1963. The resolution was
adopted by acclamation.
3The New York Times, October 10, 1963. Several delegations openly stated
their regret that the resolution established only a moral obligation.
Padilla Nervo who introduced the resolution recalled that _xico had proposed
a draft treaty in June 1963. See United Nations Review, December 1963, p. 18.
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,,1the resolution "constitutes a recommendationon the part of the Assembly.
But Adlai Stevenson's discussion _ *_ _"*" .... "
the First Committee suggested the gap between a recommendation and a
formal treaty. He reiterated the United States "firm endorsement" of the
resolution, while leaving the door open for subsequent re-evaluation of the
commitment
We recognize that it is not possible to foresee today
all events which may at a future time occur in the newly
emerging field of space technology and in the exploration
and the use of outer space. Nor can we foresee fully the
outcome of continuing efforts to achieve disarmament.
Naturally, if events as yet unforeseen suggest the need
for a further look at this matter, we would acquaint the
United Nations with such events .2
The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus might be interpreted to justify
repudiation of a treaty. But a declaration of intent was even less binding.
Soviet spokesmen seemed not to object to the lack of any legally-binding
obligations in the General Assembly resolution on stationing weapons in
outer space, despite the fact that throughout 1962 and 1963 Moscow had
campaigned for a treaty on the legal principles governing the use of
outer space, arguing against a mere declaration setting forth these
principle s. 3
Despite the extremely limited commitment entailed by the resolution on
space weapons, it has come to be widely termed a "ban" on bombs in orbit.
Soviet representative Novikov, for example, in a speech to the First
Committee spoke of "adoption by the General Assembly of a resolution
prohibiting the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction...."4 And
IAddress by AC_ Director William C. Foster before the Southwest Conference
on Arms Control, October 31, 1963, in Documents on Disarmament_ 1963, p. 571.
2Speech on October 16, 1963, ibid., pp. 536-537.
3Such a declaration was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly on
December 13, 1963, after compromise by both the United States and the Soviet
Union. Ambassador Fedorenko criticized the declaration because it established
no firm legal obligations, a problem which, he added, "must of course be
solved." He also noted, however, that the United States interpreted the
declaration of principles as "reflecting" international law and stated that
it would respect them. If the declaration were unanimously adopted, Fedorenko
said, the Soviet Union would also respect its principles. For the declaration,
see Documents on Disarmament I 1963, PP. 644-6_6; for Fedorenko's speech, see
ibid., pp. 637-638.
4Speech of November 19, 1963, in ibid., p. 611.
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William C. Foster spoke of a U.S.-Soviet "understanding" to keep the arms
race from outer space, as if more than a statement of intent had been
1
made by each side.
What weapons did the General Assembly resolution encompass? Gromyko's
speech of September 19 had referred to "objects with nuclear weapons on
board," whereas U.S. statements usually discussed a broader object: any
weapons of mass destruction. The resolution mentioned both categories, thus
2
accepting the more comprehensive limitation advocated by Washington.
What acts dld the superpowers intend not to commit? They affirmed an
intention "not to station in outer space any objects carrying nuclear
weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. ''B Two forms of
"stationing" were enumerated in the second part of the resolution: placing
weapons in orbit around the earth and installing them on celestial bodies.
These and other forms of "stationi_g" _re presumably included under the
U.S. and Soviet declarations of intent.
What relevance did these limitations have to the "global rocket"
which Soviet officials had claimed to possess, since at least 1962?
Was Moscow in effect now pledging not to use such a weapon? Probably
there was no such implication, for the statements by Moscow and
Washington that they would not station or place in orbit certain weapons
_cemed to refer to peacetime deployment _ther than to actual launchings
in war. To make the extreme point: there was no intimation that in wartime
long-range missiles would not be used, even though they passed through
outer space.
A more delicate issue was the provision in the last paragraph of the
resolution against "causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the
conduct" of certain activities. Did this mean that a state could not carry
1Speech of October 31, 1963, in ibid., p. 571.
2Soviet spokesmen usually include chemical and bacteriological weapons among
instruments of "mass destruction." (See U.S. editors' note to Sokolovskii,
op. cit., p. 337.) Presumably the United States position on CBR weapons in
space would be considered on its merits the question of whether they were
"weapons of mass destruction."
3Emphas is added.
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out research and development on space weapons? Strictly speaking that part
of the resolution was mere exhortation, and established no legal obligations
whatsoever. Themeaning of this limitation would howeverbecomea sore
point in 1965 whenMoscowparaded what it termed "orbital missiles . "l
It should be noted that neither side attempted to ban all military
activities in space. The Soviet Union washerself ready now to orbit
reconnaissance satellites and Soviet legal writers no longer condemned
such activities. 2 Schlesinger goes so far as to state that the "least
heralded but perhaps most important" area of U.S.-Soviet understanding on
outer space in 1963 "was the tacit acceptance of reciprocal aerial re-
connaissance from space satellites--the American Samosand the Soviet Cosmos.
By supplying a partial substitute for organized international inspection,
the satellites provided mutual reassurance and thus strengthened the system
of stable nuclear deterrence ..3
The fact that the great powers had chosen to record their understanding
in a U.N. resolution which they could later ignore produced considerable
resen_ent within the U.N. Secretariat. If Moscowor Washington chose to
repudiate its 1963 "intention," the United Nations would appear the weaker.
OneU.N. official therefore attempted to draft a statement emphasizing the
obligations inherent in a unanimously accepted U.N. resolution, suggesting
that its breach would create a "threat to the peace" under the U.N. Charter.
Both Soviet and U.S. representatives, however, objected strenuously to this
formulation. Moscow,for its part, wanted the Secretary General to stress
the resolution's contribution to the relaxation of international tensions.
iSee below, pp. 71-72, 84-86.
2For background, see ThomasW. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 202, 208-209.
3Schlesinger, op. tit., p. 920.
U Thant's statement on the resolution hailed it as "one more step along
the road" to general disarmament, but he stressed that it was significant
for the United Nations because its adoption by the General Assembly
implies the acceptance by the Organization of the
continuing political and moral responsibility for
its implementation.
Thus, he endeavored to prevent the member-nations of the United Nations
1
from eschewing all responsibility for their recommendations and resolutions.
Significance of the Accord
To what extent could the signers of the U.N. resolution be assured that
no power would station weapons in orbit? No on-site launch inspection was
authorized, although many characteristics of space vehicles and their launch
sites could be determined by aerial surveillance. As noted before, the
"Saint" detection and interceptor program had been reoriented in late 1962
so that it would not become effective before 1968. 2 One U.S. authority
stated in October 196 B that there was still no way to detect from the ground
the presence of a nuclear weapon in a satellite. However any sudden
change in the satellite "population" would be noticed. And study of a
satellite's orbit would immediately show whether it constituted a threat. B
The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reported in January 1964 that
United States space-tracking systems were able _o detect launchings and
devices in orbit. 4 But no claim was made of a capacity to identify the
payloads of the space vehicles detected.
A clandestine deployment of weapons in space was thus unlikely, unless
limited to a very small number. If one side did manage to station a signifi-
cant number of space weapons without detection, their value for a surprise
attack would be limited. True, a strike from space might afford less warning
time than an ICBM launched from across the ocean, but the time advantage
would hardly be greater than a strike from a submarine close to enemy shores.
1Statement of October 17, 1963, cited in the United Nations Review,
December 1963, p. 18.
2See above, p. 42.
3The New York Times, October 16, 1963, p. 3.
4Third Annual Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, January 16,
1964, in Documents on Disanmsment. 196_, pp. 678-679. The Agency stated that
it had entered a contract to study the verification problems of arms controls
on bombs in orbit, and that the study had been completed before the October 1963
negotiations.
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In any event the second-strike capacity of either superpower _¢ouldcontinue
to deter a _+ _+_ .... _+_ outer _o_ _ _ .... +_ earth.
..... - ....... , .......... from s_._._e ..........
If a significant deployment of space weapons were carried out in secret,
it would eventually have to be made public if the purpose were to enhance
one's posture for political-military bargaining. But the utility of such a
fait accompli would also be limited, since each superpower could continue to
trust in its own second-strike deterrent.
As in any arms control accord, a fundamental restraint _as the
probability that violation by one side would be matched in kind by the other.
The lead-time advantage for either superpower of being the first to station
bombs in orbit would be small, since both powers' research and development
programs would continue and because each would retain its second-strike
capability. This restraint was probably keener for the Soviet Union,
because experience showed that U.S. technological and economic power could
rapidly overtake Russia even when the latter had a lead in some area due
to earlier concentration of effort. But it was also in Washington's
interest not to provoke the Soviet Union into an arms race in space, for
the United States had a comfortable superiority in existing weapons systems
and had no reason to want to complicate the equation in the balance of power.
In particular it was in the U.S. interest to restrain Russia from entering
a form of the arms race that lent itself to dramatic threats and bluffs, a
game to which Russian leaders had shown a dangerous predilection.
Thus, the main assurance that neither _scow nor Washington would
station weapons of mass destruction in space was that such a move would not
be in the self-interest of either superpower. "To the best of our knowledge
Stevenson told the First Committee, "no weapon of mass destruction has ever
,,1
been placed in orbit around the earth. And the negative appraisal of such
weapons made by Deputy Secretary Gilpatric in 19622 was reiterated by
Mr. Foster in October 1963:
iSpeech of October, 1963, Documents on Disarmament_ 1963, p. 537.
2See above, p. 41.
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Present analysis indicates that [weapons of mass
destruction in outer space_ would be more expensive
and less effective than conventional IC_4 delivery
systems. Moreover, once placed in space such
weapons would constitute a permanent risk. There
would always be a possibility that normal mechanical
failure; collision with a meteorite; or interaction
with unforeseen solar radiations might trigger it
by accident. 1
Did Moscow share this estimate? It seems likely that some political
and military factions within the Soviet leadership opposed entering
further arms control understandings with the United States; they may have
particularly objected to arms controls in space, a domain where Russia
had certain advantages. If such groups existed, however, the record
suggests that their case did not prevail. The Kremlin continued to seek
limited arms control arrangements with the United States in late 1963-1964
until Khrushchev's fall and escalation in Vietnam. Khrushchev's successors
reduced the Soviet military budget for 1965, although it rose again in 1966
2
as part of an overall increase in the Soviet budget. Both under Khrushchev
and in 1965-1966 the Kremlin worked at increasiDg rapidly the number of
Soviet IC_M's and submarine-based missile forces. _is large capital in-
vestment did not necessarily mean that Russia had for all time renounced
the stationing of bombs in orbit, but it was a sign that top Soviet leaders
might well agree with U.S. estimates that weapons in space offered no major
advantages over land- and sea-based forces. Moreover, as we shall see,
Moscow continued in 1965 to stress its adherence to the 1963 General
Assembly resolution on space weapons and in 1966 to campaign for a treaty
barring bombs in orbit or on celestial bodies .3
1Address of October 31, 1963, ibid., p. 571.
2See The New York Times, December 8, 1965, P. 1.
3Another oblique indicator that Moscow believed the main threat would
continue to come from IC_M and submarine-based missiles was the limited
deployment of anti-ballistic missile (A/_) defenses in Russia in 1964-1966,
together with signs the Kremlin was considering a full-scale deployment.
Such defenses would probably be obsolete if the superpowers embarked on
extensive deployment of bombs in orbit.
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Of what positive value, then, _as the 1963 declaration of intent
regarding space _apons? The U.S.-Soviet understanding w_s deprecated by
someWestern officials, particularly when comparing it with the nuclear
test ban treaty. The latter w_s a legal commitmentto halt an on-going
operation of somegenuine military interest, while the former merely
registered the view of each superpower that space weaponswere not
necessary or feasible for the time being.
The primary advantage was succinctly stated by William C. Foster:
Without such an understanding we believe there
would be a greater risk that an arms race in space
might develop simply for prestige reasons, rather
than becauseof any real military value .i
Both sides had the capability of placing bombsin orbit_ but it would be
cheaper and less dangerous not to up the ante in their confrontation. The
motives in Moscowand Washington maynot have been entirely symmetrical,
offensive weaponsfrom outer space.
The fact that neither superpower insisted on sealing the agreement in
principle on space weaponsin a formal treaty could be criticized from
the standpoint of world security, because each side remained free to con-
tinue research and development and to deploy space weaponsat a later date,
should it appear useful to do so. This argument howeverexaggerates the
binding quality of a treaty. Evenwithout a withdrawal clause (like that
in the test ban treaty), treaties stand so long as the interests of the
2
signatories are served by them.
By settling for half a loaf rather than one, the supporters of the
General Assembly resolution scored four victories for arms control and
world security. First, a limited gain was made for the idea of preventive
arms control. To a large extent the arms competition since 1945 had
followed inexorably the thrust of technology and its rule, whatever is
feasible ought to be built. Now, although both superpowers had a certain
iSpeech of October 31, 1963, in Documents on Disarmament t 196 3.
2Soviet officials are reported to have cited this in July 1963 as a self-
evident reason why a withdrawal clause in the test ban treaty would be
superfluous, though they finally agreed to include one.
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capability, they indicated that they would not exercise it, at least for
the present. Such restraint might be useful in other areas as well,
e.g., in the technology of anti-ballistic missilry. 1 Second, the faltering
movement toward other arms controls and improvement in u.s.-Soviet
relations received some sustenance, even if it proved insufficient to
ride out the events of late 1964-1965 . Third, however informal the U.S.-
Soviet accord on space weapons, it helped to reinforce a growing pragmatism
in Moscow, one that accepted the notion of limited but feasible measures,
as opposed to general disarmament. Fourth, by restraining U.S.-Soviet arms
competition in space informally, the option would be kept open for a formal
treaty at a later point in t_me.
Soviet statements on the accord stressed its value for improving
East-West relations, but took note of the long way to travel toward more
radical measures of disarmament. They also stressed the catalytic role
played in these developments by the "Moscow Treaty" on nuclear testing.
Thus, Ambassador Fedorenko told the First Committee on October 16, 1963,
that the partial test ban had afforded "a favorable atmosphere...for
further steps towazd disarmament and toward solving other problems awaiting
solution." Adoption of the draft resolution on space weapons, he went on,
would doubtless "be another step in relaxing international tensions and
O
improving relations between peoples ."_ Later, after the adoption of the
resolution, he called it "a new achievement in the cause of peace after...
the Moscow Treaty." The resolution, he said,
IThe major comment on the U.N. resolution by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson
reiterated again the idea that preventive arms limitations are more feasible
than actual disarmament: "The resolution...does not require the cessation
by Governments of any present activity. To the best of our knowledge, no
weapon of mass destruction has ever been placed in orbit around the earth.
Rather, this resolution calls for abstention .... Certainly it would seem
easier not to arm an envirorment that has never been armed than to agree to
disarm areas which have been armed." (Speech of October 16, 1963,
Documents on Disarmament 2 1963, p. 536.)
2The New York Times, October 17, 1963.
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constitutes a step to prevent the extension of
the armamentsrace to outer space. The decision is
not only concerned with celestial bodies, but also
bears upon terrestrial matters, thus opening up
one of the roads leading to general and complete
disarmament,i
While someof Moscow'sostensible interest in GCDwas no doubt motivated
by propaganda considerations, the fact is that Soviet diplomats continued
to emphasize vigorously the need for more sweeping measuresof disarmament.
Fedorenko, for example, warned against overestimating the results achieved
by the test ban and space weaponsaccord, for they did not "put an end to
.2
the armaments race or prevent the danger of war. Similarly, Novikov
argued that after the Moscow Treaty and the resolution "prohibiting the
weapons of mass destruction, it would be logical and reasonable to agree
on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons." The United States, he
complained bitterly, w_s frustrating such an agreement. 3
Despite the apparent narrowing of East-West differences on arms control,
including the question of weapons in space, the Kremlin continued to make a
sharp distinction between banning weapons in orbit, on the one hand and, on
the other, the total demilitarization of outer space and general disarmament.
Thus, in the December 1963 debate on a declaration of legal principles
governing exploration of outer space, Fedorenko stated that the Soviet
Government did not and could not agree "with attempts to divorce the
matter of the military uses of outer space from other measures linked to it."
In a curious reversion to an earlier Soviet emphasis, Fedorenko declared:
•..the prohibition of the military uses of outer space
can be solved only in the context of disarmament, with
parallel and simultaneous liquidation of foreign
military bases on the territory of other countries. 4
_Wnile this argument seemed somewhat atavistic after the October 1963
declaration on space weapons, there was no inconsistency: Moscow would not
iSpeech in the First Committee, October 30, 1963, Documents on Disarmament,
196____3,p. 556.
2Ibid.
3Speech to the First Committee on November 19, 1963, ibid., p. 611.
4Statement to the First Committee, December 2, 1963, in ibid., p. 637.
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promise to keep its ICE's from penetrating outer space except in the
context of general disarmament. This did not mean, however, that the
Kremlin was reneging on its stated inte.ntion to refrain from stationing
weapons in space.
7G
iv. CIL_LLENGESTOTHEUNDERSTANDING,19o4-1960
"Orbital" ._,'iszi!e s
The viaL ility of" the U.N. resolution on stationing weapons in outer
space was challenged by many forces from 1964 through 1966, but both
superpowers continued to affirm their intention to abide by it. Both
Moscow and Washingtol, expressed doubts, however, as to whether the other
was upholding its part of the understanding. The suspicions of each
government fed not only on hard-line statements but also upon actions of
*me c tLer sii_ casting doubt on its long-term intention to keep weapons
of .mass deztr:?tion from outer space.
Both space powers were likely to accept in principle the underlying
assumpt_icn of what has been called a "multiple symmetry model" of U.S.-
Soviet relations:
In a protracted conflict, the opponents must employ
the same means; if they do not, that side which
fails to modernize these particular means to match
those of the other side, all things being equal,
is doomed. 1
Particularly in the space race, some such assumption seems to have guided
both Moscow and Washington. Unsure what military, political, economic or
scientific benefits would result from huge investments in space research
and technology, both superpowers have been reluctant to leave the field
to the other party.
ijan F. Triska and David D. Finley, "Soviet-American relations: a multiple
symmetry r.:3de_," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, IX, No. 1 (March 1965),
37-53, quo_d at p. 37, the authors.' _oaraphrase of a theorem advanced by
hhgene Dupreel in his Sociologie Ge'ner"ale (Paris: Press Universitaires de
France, 194_). The theorem fails, however, in that not every action or
operation by one side in the cold war has been matched in kind by the other.
For example, the Soviet deterrent force has been quite smaller--and of a
different nature--than the American. Indeed, Triska and Fin/ey suggest
that the United S_ates should meet Soviet challenges "without striving to
surpass tLe: in such dimensions as...military weapons systems," while
going _n _c initiate U.S. challenges "in more acceptable sectors."* The
theorem, i_o-._ver, seems particularly applicable to U.S.-Soviet competition
in out_z" syazu, _ecause it is precisely in this arena that it is difficult
to perceive and react realis_ically to the feats of the adversary.
*(Triska and Finley, loc. cir., p. 51.)
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Hence the danger was that, despite the 1963 U.N. resolution, the Soviet
Union and the United States would willy-nilly extend the arms race into
outer space as each drove to exploit to the utmost the military possibilities
of technology, stimulating an interaction chain that functioned as a self-
fulfilling prophecy, demandingin the final analysis that each side match or exceed
what it expected the other to do. Thus, military and political leaders
in Moscowand Washingtonoften spoke of their strategic and space
capabilities in a provocative manner. If they did not claim for themselves
a military advantage in space, they described the terrestrial balance of
power in terms which implied the adversary would be well advised to look
to outer space for meansto improve his military posture. Alternatively,
strategic analysts described the foe's military space programs in a way
that implied countermeasures were required to overtake and surpass the
enemyat his own game.
On the Soviet side, there was Khrushchev's boast (shortly before his
ouster) to a visiting Japaneseparliamentarians that Russian scientists
had developed a "monstrous newweapon" capable of destroying all
1humanity. Then, immediately after his downfall, the new regime staged
on the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution what manyobservers called
the most impressive military parade seen for years in Red Square. For the
first time the Kremlin displayed an intercontinental ballistic missile, as
well as what it called an anti-missile missile. An accompanyingspeech
by Defense Minister Malinovsky denouncedSecretary McNamaraby name, while
TASSreleased a Chinese statement calling for Communistunity that would
make the United States and other imperialist powers "shudder. ''2
The military parades across Red Square in Mayand November1965 were
still more ominous, and raised directly the question of whether Moscow
intended to abide by the 1963 U.N. resolution on space weapons. The Kremlin
displayed on both occasions a numberof weapons, including a liquid-fueled,
three-stage rocket described by TASSas an orbital missile "capable of
delivering a surprise blow on the first or any other orbit around the earth. ''3
1The Christian Science Monitor, September 16, 1964, pp. l, 6.
2The New York Times, November 8, 1964, pp. l, 3.
3The New York Times, May lO, 1965, p. l; November 9, 1965, p. 5; Moscow
cooperated by giving data on the missile to Jane's All the World's Aircraft,
1965-1966 (New York: The McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966), p. 446.
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A June 1965 issue of the popular magazine Ogonekdeclared that:
The basis of the fightir_ power of the armed
forces of the Soviet Union is rocket troops
of strategic designation.
At their disposal they have ballistic rockets
of medium, intercontinental range, and orbital
range.
The article did not clarify, however, how the orbital rockets would be used,
e.g., whether they were to be fired from a satellite or whether they were
the same"global" rocket Soviet spokesmenhad claimed in 1962.1 Some
2
Western analysts doubted that the Soviet rocket was being massproduced;
others have doubted that it has the launching capability claimed for it
by Moscow;3 somequestioned whether the craft could even fly. There was
greater interest amongWestern analysts in a second rocket exhibited in
1965 which the Russians claimed wasmobile, solid-fuel IC_M. This claim
too was discounted, however, because Air Force experiments showedthat a
railroad-based IC_4 would double the cost of the Minutemanmissile and
be muchless accurate than one fired from a silo .4 Perhaps the greatest
concern amongWestern analysts arose from Soviet claims to have an
operational anti-ballistic missile (A_M) system. Western analysts could
not agree whether Moscowhad madeonly a limited, perhaps token ABM
deployment in 1963-1966, or whether Moscowwas proceeding on a large-scale
1The Christian Science Monitor, June 23, 1965. As indicated in Chapter V,
when an East German listing of Soviet missiles in 1966 distinguished orbital,
global, intercontinental, and medium-range rockets.
2The Christian Science Monitor, November ll, 1965.
3The three-stage rocket (code-named Scrag) and another liquid-propelled but
two-stage rocket called Sasin were said by Russian spokesmen to be akin to
vehicles used to launch the large manned spacecraft weighing more than
lO,O00 lbs. According to one analyst, it is obvious that neither Scrag nor
Sasin possesses such a capability. See Henry T. Simmons, "The Soviet Space
Program," Space/Aeronautics, Vol. 44 (December 1965), p. 56.
4This vehicle was code-named Savage. See "U.S. Doubts Red Missile Boasts,"
The Christian Science Monitor, November ll, 1965, p. lOc.
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program that would substantially alter the effect of a U.S. second-strike.
Unquestioned, however, was the fact that the Soviet Union had greatly
increased the numbers of its IC_M and submarine-rocket forces, cutting
2
the U.S. lead in long-range missiles from a 4:1 to closer to a 3:1 ratio.
iFor a report on divided opinions among U.S. analysts, see The New York Times,
June 9, 1966, p. ll.
Soviet theorists have rejected U.S. arms control arguments that ABM
systems could lead to an upward spiral in the offensive arms race. And
Soviet leaders have frequently boasted of their AI_4 capability. See e.g.,
N. Talensky, "Anti-Missile" Systems and Disarmament," International Affairs,
No. lO (October 1964), pp. 14-19, published simultaneously in Mezinarodni
_olitika (Prague) and in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 1965,
pp. 26-29. As early as 1961 both Khrushchev and Malinovsky boasted that
Soviet scientists had solved the problem of destroying missiles in flight.
(Izvestiia, September 9, 1961; Pravda, October 25, 1961.) In May 1965 Soviet
television viewers saw the firing of an APM and its intercept_or_ of an IC_
at an unspecified altitude, as well as scenes showing installations of A_4
defenses including testing stations, computer centers, and launch sites.
Western observers, however, believed the television film did not show recent
developments but rather tests of at least three years earlier. (The New
York Times, May ll, 1965.) Shortly thereafter, on August 7, 1965, the East
German National Zeitur_ (p, 6) printed a photo of a Soviet anti-missile
m_ss _I_ _ asserted that _T_o+ A}94 +_ .... is superior to _merican.
Also in August 1965 the commander of the Soviet anti-aircraft defense corps
noted that the U.S.S.R. has "adequate means to detect an_ destroy any air-
craft of any size and at any altitude, even the lowest ones." He granted
however that it was "'extremely difficult to aetect in time aircraft at
heights of 50 to lO0 meters." (Air Vice Marshal Vladimir Sudets, interview
in Nedelia reported in The Washington Post, August 15, 1965. ) And in
September 1965 a leading Soviet military journal printed an article that
argued: "Victory in war is determined not merely by the character of weapons
but by the relationship of forces of the combatant sides .... It is possible
that new means of war, capable of reliably parrying the enemy's nuclear
strikes, will be developed." From these and related assumptions, the author
challenged the view often expressed in both the West and the Soviet Union
that general war cannot be "won" in any meaningful sense. (Lt. Col. E.
Rybkin, "War and Policy," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, excerpted in Survival,
VIII, No. 1 _anuary 1966_, pp. 12-16.) For Western analyses, see Wolfe,
op. cit., pp. 189-199; Fritz Ermarth, "The A_M Decision," Radio Free E_rope
_Research_ Communist Area, Munich, December 8, 1965, mimeo; Walter F. Hahn
and Alvin J. Cottrell, "Ballistic Missile Defense and Soviet Strategy,"
Orbis, LX, No. 2 (Summer 1965), pp. 316-317.
2Washington reported in 1966 that Moscow was placing increasingly heavy em-
phasis on the submarine-launched portion of its nuclear arsenal. Of almost
400 Soviet long-range missiles, 120 were believed to be carried in sub-
marines (lO of them nuclear-powered, 35 diesel-powered). By contrast the
United States had 1,480 long-range missiles, 576 of the Polaris type being
carried in 36 nuclear-powered submarines. See The New York Times, June 9,
1966, p. 10. Compare with the annual reports, The Military Balance, issued
late each year by the Institute for Strategic Studles _n boncon.
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Nor did Western analysts dispute the Soviet claim madelate in 1965 that
Russia had twice that year used the world's most powerful rocket to put
into orbit the heaviest payloads ever launched.1
A recentralization of the Soviet defense ministries in March 1965
suggested to someobservers that the Soviet marshals might be having more
influence under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime than they enjoyed under
Khrushchev. A decree of the Presidium of the SupremeSoviet converted the
"state committees" for aircraft, defense technology, radio shipbuilding,
2
electronics and medium-machineryinto full-fledged ministries. This decree
removedmanagementof these activities from the control of the regional
industrial councils established by Khrushchev in 1957. (Unlike the other
industries affected in 1957, medium-machinebuilding, a euphemismfor
nuclear weaponsindustry, had remained under the control of the Central
State Committee.) It was not clear, however, whether this recentralization
• _±ec_=_ primarily -^_*_'._ _ -_ .... _" Ap_± a_ or .._ua1-_ criteria, u_ w_ merely _ of
general reshuffling of the Soviet economic structure in the interest of
efficiency. Khrushchev's successors had cut the military budget for 1965
in December 1964, but they increased it by 5 percent for 1966--perhaps to
"match" stepped-up U.S. spending due to the Vietnam war, but also as part
of an across-the-board increase in the Soviet budget.3 On the other hand
one U.S. study showed a steady upward curve in Soviet expenditures on
research, development, testing, and evaluation in military and space
activities, overtaking and surpassing U.S. investment in these areas (which
4
remained relatively stable) in 1964.
1professor Georgi Petrovich disclosed in the November 1965 issue of Aviatslia
i Kosmonatika that two spacecraft in the Proton series had been launched by
rocket boosters capable of generating more than 60 million horsepower. Such
power requires rocket engines that develop about 3 million pounds of thrust
at liftoff, as compared with the 2.4 million pound thrust produced by the
United States' Titan 3-C, thought to be the world's most powerful rocket when
it made its maiden flight in June 1965. See The New York Times, November 14,
1965, p. 74; for a slightly more skeptical appraisal, see Simmons, loc. cit.,
PP. 56-57.
2The New York Times, March 4, 1965, pp. l, 3; also Paul Wohl, "More Soviet
Guns," The Christian Science Monitor, May 8, 1965.
3See Bloomfield, Clemens, Griffiths, op. cit., p. 226.
4This study found it impossible to distinguish R, D, T & E in defense from
that on space activities. It reportedly "corrected" for conversion difficulties
in comparing U.S. and Soviet outlays.
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Military Men in Orbit
Regardless of the facts about Russia's rocket capabilities and in-
tentions, powerful voices in the United States became increasingly articulate
in calling for active measures to strengthen U.S. defenses, including a
dynamic role for the military in space.
The U.N. resolution on stationing weapons in space was denounced
immediately after its adoption by the man who became the Republican candidate
for President in 1964. On October 17, 196B, Senator Goldwater termed the
resolution a "usurpation" of the Senate's treaty powers and an "assault"
on the U.S. "bulwark against Communist domination. ''l In part to counter
such criticisms President Johnson revealed on September 17, 1964 that the
United States had already installed two systems for intercepting and
destroying armed satellites in case the Soviet Union violated the 1963
2
understanding. Pressure on the administration nevertheless continued from
many sides. As General Curtis LeMay retired from the Air Force, the former
director of the Strategic Air Command declared early in 1965, the United
States would leave herself open to enemy attack unless she became capable
of using military weapons in space.
Developing military capabilities is a task that I
think we ought to accept as an unavoidable
requirement .... _Man_ will undoubtedly discover
uses for space systems over the years ahead that
go far beyond the observation and inspection
functions we envision at this time.3
1Quoted in Lester A. Sobel (ed.), Space: From Sputnik to Gemini (New York:
Facts on File, Inc., 1965), p. 227.
2Johnson added that the United States did not intend to place satellites with
warheads in orbit and that "we have no reason to believe that any nation plans
to put nuclear warheads into orbit." McNamara explained on September 18 that
the two systems represented an adaptation of the Nike-Zeus anti-missile system
and the Thor rocket. The Defense Secretary said the two systems had been
"effectively tested" and were "operational." The President also announced
that the United States was installing a radar system that could "bend" around
the earth's curvature so as to detect missile firings almost as soon as they
occurred. (Hitherto military radar had been limited to line of sight
operations.) Ibid., p. 263; also The Christian Science Monitor, September 19,
1964; also the P---_sident's annual report to Congress on U.S. space activities,
January 27, 1965.
3See interview in The Christian Science Monitor, February 2, 1965.
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Manymilitary (but not necessarily civilian) officials at the Defense
Departmentwere reported in 1965 to _ increasingly anxious about what they
believed to be a substantial Soviet lead in the strategic uses of space, a
concern that heightened sharply whena Russian cosmonautfloated outside
his spaceship on March 18. While NASAfocused on landing a manon the moon,
Pentagon officials worried about Russia's winning control over areas lOO to
600 miles above the earth. Air Force planners, it was reported,
envision men in reconnaissance vehicles, in satellite
interceptors, in nuclear dreadnaughts able to fire
downon earth targets. Menare counted on to run elaborate
commandposts in space, control entire fleets of space
weapons.
...Many believe that the most likely way the growing
stalemate in nuclear missiles will finally be broken
is by the development of space-based weapons.
Top civilians in the Pentagon, however, were said to believe there was no
clear-cut mission in space for the mission. HenceSecretary McNamara's
cancellation of the DynaSoarmannedspace glider late in 1963 and his
slowness in getting a substitute program MannedOrbiting Laboratory (MOL)
1
off the ground.
Similarly, the HouseGovernmentOperations Committeewarned on June 4,
1965, that Russia was "substantially ahead" of the United States in military
space developments. The Voskhodlaunchings of October 1964 and March 1965
were cited as evidence. The Committeecalled for full-scale development
"without delay" of the Pentagon's M0Lproject. While it was appropriate for
NASAto operate the Apollo moonprogram, the Committeeargued, it should be
the Pentagon's task to develop the mannedlaboratory for military reasons.
The Voskhodlaunched in October 1964, the report stated, "was in certain
respects a mannedorbiting space station. Three menwere in orbit for
.2
24 hours, and they conducted experiments that we have yet to do.
IU.S. News & World Report, LVII, No. 14 (April 5, I_65), p. 34.
2The New York Times, June 4, 1965. For whatever reasons, political or
technical, Krasnaia Zvezda in June 1965 published a number of articles
criticizing the Soviet Rocket Forces for various shortcomings. Some
commanders were accused of conducting training exercises "as though combat
moves will be made only by one side and the 'enemy' will either be idle or
will display a passivity that will be to the trainee's advantage." See
The Christian Science Monitor, June 29, 1965.
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A major U.S. space achievement followed immediately upon publication
of the Committee's report and gave strength to its main argument: that the
time had cometo press aheadwith investigation of the military utility of
a man in space. On June 3 a Gemini capsule was launched from which Major
EdwardH. White madea twenty-minute "walk in space," propelling himself
about with a gas-firing jet gun. This feat, like the excursion of
Lt. Col. Aleksei A. Leonov in March 1965, suggested that there was indeed
a specific utility to having a man in space as contrasted with unmanned
satellites. A man might be essential to build space platforms, to
assemble maneuverable vehicles, and to employ the discrimination and
judgment best exercised by the human mind. A manned vehicle might be
needed to distinguish another satellite, identify enemy satellites, to
discriminate between a satellite with a lethal weapon and one with a
nonlethal payload, and--if necessary--to capture, neutralize, or destroy
the enemy satellite .1 At any rate the feasibility of manned maneuvers
outside the satellite had been demonstrated, and this increased the
pressures for investigating further his actual utility in carrying out
such operations.
In August 1965 the two pilots of Gemini 5 broke the U.S. and Soviet
record for hours in orbit. Their flight pointed again to the specific
value of man in space. With eyes, cameras, and infrared sensors they
spotted missile firings, aircraft, naval ships, and other items of possible
military interest. Their assistance was critical in solving a fuel-problem
that otherwise might well have ended the mission. 2
On August 25, part-way in the course of Gemini 5's eight days in orbit,
two important statements were issued, one in Moscow, one in Washington.
The Soviet military newspaper Red Star charged that the basic function of
the Gemini program was not preparation for a moon landing. Rather, it
argued , "the main purpose is testing the capability of intercepting arti-
ficial satellites and conducting reconnaissance from space." In what could
have been a message to Moscow's political hierarchy, the military organ
declared that "the bosses in the Pentagon don't hide the fact that the
piloting of a cosmic ship can hold the key to strategic domination of cosmic
iSee the analysis by Hanson W. Baldwin, "Space and Defense," The New York
Times, June 5, 1965.
2The Christian Science Monitor, August 26, 1965.
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space." As early as 1956-1957, the article went on, the Pentagon had laid
plans for military space ships, but responsibilities had been divided so
that NASAworkedon scientific-technological base for military activities
in space while the military departments developed concrete strategic
applications. Red Star suggested further that the two U.S. astronauts
might well be occupied taking pictures of installations in Communist
countries. It noted:
The spaceship will pass ii times over Cuba, 16 times
over Vietnam, 40 times over the Chinese People's
Republic .... It suffices to say that of the 17 experi-
ments programmed for the flight, six were planned by
the Defense Department and are top secret.
Red Star noted that a modified version of the Gemini capsule was to
be used as a vehicle for astronauts between earth and the Manned Orbital
Laboratoryl--the subject of an announcement by President Johnson the same
day as the Soviet article.
As Gemini 5 continued to orbit, President Johnson ordered the Defense
Department to proceed immediately with construction of a two-man orbiting
laboratory to determine man's usefulness in space. The project, assigned
to the Air Force, was expected to cost $1.5 billion, with the first of five
month-long flights scheduled for 1968. Aware of Soviet sensitivities
about military overflights of the U.S.S.R., President Johnson reiterated
U.S. interest in extending the rule of law into outer space. Referring
obliquely to the 1963 U.N. resolution, Mr. Johnson stated:
We intend to live up to our agreement not to orbit
weapons of mass destruction and we will continue to
hold out to all nations, including the Soviet Union,
the hand of cooperation in the exciting years of space
exploration which lie ahead for all of us.
To further demonstrate his desire for cooperation in space, the President
announced that top-ranking Soviet scientists were being invited to witness
the next Gemini launching in October, 1965 .2
iEngineer-Major I. Vereshchagin, "Gemini and the Aims of the Pentagon,"
Krasnaia Zvezda, August 25, 1965.
2The New York Times, August 26, 1965.
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A similar offer to observe the Mercury manned spacecraft program had
been rejected earlier by Moscow, perhaps because of Soviet unwillingness to
reciprocate. The President's invitation to observe the Gemini launch,
therefore, deliberately avoided any mention of reciprocal visits. A sign
that the President's August 25 proposal was well received by at least some
Soviet authorities came on September 2, 1965, when Pravda published a long
article by Academician Sisakian calling for more international cooperation
in space and congratulating U.S. scientists on Gemini 5- This line did not
triumph, however, for the President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences,
M. V. Keldysh, sent James E. Webb a polite rejection on September 8. "Soviet
scientists," Keldysh wrote, "positively evaluate cooperation between our
countries in the study of cosmic space for purposes of peaceful use.
However at the present tlme our representative cannot avail himself of
your invitation." In a different spirit from Red Star, nevertheless,
Keldysh congratulated the astronauts, scientists and engineers "who took
part in the preparation and execution of the flight of the space ship
Gemini 5 .''1 There was, of course, a qualitative security distinction
between various kinds of space cooperation, and on October 1B the Soviet
Union and United States reached two agreements: (1) a reaffirmation of the
existing plan to exchange data from their weather satellites; and (2) an
agreement on the preparation and __n _ _......._ review in" space
2
biology and medicine.
Despite the assurances of the President and various government press
releases that the MOL was not meant for aggressive purposes, and did not
conflict with the 1963 General Assembly resolution, many Western as well as
Communist writers criticized the project for opening the door to an arms
race in outer space. An essay by Harry Schwartz predicted that historians
might "conclude that this Presidential decision was even more important"
1The New York Times, September 9, 1965, p. ll.
2The latter accord provided for the establishment of a joint editorial
board and for full cooperation by both sides in the preparation of materials
available in the two countries, the selection of authors, and the publication
of their work, probably in two or mere volumes. (The Baltimore Sun,
October 14, 1965, P. 16.)
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than the Gemini 5 flight. Why, Schwartz asked, did the President make
the announcementat the very momentwhenSoviet propagandawas already
attacking Gemini 5 as a venture in space espionage?
Moreover by underlining the potential military
significance of space, the President mayhave
finally ended any last lingering hope that there
might be a joint Soviet-American program for
sending a man to the moonor to somemore distant
objective in the solar system.
Immediately after the President's announcement,Schwartz noted, several
East European newspaperswarned that the Soviet Union could hardly fail
to try to obtain similar military capability in space.
Would it not have been wiser, he concluded, to have let NASAcarry out
the M0Lassignment, for scientific purposes and for military contingencies?
If it turned out that enemystates were actively exploiting space for
military purposes other than intelligence collection, the U.S. Defense
Department could then makeuse of the capability developed by NASA.
Such a course might have kept Washington from
bearing the onus of seeming to start an arms race
in space, while giving more time to exert pressure
on Moscowfor cooperation rather than rivalry in
the new dimension of humanactivity. 1
Isolated Soviet statements on the MOLcould not be taken as a firm
indication of Moscow'sposition, but one of the first Soviet responses to
Johnson's announcementimplied a wish to guide Soviet policymakers as
well as to rebuke Western. The Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Soviet strategic
rocket troops contended that the Pentagon intended to develop a platform
from which to bombardthe earth with nuclear bombs--which, he added, "does
not tally with Johnson's hypocritical announcementabout extending the
reign of law to outer space."
I"MOL: The NewRacein Space," The New York Times, September 13, 1965.
Similar criticisms appeared in The Saint Louis Post-Dispatch, September 9,
1965, p. 13; The New Republic s September ll, 1965 and November 27, 1965;
in a column by Marquis Childs, The Washington Post, September 31, 1966,
p. A22; and in an anticipatory essay by Leonard E. Schwartz in The Christian
Science Monitor, March 2, 1965. Favorable appraisals appeared in Business
Week, September 4, 1965, P. 8; William Beecher, "New Russian Weapons Spur
U.S. to Explore Military Use of Space," The Wall Street Journal,
November 22, 1965; and in "MOL at Last," Omaha World-Herald, August 27, 1965.
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Further, in a viewpoint that Moscowlater overruled 3 the sameauthor
suggested that the very developn_nt of the MOL"leads to a definite breach
of the agreementon non-orbiting of weaponsof m_ssdestruction," because
"the concept of nuclear weaponscovers both carriers and the warheads
.1
proper.
That this line might not prevail was suggested to some observers at
the United Nations when Soviet representatives to meeting of the Legal
Subcommittee of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
failed in September 1965 to denounce the MOL. Indeed, later that month
Moscow disclosed that it too would put up an equivalent vehicle.
Cosmonaut Alexei Leonov told the 16th International Aeronautical Congress
meeting in Athens that a permanent manned space platform was the next major
2
project in the Soviet space program. Unlike Washington, Moscow did not
specify that its platform would be for experimental military purposes.
It was subsequently reported, however, that one of the reasons President
Johnson ordered the Air Force to proceed with the MOL was that intelligence
indications suggested the Soviet Union was already w_ll advanced in developing
such a spaceship. 3
That Moscow was indeed moving in this direction was suggested by an
article in Red Star early in 1966, entitled "Now--To An Orbiting Station."
While the article did not specify that such a station would have military
applications, this seemed to be implicit--not only because of the author's
4
position, and the vehicle of publication, but also because of the article's
contents. It discussed in a matter of fact way, for example, the problems
involved in extra-vehicular activities, one of which involved armed
satellites:
ipart of his analysis, it should be noted, was based on an essay in the
distinguished West German newspaper, Die Welt. See Col. Gen. Vladimir
Tolubko in Za rubezhem, September 1965; see also the article by East
German Julius Mader, "U.S. Militarist Plans in Space," International Affairs
(Moscow), XI, No. 8 (August 1965), pp. 54-58.
2Leonov added that after "many space laboratories" had been established, "with
crews periodically changed," the Soviet Union expected to give attention to
"a spaceship to the moon, and a landing on the moon." See the editorial,
"Space Plans and Defense," Philadelphia Inquirer, September 19, 1965; also
The Washington Post, September 17, 1965, p. A3.
3The Christian Science Monitor, October 13, 1965.
4General Major Engineer-Technical Service, Georgi I. Pokrovsky, Professor at
the Zhukovsky Military Air Engineering Academy, Doctor of Technical Science.
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...imagine that two enemy ships are flying
parallel courses and are shooting at each other.
In this case the shells will not fall on the target.
They will come back and it is not impossible that
they could hit the ship from which they are shot.
There is a paradox for you.
The author did not explicitly recommend the arming of satellites, but he
concluded on the note that "cosmonautics of our days had already solved
a series of problems connected with manneuvers in space." Hence, the
agenda for cosmonauts in the twentieth century would include a series of
steps in succession:
The meeting of ships in space, assembling in
orbit large inhabited stations, and the building
of cosmic "railway stations" from which will go
into deep space "interplanetary long distance
trains" ....
A subsequent article in Red Star again assailed what it viewed as a
contradiction between the President's assurances that the United States
intended to adhere to the 1963 understanding on weapons in space and his
transfer of authority over the MOL to the Pentagon. Citing many Western
2
periodicals, Red Star concluded that the Western press viewed this shift
of responsibility from NASA to the Defense Department as "the birth of
the era of military cosmonautics." The Soviet article commented
sarcastically:
Trying to enoble these plans Efor the MOLJ, the
American press puts out the argument that it is
necessary "to make a distinction between aggressive
and simply (') military sputniks, for it is evident
that the basic purpose of the MOL is to collect recon-
naissance information.
With apparent revulsion, the article also observed:
It appears that military espionage from the cosmos
is a permitted action in relation to countries with
which they maintain normal diplomatic relations'
1Krasnaia Zvezda, February 12, 1966.
2The following periodicals were cited, but usually without reference to
specific articles or dates: Air Force, Aviation Week, Missiles and Rockets,
Army, Astronautics, an@ U.S. News & World Report.
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Since Moscow's satellites had been carrying out reconnaissance missions for
several years, Red Star's indignation was probably not to be taken seriously.
More significant, perhaps, was Red Star's conclusion that "the
strategists from the Pentagon must realize that they are making a step
toward madness ."
Of course, one cannot approach the question of the
creation of piloted space ships so simply as is done
by a few Western observers, who very much want that
"the MOL station might be able to drop nuclear bombs."
The unscientific vulgarization of such a serious
business is intolerable. However, one cannot
escape the fact that all these "purely military"
apparatuses which are the carriers of means of mass
destruction, nuclear, chemical, bacteriological,
and other.
We notice that the further the development goes on
American cosmic apparatuses, the more the dividing
line between their "peaceful" and "military"
designation is erased. 1
It seems fair to conclude that in 1964-1966 both Moscow and Washington
did much to encourage mutual suspicions that arms control in space was a
utopian chimera. Repeated Soviet claims of an "orbital missile," even if
it were only in limited production--combined with signs that both sides
would soon test the military uses of manned orbiting laboratories--
suggested that the 1963 "intention" not to station weapons of mass
destruction in space might soon be revised. Parallel with these portents,
however, other developments occurred in the East-West dialogue, indicating
that the declarations of intent might not only be observed for some time
but might even be converted into a bilateral or multilateral treaty.
iGeneral _Major of Aviation, B. Tep]insky, retired, "The Strategy of
Cosmic Adventures," Krasnaia Zvezda, April 23, 1966.
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V. C0bS_TERVAILING RESTRAINTS, 1964-1966
Despite the parading of so-called orbital missiles across Red Square
and the amnounced plans of both superpowers to orbit marnaed stations, the
future of outer space remained open-ended. Options were not yet closed.
Although Moscow and Washington sought to exploit outer space for certain
propaganda and strategic values, neither seemed anxious to convert this
domain into the locus of a full-fledged arms race. If only implicitly,
each superpower seemed to recognize the utility in maintaining or extending
the principle of preventive arms control in outer space.
While Moscow and Washington questione_ one another's motives in outer
space, neither side definitively accused the other of overthrowing the 1963
U.N. resolution on weapons in space. To be sure, U.S. spokesmen issued a
firm protest after the Kremlin paraded its orbital missiles. The State
Department demanded to know whether Moscow meant to abide by its 1963
declaration of intent. Preferably, Washington indicated, the Soviet
Union should publicly reaffirm its earlier position. ±
Considering the seriousness of the American inquiry and the complexity
of the problem, Moscow reacted with impressive dispatch. Soviet Ambassador
Dobrynin visited the State Department on December 8, 1965 to reaffirm his
government's support of the 1963 declaration. His clarification, it was
reported, followed the lines of an article entitled "False Doubts", appearing
over the authoritative signature of "Observer" in Pravda, on the next day,
December 9, 1965. The State Department, Pravda asserted, had not the slightest
grounds for intimating that the Soviet Union had violated the U.N. resolution
or that it did not intend to adhere to it in the future. Pravda noted that
the General Assembly resolution called upon states to refrain from
stationing atomic weapon carriers in outer space, but the "Observer" article
registered an important distinction: It held that the resolution did "not
apply to the production of orbital rockets, or, for that matter, to any other
rockets launched into space".
The article defined Moscow's future plans in this way:
iIn response to queries, the State Department stated on November 8, 1965,
that it was studying Moscow's claims to possess an orbital missile "with care"
and at "fairly high levels throughout the government" See The New York Times,
November 9, 1965, P. 5; also The Baltimore Sun, November 18, 1965.
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The Soviet Union regards the recommendations contained
in the General Assembly resolution...as most important;
it fulfills them and will observe this resolution in
the future, having in view that other governments
will act in the same way.
But Pravda again stated the Soviet view of the dependency of arms control
and cooperation in outer space on terrestrial disarmament. The Soviet
approach to the U.N. resolution, "Observer" declared,
is dictated by the peace-loving character of the
foreign policy of the Soviet Union, her decisive and
consistent struggle for the liquidation of all types
of rocket-nuclear weapons, for the achievement of
general and complete disarmament, which would ensure
the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes.
"Observer" declared that the United States knew of Moscow's peaceful
intentions, but sought by protesting the Soviet orbital rocket to divert
attention from the U.S. space program. From the outset, U.S. activities
in outer space had been subordinated to the idea of "the mastery of space
for military purposes," an attitude exemplified most recently, the article
stated, by the announcement of the M0L project.
As for the military equipment demonstrated in Red Square, Pravda
concluded, its purpose was not to threaten anyone. Moscow's nuclear rockets
,,i
were merely a "powerful means of guaranteeing peace.
_nese explications of the Soviet position seemed to satisfy the State
Department, 2 which since 196B had accepted the view that the resolution did
not bar development but only the deployment of space weapons. Indeed, as
noted earlier, the U.N. resolution consisted of two parts, one which
welcomed statements of intent by Moscow and Washington, and a second part,
exhorting all states to refrain from stationing weapons in space or from
"encouraging or in any way participating" in such activities.3 Given a
broad or narrow interpretation, these paragraphs did not constitute a pledge
to refrain from production of weapons which, if orbited, would violate the
1963 declarations of intent.
ipravda, December 9, 1965, P. 5.
2See The New York Times, December ll, 1965, pp. l, 4. After Dobrynin's
visit the State Department announced that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament
Committee would reconvene on January 27, 1966.
3See above, pp. 59-60.
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Washington's acceptance of Moscow's clarification regarding Soviet
intentions in outer space appeared to be part of a larger strategy de-
signed to contain and, if possible, reverse the deterioration in U.S.-
Soviet relations in 1965-1966 due to escalation in Vietnam, changes in
U.S. and Soviet top leadership_ and other factors. If rapport could be
maintained with the Kremlin on arms control, perhaps other problems could
be compartmentalized. But for negotiations to makeprogress on such
issues as nonproliferation, previous arms control accords would have to be
maintained. Indeed, their observance would be important merely to keep
U.S.-Soviet tensions from growing more acute.
The U.S. interest in "not rocking the boat" on previous arms control
accords led Washington to play downpossible Soviet violations of two other
agreements reached in 1963-1964. The first possible breach occurred early
in 1965 whena Soviet underground nuclear test "vented," probably carrying
radioactive material beyond Soviet frontiers--technically a violation of
the 1963 test ban treaty. Moscow's response to U.S. inquiries was to deny
that such an event had occurred, and since the venting was probably not
deliberate, the State Department did not carry its protests further.
Another possible violation was more difficult to prove or disprove from
abroad. SomeU.S. officials doubted, however, that the Soviet Union had
in fact reduced substantially the production of uranium-235 for nuclear
weapons, as Khrushchevhad promised to do in a statement issued simul-
taneously with similar declarations by the United States and the United
Kingdomin April 1964.i
The United States was concerned not only with the political conse-
quences of arms control, but also with its potential for containing the
arms race. This awareness was seen particularly vividly as the Defense
Department in 1965 refused to give in to mounting pressures to begin
immediate deployment of an anti-ballistic missile defense system. While
manyconsiderations affected the administration's approach to this problem,
including economicand feasibility factors, the Defense Department appeared
iTexts in Walter C. Clemens, Jr. (ed.),Toward a Strate_ of Peace.
(Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965), Pp. 214-218.
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hopeful that it could avoid a measure that would contribute unnecessarily
1
to another upward spiral in offensive arms competition.
Similarly, the United States appeared anxious to ensure that the
deployment of military personnel in space for support activities such as
reconnaissance did not automatically lead to an unbridled race to put
major weapons systems into space. Thus, while announcing plans for a MOL,
Washington took pains to reiterate its determination to adhere to the 1963
resolution of the General Assembly. Ambassador Goldberg, probably in re-
sponse to widespread concern over the MOL, reassured the United Nations
that U.S. "space activities have been, and will continue to be, non-
aggressive, and peacelhl and beneficial in character. ''2
It was also reported that the U.S. Government--or at least some influ-
ential portions of it--agreed to allow the Air Force to develop an orbiting
laboratory only after being persuaded that the MDL's peacekeeping potential
outweighed the possible negative international repercussions from putting
the military into manned spaced flight. B True, the time was hardly pro-
pitious for the United Nations to take over a MOL program to carry out its
own arms control inspection operations .4 But the MOL could provide an
effective means of national inspection by which each great power could be
assured that its adversary was not putting weapons into orbit or, more
generally, conducting operations tl_it would upset ti_ balance of power or
mount a surprise attack. From this point of view it might even be in the
U.S. interest that Russia develop an effective space observation system in
order that Moscow could remain assured that U.S. activities in space were
non- lethal. 5
1See The New York Times, December l, 1965, p. l; January 25, 1966, p. lO.
2U.N. Doc. A/PV. 1334, September 24, 1965, pp. 42-45.
3This judgment, it was reported, was made at a meeting of the National
Aeronautics and Space Council, chaired by Vice President Humphrey, which dis-
cussed 25 detailed questions about the impact of the M0L on arms control and
the arms race. (Howard Simons and Chalmers M. Roberts, "Role in Arms Control
Clinched MOL Victory," The Washington Post, September 5, 1965, pp. l, 5. )
On the other hand, it was generally acknowledged that the origin of the
MOL lay in Secretary McNamara's desire to provide a sop for the Air Force when
he decided to cancel its DynaSoar orbital glider program late in 1963. (Ibid.)
4See below, pp. ll2-113.
5For further discussion, see below, pp. lll-ll2.
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Both sides, it seemed,were keeping their powder dry. NASAdirector
JamesE. Webbstated in March 1965 that he sawno evidence that Moscowwas
con_nitted to any definite military role for man in space, but, like the
United States, wanted to find out what the possibilities were. "We think we
are providing a base for military power if we want it," Webb stated. 1
Moscow's diplomatic assurances that it intended to adhere to the 1963
U.N. resolution gained credibility in that they corresponded or at least
did not conflict with contemporary statements of Soviet strategic doctrine.
Soviet military spokesmen emphasized in 1964-1965 the great significance of
missilry, including A/_4 defenses, but they appear not to have extolled the
specific u_ility of space weapons--except to accuse the United States of
planning to use them. 2 Marshal Sokolovskii in February 1965 went so far as
to deny the utility of weapons in space. 3 The Soviet Union, he said, "sees
no sense in developing space weapons," for the weapons already stockpiled on
earth sufficed to destroy all living things. On the contrary, Sokolovskii
went on, the Soviet Union strove to ensure that engines of destruction were
not stationed in space, for that would be a complete waste of resources and
iThe _.Tashington Post, March 23, 1965, p. 2.
2See sources cited in Wolfe, op. cit., p. 313, note 22.
3The contrast between Sokolovskii's 1965 remarks, on the one hand, and the
1962 and 1963 editions of his treatise on military strategy, on the other,
was most striking. The revised version of his book appeared in 1963,
prior to the U.S.-Soviet understanding on banning weapons in space. It did
not retract the 1962 edition's warnings that the Soviet Union should take
strong steps to prevent U.S. superiority in the military uses of space.
The 1963 edition added the charge that the Pentagon was studying the military
potentiality of the moon for "communications, reconnaissance and as a base
for cosmic means of attack." Further, the 1963 version added that "the
concept of the 'spatial scope' of a future war must be basically amended,
because military operations can also embrace the cosmos." (V.D. Sokolovskii
(ed.), Voennaia strategiia _nd ed._ Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo
ministerstva oborony SSSR, 1963J, pp. 404, 254, cited in Wolfe, o2. cit.,
pp. 204, 206.
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would "not promote but act against the scientific aims of the conquest of
,,i
space.
While Sokolovskii may not have wanted to emphasize the connection
between Moscow's space explorations and Soviet military might, this tie was
nevertheless suggested when the Marshal replied to a query as to the range
of Soviet rockets. Their range was "unlimited," a fact which he claimed
was borne out not only by Soviet military rockets but also by Soviet
launchings of sputniks with cosmonauts on board.
Furthermore, in describing the adequacy of Soviet rocket forces,
Sokolovskii declared that the Soviet Union possessed "intercontinental,
global rockets" with warheads having the equivalent of up to lO0 million
tons of TNT. By using the word "global" he harked back to a term
Khrushchev and others had used in 1962, and perhaps adumbrated Soviet claims
of an "orbital" missile in May and November 1965 .2
For Sokolovskii to say that space could be important militarily was,
of course, not in conflict with his statement that Moscow did not believe
it necessary or desirable to place weapons in orbit. In any event, in works
published before and after his February 1965 news conference, Sokolovskii
and other Soviet strategists remained silent about the military utility of
outer space and stressed instead the important role and the adequacy of Soviet
iSokolovskii's comments on outer space were not part of his prepared speech,
• \
which stressed the adequacy of Soviet missiles vis-a-vis the United St_Ates,
but came in response to a query by a New York Herald Tribune reporter as to
whether outer space would be used for military purposes in the next twenty
years. On the one hand Sokolovskii's remarks should be treated as authori-
tative, not only because he was then active in publishing on military strategy,
but also because he spoke before a specially convened meeting at Moscow's
Union House and took questions from the floor, from Soviet as well as Western
newsmen. His remarks on outer space and his answers to other questions, as
well as his prepared speech, were broadcast both abroad and domestically.
On the other hand Sokolovskii's statements had transparent propaganda
motivations, and he probably exaggerated the size of Soviet missile warheads
(the equivalent of up to lO0 million tons of TNT), the quantity of Soviet
atomic submarines ("no fewer" than the United States possessed), while he
minimized the number of Soviet men under arms (2,423,000--as opposed to
over 3 million by Western estimates). Broadcasts by TASS and Moscow Radio
on February 17, 1965.
2One English version of Sokolovskii's prepared remarks had him saying that the
Soviet Union had intercontinental and global rockets; a later version made
this "intercontinental, global..."--_t a commentator for Moscow Radio spoke
only of "global" rockets.
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strategic and tactical rocket forces. It could also be observed that no
claims were made at the Twenty-third Congress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union in the spring of 19662 or at the May Day parade that year to
3
Soviet possession of an orbital missile or other space weapons.
1See, e.g., _arshal Vasilii D. Sokolovskii and Major General M. I.
Cheredinichenko, "Military Art at a New Stage," Krasnaia Zvezda, August 25
and 28, 1964; see also the article by the same two authors in Konmmnist
Vooruzhenn_kh Si___l,No. 7, 1966; see also Marshal A. A. Grechko, "A Mighty
Guardian of the Fatherland," Krasnaia Zvezda_, February 23, 1966, where the
commander of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces extols their equipment,
especially the mobile ICBM's exhibited on November 7, 1965, but says nothing
about "orbital" or "global" missiles; see also Marshal M. Zakharov, "The
People's Striking Power," Izvestiia, February 23, 1966, for praise of the
Strategic Rocket Forces and their defensive capabilities, but silence on
orbital weapons.
2Defense Minister Malinovsky's address to the Congress stated that since the
22nd Party Cor4_ress in !9 g] -_,,_ _a _n taken "to increase the reserve
of nuclear warheads for various purposes and to reinforce sharply the equipment
of all types of armed forces with means of delivery." Much attention had been
paid to "the development of our strategic rocket forces and atomic submarines
equipped with rockets. The main efforts of the leading branches of our
military industry have been subordinated to the rapid expansion of these
forces, the chief means for restraining an aggressor and decisively routing
him in a war." Malinovsky also noted the "development of operational and
tactical nuclear weapons, especially those of the land forces and the navy."
He asserted that "the equipment of the armed forces with conventional weapons
has also been expanded in corresponding proportions ." Malinovsky's remarks
on ABM defenses were less extensive than some previous claims: "Our defenses
ensure the reliable destruction of any aircraft and many of the enemy's
rockets." (Italics added.) For text, see Krasnaia Zvezda, April 2, 1966.
Malinovsky's most enigmatic claim--"the establishment of the 'Blue Defense
Belt'"--has been explained by East German sources as a reference to
Polaris-type submarines.
3While Moscow itself does not seem to have claimed again in 1966 a capacity
for orbital missiles, the Defense Minister of East Germany, Heinz Hoffmann,
was reported in May 1966 to have declared that "the firm shield and sharp
sword of the socialist military coalition are the rocket troops of the U.S.S.R.,
whose orbital, global, intercontinental and medium-range rockets can carry a
nuclear warhead with an explosive power of up to lO0 megatons to every point
on earth To this are added the atomic submarines of the 'blue defense belt'
-
which can operate in every sea of the world." It was not clear whether this
statement is a quotation or paraphrase; cf. AND Domestic Service in German,
1421 GMT, May 25, 1966; no apparent reference to the statement in Neues
Deutschland.
Since this statement is clearly designed to press to the utmost all evi-
dence of Soviet military power (probably exaggerating, for example, the size
warhead available for ICI_4's--not to speak of medium-range or even "orbital"
missiles), and since East Germany has been especially interested in obstructing
U.S.-Soviet detente, Hoffmann's statement may not even reflect Soviet wishes or
capacities.
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The upshot of these developmentsfrom 1964 through mld-1966 was that
both superpowers continued to adhere, at least in their declaratory policies,
to the 1963 resolution on weaponsin outer space. Propagandaclaims and even
production of space weaponswould be tolerated, although not welcomed,
especially by the United States. More important, actual deployment of
military support vehicles in outer space would be distinguished from the
stationing of weapons of mass destruction. Moscow's acquiescence in this
understanding ranked with its tacit acceptance circa 196 3 of the legality of
unmanned reconnaissance satellites. This, in turn, may have reinforced the
Soviet commitment to a pragmatic, limited measures approach to arms control
and inspection, as it crystallized in 1963-1964.
These events seemed to vindicate the wisdom of avoiding a formal treaty
on arms control in outer space in 1963. Scholars and statesmen concerned
with the political implications of science had long debated two polarized
alternatives for coping with technological change. Should one attempt to
foreclose undesirable technological innovations by prohibitive legislation
before they become accomplished facts? Or should one wait to see what is
technologically (and militarily) feasible and attempt to control it after
the fact, assuming perhaps that the drive of technology cannot in any
case be stifled? The 1963 U.N. resolution avoided some of the dangers of
both extreme approaches. The very flexibility of the resolution proved
to be an asset in some respects, for it did not lay down a set of laws too
constrictive to be upheld; on the other hand it provided a climate and
some specific indicators describing the consensus of the superpowers re-
garding the acceptable parameters of military operations in space. To have
attempted prematurely to formalize this consensus in treaty language may
have risked reaching no understanding in 196 3 or one that was later denounced
by one of the superpowers.
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VI. "ANTARCTICA"FOROUTERSPACE?
The 1963 resolution of the General Assembly had withstood the challenges
of 1965, but its combination of flexibility plus restraint was far from pro-
viding Candide's '_best of all possible worlds." Inherent in its permissive
and ambiguousnature there were substantial liabilities as well as assets.
Although the mutual recriminations of 1965 had been weathered, subsequent
circumstances might still see one or both superpowers revise its position on
weaponsin space. As the capacity of both the United States and the Soviet
Union to send mannedships to the planets becameevident, pressures increased to
give a more specific form to their understanding on arms control in outer space.
Two questions becameparamount: first, to ensure that outer space re-
mained essentially off-bounds to major weaponssystems; and second, to
guarantee that national claims were not madeupon celestial bodies. Both
concerns were reflected in recommendationsof two committees reporting to the
White Housein December1965 in connection with "International Cooperation
1
Year," designated by the General Assembly to take place in 1965 ._
The Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament declared that the recent
announcement by the United States of plans for a MOL ':gave rise to serious
misunderstanding and led some observers to the erroneous conclusion that the
United States was repudiating her intention, now embodied in a U.N. resolution,
to refrain from placing nuclear weapons in space ." The Committee did not call
for a treaty to deal with these problems, but it advocated that the United
States "continue to reaffirm, as Ambassador Goldberg recently has, her commit-
ment to the General Assembly resolution against weapons of mass destruction
in outer space."
The concerns of the Space Committee were broader and its recommendation
more sweeping. Noting that "multiple manned landings on the moon" were in
prospect over the next several years, it suggested that the U.N. Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space could direct its Legal Subcommittee to
draft a convention to serve as a guide for nationally-sponsored exploratory
expeditions there. The report declared:
The Antarctica Treaty stands as a model providing
the essential elements of such a convention:
suspension of sovereign claims, free access by all
for scientific purposes, exclusion of military
maneuvers and weaponry, and a verification procedure.
1The Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament was headed by Jerome B. Wiesner,
then Dean of Science at M.I.T.; the Committee on Space by Joseph V. Charyk,
Chairman of the Communications Satellite Corporation. (Continued on page 93)
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Such a convention, the committee went on, "would give substance to the
principle, already adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in December 1963,
that celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation. It
would become, in effect, a code for human activity on the moon.
Editorially, The New York Times gave the Committee's recommendation its
1
full support.
The Kremlin also showed an increasing concern in 1966 to reduce the
anarchical possibilities inherent in unrestricted competition in outer
space. As noted earlier, Moscow went on record in 1962-1963 as favoring
a multilateral treaty specifying the legal principles to guide nations in
the exploration of space. In December 1963, however, the Soviet Union
nevertheless joined the other nations in the General Assembly in endorsing
a "Declaration" of such principles, noting however that such a document
"could not...deal with the matter of military uses of space." It was
quite clear, said the Soviet Ambassador,
that the question of the prohibition of the
military uses of outer space can be solved only
in the context of disarmament, with parallel and
........... _............... __ milit.a_y bases
on the territory of other states._
By late May 1966 Moscow had clearly dropped this linkage of space arms
control with terrestrial disarmament. A numbe_" of signs _pea_-ed e_licr
in the year suggesting that the Kremlin was becoming more serious about
space arms controls as a separate measure. But these indicators were also
ambivalent in that they had obvious propaganda motivations as well as a
potential for providing a broader base for an accord on an arms control
regime in outer space. Thus, in January 1966 Academician Blagonravov
suggested to the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space that an
international conference on outer space be held in 1967, the tenth
anniversary of the launching of the first artificial satellite, an event
l(continued from page 92)
Both committees consisted entirely of citizens, many of whom had serried earlier
in the government, and both had the benefit of consultation with officials from
various governmental agencies. But the report of the Committee on Space was
known to represent a consensus of its members and governmental consultants,
whereas the report of the Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament was openly
criticized in various respects by many governmental officials. All the reports
for the White House Conference on International Cooperation were printed in
1965 by the U.S. Government Printing Office.
iThe New York Times, November 30, 1965, p. 3_.i.
2Speech of December 2, 1963, by Ambassador l_dorenko in Documents on
Disarmament_ 1963, P. 637. See above, p. 68.
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,,i
_hich h,._ sai_ mar_ed "the beginning of the space age. In February, the
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference heard Ambassador Tsarapkin warn
that "military circles are scanning the moon to establish military bases
,,2
the re.
Tsarapkin's statement coincided with another major Soviet "first" in
space, a relatively soft landing of the spaceship Luna 9 on the moon, from
which it sent television signals back to earth. This event was followed
by a press conference held in Moscow by the President of the U.S.S.R.
Academy of Sciences, M. V. Keldysh. Replying to one question, he stated:
"I would ban all military actions on the moon. Our country is against
armaments on earth and the more so on the moon." As for the question of
rivalry with the United States, "I think that in this field there should
be cooperation, not competition." Further, Keldysh stated the Soviet Union
did not claim ownership of that part of the moon where the automatic station
landed. 3 A Soviet publication later summed up Keldysh's remarks by re-
porting that "he said the Soviet Union urged prohibition of any military
,4
installations on the moon.
Tsarapkin's accusations in Geneva in February 1966 were amplified in
the April number of a leading Soviet publication on international politics.
It asserted that "hostile imperialists" were calling for "occupation of
the moon in order to conduct from there a nuclear war."
The plans of the imperialist strategists to use
outer space for military goals kindles war
hysteria, justifies the arms race, and in conse-
quence, the dizzying rate of profits for the
manufacturers of death.
iThe precise utility and purpose of the proposed conference were not very
clear. Blagonravov said the conference could provide information for
peoples in all countries and training for the developing countries. (The
Christian Science Monitor, January 26, 1966, p. 4.) In a gesture toward
cooperation with the United States, the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences elected
three U.S. scientists as members in early 1966, raising the total of U.S.
membership in the Soviet Academy to six. Five Soviet scientists were already
members of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences. (The New York Times,
February 12, 1966, p. 4.)
2The Christian Science Monitor, February 9, 1966, p. 2.
3TASS International Service in English, 1005 GMT, February lO, 1966.
4Whether this summary read more into Keldysh's remarks than was actually
present is difficult to determine on the basis of the TASS broadcast cited
above. (New Times, No. 24 _June 15, 1966J p. 15.)
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Arguing that the responsibility for such plans did not lie with "generals"
alone, the article stated that the U.S. Congress had authorized $25 billion
in five years for outer space, and not just for research. Citing a British
source the article took note of a number of strategically useful U.S.
developments in space: reconnaissance satellites passing over Soviet
military objects; "Spasur," the radio-wave fence in the southern United
States which "constantly follows all artificial bodies launched into outer
space"; the early warning missile defenses extending from Alaska to England;
the Nike-Zeus anti-satelllte force stationed on Kwadjalein and a parallel
system using Thor rockets based in the Hawaiian Islands; the SV-5 "falling
tear" rocket capable of maneuvering in space; the MOL in which "two Air
Force officers with the assistance of advanced equipment will be able to
observe the surface of the earth, the atmosphere, and outer space"; and
finally, experiments to rendezvous with other space ships.
On these grounds the Soviet article seconded the question raised by
its British source: Would not military competition in space come to pre-
dominate over scientific exploration? Ostensibly, to be sure, the Soviet
publication opposed all such measures to militarize outer space. But there
was implicit the suggestion that, if the United States engaged in such
programs, the Soviet Union must do the same. In general, the article
(entitled "Socialist Aspects of the Mastery of Outer Space _;) attempted to
justify the Soviet space program against those who called for using its
resources for the immediate needs of mankind. On the other hand the author
may also (or instead) have intended to argue that to place nuclear weapons
in outer space was sheer folly, for he stated that the U.S. imperialists who
"dream" of stationing thermonuclear weapons on the moon forget one "'trifle':
that such an expedition would cost $7 trillion--approximately 120-1SO times
the short annual budget of the U.S.A. ''l
IE. Kolman, "Socialist Aspects of the Mastery of Outer Space," Mirovaia
ekonomika i mezhdunarodn_re otnosheniia, No. 4 (1966), pp. 36-37. A more
hostile tone characterized comments in April 1966 by Colonel Yuri Gagarin,
the first cosmonaut, and Marshal Vershinin, commander of the Soviet Air Force.
At a meeting in the Kremlin attended by Brezhnev, Kosygin, members of the
Politburo, cosmonauts, and almost 6,000 members of the public, Colonel Gagarin
commended U.S. scientists and astronauts for a "number of interesting experi-
ments." But he expressed regret that "American cosmonautics are increasingly
falling under the influence of the Pentagon, (Continued on page 96)
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Although the superpowers continued to investigate the military
possibilities of outer space, both Washington and Moscowcameforward in
May 1966with specific proposals for a treaty to govern the exploration of
outer space. Differences of substance as well as protocol distinguished
the U.S. and Soviet proposals, but the gaps between them were small
comparedwith the usual starting positions of the major protagonists in
East-West negotiations.
Warning that "the time is ripe" and "we should not lose time,"
President Johnsonannouncedon May7, 1966, that he was instructing
AmbassadorGoldberg to seek a treaty with five key elements:
_J Themoonand other celestial bodies should be
free for e_ploration and use by all countries. No
country should be permitted to advance a claim of
sovere ignty.
f2J There should be freedom of scientific investi-
gation, and all countries should cooperate in
scientific activities relating to celestial bodies.
_BJ Studies should be madeto avoid harmful
contamination.
_J Astronauts of one country should give any
necessary help to astronauts of another country.
_SJ No country should be permitted to station
weaponsof massdestruction on a celestial body.
Weaponste_ts and military maneuversshould be
forbidden. _
l(continued from page 95)
which regards outer space as a theatre for future military operations."
Similarly, in an article in Pravda, Vershinin expressed "deep indignation"
at the military aspects of U.S. space activities. Heaccused Washington
of basing its relations with other countries on cosmic subjects with a view
to gaining access to launching pads, tracking stations, and research insti-
tutions. (The Times fLondonT,April 14, 1966.) In light of this accusation
it was interesting to read a TASS report one day later announcing that
Russian scientists had set up two stations in the United Arab Republic and
Mall to photograph artificial earth satellites. TASS stated that stations
have Soviet equipment and are operated by specialists of the Soviet Union,
the U.A.R., and Mall. (The New York Times, April 16, 1966.)
1The New York Times, May 8, 1966.
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One official stated his belief that the arms control aspects of the
President's proposal would most attract Soviet attention. "There is some
feeling that the Antarctic Treaty An 1959_ turned out better than we
thought it would," he said. "Soviet interests and ours would seem to be
quite similar in the matter of space. I think there is every reason to be
rather hopeful about this. ''l
Restrained optimism was partially justified when, on May 31, 1966,
the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko dispatched a letter to U Thant calling
for a treaty on the peacefUl uses of outer space. The four key points of
the Soviet proposal corresponded in large part with those suggested by the
United States on May 7. But the Soviet arms control paragraph was much
broader. It declared:
The moon and other celestial bodies should be
used by all states for peaceful purposes only.
No military bases or installations including
installations of nuclear and other celestial
bodies .2
The phrase "for peaceful purposes only" opened the possibility that Moscow
meant to bar military support activities such as reconnaissance as well as
offensive weapons systems, if so, the road to a treaty might be longer than
many observers expected. Further, although neither the U.S. nor the Soviet
documents of May 7 and May 31 spoke of weapons in orbit, Moscow's draft
treaty made public on June 17 prohibited the orbiting of weapons of mass
destruction as well as their stationing on a celestial body. The relevant
clause in the U.S. draft announced on June 16, stated that in accord with
resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, "no state shall station on or
near a celestial body any nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass
destruction. "3
The Soviet letter to U Thant on May 31 went a step toward reversing the
usual sequence specified in Soviet disarmament theory: It suggested that
iThe New York Times, May i0, 1966, p. 4.
2The New York Times, June i, 1966, p. 22.
3Ibid., June 18, 1966, p. ll.
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l:rohz:J'_o'. ' the use ,_. the moon and other celestial bodies foz" .._i_*:_.,,........ _
purposes w_ull prove an important step" in the direction of general !isarmament,
rather than making space arms control contingent upon eaz-thly disarmament.
Such a prohibition plus the creation of a sound legal basis for space
exploration, the letter continued, would benefit international cooperation
in space and Friendly relations among nations. Here too was another shift
in Soviet theory, which had previously conditioned space cooperation as
well as space arms control on general disarmament.
Gromyko's letter recalled the Soviet initiatives in 1958, 1961, and
1963 which proposed legal accords to govern the use of outer space, bypassing
completely any reference to Johnson's proposal of _y 7, 1966. As if to
dispel any thought that Moscow was acting out of weakness, the Soviet
letter prefaced its treaty proposal by recounting the recent "firsts"
scored by Luna 9 and Luna i0. These flights, Gromyko wrote, demonstrated
,,1
"the real possibility of using the moon by man in the very near future ....
.... u_j_v _e_c_ suggested that the Soviet draft treaty be discussed
at the 21st session of the General Assembly in September, 1966, while the
United States had proposed on May 9 that the treaty for outer space be
debated forthwith in a Legal Subcommittee of the U.N. Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The Soviet, position gave rise to fears that
Moscow wanted only a propaganda score on outer space, but Moscow agreed in
June 1')66 to discussions in the Legal Subcommittee.2 An analogous fear was
nourished when Soviet Ambassador Fedorenko, after reading the Gromyko letter
to U Thant at a press conference, stressed Moscow's continuing clash with
Washington over Vietnam. 3 Anxiety that disagreements in Southeast Asia might
prevent a treaty on outer space was eased somewhat by a strong denial in
Izvestiia on June 22, 1966, that Moscow insisted on a pull-out of American
troops from Vietnam as a precondition for another arms control measure--
a treaty on non-proliferation. Just as Moscow has attempted to justify
IThe New York Times, June i, 1966, p. 22. U.S. officials welcomed what they
took to be an "affirmative interest in President Johnson's proposal" of May 7,
1966. (Ibi____dd.,June i, 1966, p. i; June 17, 1966, p. 15.)
2The New York Times, June 23, 1966, pp. i, 17.
3The Christian Science Monitor, June l, 1966, p. i.
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negotiations on nonproliferation in terms of the dangers resulting from the
Vietnamese war, so it rationalized talks on outer space by the need to curb
1
the ambitions of U.S. militarists to rule cosmic space.
The U.N. Legal Subcommittee meetings began on the date requested by the
United States (July 12, 1966) and the site proposed by the Soviet Union
(Geneva) 2 In this fashion began a set of negotiations that one observer
characterized as having a "strikingly businesslike manner." It was probably
an exaggeration to say, with one editorial, that the two major space powers
displayed a "maximum readiness to make concessions" at the Geneva meetings. 3
But wide areas of agreement could be seen in the draft Treaties proposed by
Moscow and Washington on June 16, 1966--almost a month before the negotiations
4
began. When they adjourned on August 4 important differences remained un-
settled, but agreement had been reached on nine draft articles of a treaty
tentatively approved by the entire 28-nation subcommittee .5
The most important development for arms control came two weeks after the
Geneva negotiations began when Ambassador Goldberg announced that the United
States would agree to the Soviet position that the talks should deal with
all of outer space, and not only the moon and other celestial bodies as
Washir_ton Pad vr1_-._±_^" _'- I__. proposed.
Second, the United States agreed to a draft article expressing the Soviet
formula that banned not only the stationing of weapons of mass destruction on
celestial bodies, but also the orbiting of such weapons in outer space.
1The New York Times, August 6, 1966, p. 22.
2The New York Times, June 23, 1966, p. 17; also Life, Vol. 61, No. 6
(August 5, 1965), p. 30.
3The New York Times, August 6, 1966, p. 22.
4Draft Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, in letter dated
16 June 1966, from the Permanent Representative of the U.S.S.R. to the United
Nations, addressed to the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/6352.
Draft Treaty Governing the Exploration of the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, letter dated 16 June 1966 from the Permanent Representative of the
U.S.A. addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, U.N. Doe. A/AC.105/32.
5The New York Times, July 31, 1966, p. 19; The Christian Science Monitor,
August 5, 1966, p. 2. For an article by article summary, see U.S. Mission
to the United Nations, Press Release, "Text Agreed in Meeting Working Group
of the Legal Subcommittee," 9 August 1966.
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/_arl;her, Moscow and b_ashington concurred in principles already contained
in their draft proposals of June 16: that outer space and celestial bo_i_
should be open to all nations and free of all military activity, and that
no state could claim national ownership of any celestial body. They also
agreed that international law, _including the Charter of the United Nations/
should apply to activities in outer space and on celestial bodies. Accord
_.rasalso registored on problems which had for several years yielded no
a'_ <_. _<u'_t: in articles dealing with assistance to and the return of
astronauts; liability for damages; avoidance of harmful contamination;
jurisdiction and property rights over space vehicles.
Five major disagreements remained outstanding when the Subcommittee
adjourned in August 1966. First was the question of reporting on space
activities. Washington proposed that any state conducting space exploration
(a) promptly provide the Secretary-General of the
u,,_ _=u-u,_ w-b_1 a descriptive report Of the
nature; con@net; and locations of such activities
and (b) make the findings of such activities freely
available to the public and the international
scientific community.
Platon D. Morozov_ the Soviet negotiator, however, said that 1_porting should
be "on a voluntary basis."
Second, the Subcommittee left unresolved the extent to which installations
on celestial bodies should be open to visits. The U.S. draft proposed:
All areas of celestial bodies, including all
stations, installations, equipment, and space
vehicles on celestial bodies, shall be open at
all times to representatives of other States
conducting activities on celestial bodies.
Moscow maintained that such visits should be subject to prior agreement
instead of being optional "at all times."
A third issue was whether military equipment should be permitted on
celestial bodies. The U.S. proposal prohibited the establishment of "military
fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, or the testing of any
type weapons." But it specifically did not prohibit "the use of military
personnel, facilities or equipment for scientific research or for any other
peaceful purpose .... " This provision, in Soviet judgment, could provide a
"loophole" to violate the basic aim oi" keeping outer space free of military
activity. Moscow ag.::'_._el-hovc _-,:-.,tha-_ ser-.,ice.-.,enwithout military equipment
{_9_ti<:.; .._.22,-<_,_ ,- _.ta:._.1.<..-::<tier tf ii<: :'":S_l<rChan< :,tLer _:eac_i'a] a.(.,c'[Lies
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Fourth, the Soviet Union opposed the U.S. proposal that "any disputes
arising from the interpretation or application of this Agreement may be
referred by any Contracting Party thereto to the International Court of
Justice for decision."
Finally, the United States and Soviet Union were at odds over what
nations should be allowed to sign the treaty. Washington did not want
to give indirect admission to Communist China by allowing her to sign a
document drafted under U.N. auspices. The U.S. proposal said the "members
of the United Nations treaty could be signed by Nations or of any of the
specialized agencies of Parties to the Statue of the International Court
of Justice, and by any other State invited by the General Assembly...to
become a party." The Soviet Union_ on the other hand, said that the
treaty should be open to all nations.
Thus, the Geneva negotiations had failed to live up to the hope that
they could produce a draft treaty for consideration by the General Assembly
in September. Instead, the Legal Subcommittee would have to continue its
own deliberations in New York in September. Despite the differences that
continued to divide the U.S. and Soviet approaches, progress toward agree-
ment had been remarkably rapid from May through August 1966. Only time
would tell whether the final barriers to a space treaty could be overcome.
As the next chapter suggests, _w=v_r,........a serics _ _^___,
strategic, political, and economic factors seemed to make it increasingly
in the interest of each superpower to surmount these obstacles and move
toward an arms control regime for outer space.
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Neither Washington nor Moscow is of one mind in the r_id-1960's on _he
desirability or feasibility of exploiting outer space for military purposes.
Pressures and counter-pressures arise from a complex of technological,
military, political 3 and economic considerations. The thrust of these
considerations has varied over time, seeming to militate in one direction
and then another. Factions within each government continue to argue both
_f
sides of the case, but it appears in i_o6 that the White House and the
Kremlin have opted in favor of taking decisive steps toward preventive arms
control in outer space. Their apparent intent has not been to rule out all
military uses of space, such as early warning and surveillance systems, but
they do seem to aim at precluding the stationing of weapons of mass destruc-
tion in orbit or on celestial bodies. To what extent they also seek to
rule out active defense systems in outer space is not clear, owing in part
to the difficulty in distinguishing these systems from weapons of mass
destruction.
The fundamental factors bringing each side to this view have probably
been technological and strategic, reinforced however by compelling political
and economic considerations. These will now be evaluated one by one.
Technological-Strategic F_ctors
The words and deeds of both superpowers in 1966 indicate that they are
in fact "racing for the moon" and are likely to arrive there in several
years. A common view in the West is that the Soviet Union will be the first
to orbit a i1_nned spaceship around the moon and bring its crew back to
earth, but that the United States, not long afterwards, will be the first
to land men on the moon. Whether or not this prediction proves accurate
in detail, the evidence is overwhelming that both superpowers will be
able to reach the moon within a relatively close span of one another--
probably before 1970. Even before men reach the moon, they will be orbiting
the earth in laboratories. Although it will be 1967 or 1968 before either
side orbits laboratories in which men can work comfortably for relatively
long periods of time, such flights have already been adumbrated by two-manned
space missions successfully completed by Soviet and U.S. astronauts in the
mid-1960 's.
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Given the feasibility of such flights around the globe and to celestial
bodies, what is the potential role for the military in space? Twocompeting
philosophies have been expressed: Proponents of exploring the military's
role contend that the strategic uses of space cannot be foreseen; that
wherever manhas gone, he has developed the capability to fight; that the
history of world politics demonstrates that nations will exploit for
military uses whatever technological capacity they develop. Against this
thesis is the hope of somethat "for the first time on the international
scene, it might be possible to avoid the giddy cycle of law chasing power
..ibut never quite catching up.
Apart from philosophy, practical questions remain about the specific
uses and utility of weaponsin space, insofar as these can be evaluated for
the foreseeable future. First, however, a distinction must be made
between direct and support military activities in space. Direct operations
include the placing of weaponsof mass destruction (missiles or more exotic
devices) in orbit or on celestial bodies; in contrast to weaponsthat shoot
from space to earth, other direct military applications include weaponsfor
use against other space ships or against missile launchings from earth;
finally, weather control from space mayalso be considered a direct military
function. Support missions include reconnaissance, surveillance, and tar-
geting activities, as well _s bh_ _port_tion of ii_n and material thl-ough
outer space.
Direct Militar_ Applications: Bombs in Orbit
From the standpoint of either superpower, bombardment systems in space
appear to be superfluous, expensive, and dangerous. The situation in 1966
seems little different from 1962 when Deputy Secretary Gilpatric enunciated
the Defense Department's view that to place thermonuclear weapons in orbit
was "just not a reasonable strategy for either side in the foreseeable
future. ''2 Or, as Assistant Secretary of Defe,!_e ._;_ci!aughtonput it in 1963:
iEditorial, i01 Solicitors J. 965 (1957), quoted in Philip C. Jessup and
Howard J. Taubenfeld, Controls for Outer Space and the Antarctic Analogy
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 267.
2Documents on Disarmament_ 1963 [si_ (Washington: U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Publication 24, 19o4), p. 537-
104
At least so long as the targets are on earth,
the satellite p]atfo::_:--when comparedwith a
ground, ship, or aircraft platform--promises less
payload, less accuracy, less reliability, and
less control. EVenwhenwe look ahead, we must
remembernot to comparesomeconceptually advanced
version of the bomb-carrying satellite with the
ballistic missile of today. As time passes, the
ballistic missile will lend itself to a numberof
advancedvariations.l
The basic reason why it would be superfluous to put bombsinto orbit
is that both Moscowand Washington have sufficient reason to believe that
their land- and sea-based missiles and bombersalready provide and will
continue to provide as persuasive a deterrent as is humanly attainable.
The Soviet Union is confronted with a roughly 3:1 U.S. superiority in
numbersof IC_Mand Polaris-type missiles and long-range bombers. But
Moscowcontinues to hold Europe "hostage" by almost 800 intermediate and
medium-rangemissiles, and its strategic force is so powerful that Defense
Secretary McNamaratestified in January 1966 that even the best and most
costly mix of damage-limiting measures, including A_Mand civil defense,
could hardly hope to reduce American fatalities from a Soviet first-strike
below 50 or moremillion lives. 2
At least six major considerations have been raised that run counter to
the above argument. First, from the U.S. point of view, somestrategic
analysts have argued in 1966 that qualitative and quantitative improvements
in the Soviet missile force maysoon changeU.S. "superiority" to parity
or even create a "gap" in Russia's favor. These strategists usually focus
on Washington's decision not to increase the numbersof U.S. missiles in
the late 1960's. 3 Their arguments tend to overlook the dramatic and
important gains in accuracy, penetration capability, firepower, and other
improvementsbeing madeor projected for U.S. missiles in the immediate
4
future. If Washington wishes, of course, it can exercise the option of
ijohn T. McNaughton, "Space Technology and Arms Control," in Maxwell Cohen (ed.),
Law and Politics in Space (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964, p. 66.
2See excerpts from statement before the House Armed Service Subcommittee on
January 25, 1966, The New York Times, January 26, 1966, p. lO; see Th__ee
Military Balance, 1965-1966 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1965),
esp. p. 40.
3See e.g. Hanson Baldwin, The New York Times, July 14, 1966, p. 14.
4_ee e.g., the testimony of Defense Department officials cited in Jeremy J.
[[_ton_, Comtainin. the A=_u._ i_?? (?_mb_Jdg_:: The M.].T. Press, 1966) pp. 131-132.
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increasing the numbersas well as the quality of U.S. strategic forces.
Hence, the United States need not resort to weaponsin space in order to
counter increases in Soviet strategic power.
Second, it is argued that weaponsin orbit maybe necessary to provide
an invulnerable second-strike capability. But the numberand quality of
hardened missile silos and missile-carrying submarines possessed by both
superpowers makeadditional weaponsin space redundant.
Third, if either superpowersuccessfully constructs an anti-ballistic
missile defense against land- and sea-based rockets, it maybe necessary
to have weaponsstationed in outer space which could penetrate these
defensive systems. While theoretically plausible, this thesis makesan
assumption the validity of which has not yet been demonstrated: that a
workable and effective defense against land- and sea-based missiles can
be built. It makesthe less plausible assumption that, if a relatively
effective AI_4system is constructed, it cannot be overcomeby increases
in the numbersor changes in the characteristics of these missiles. Further,
it presumes that one or the other superpower builds the fall-out shelters
needed to protect against the radiation that would result if only a small
number of enemymissiles pierced the AI_4network or exploded above the
defended territory. In any case, should either superpower construct a
defense adequate against land- or sea-based m±_±_,....... it _,._... ..._-_ _ _
and willing to build one against weaponsfrom outer space.
Fourth, it is suggested that a missile shot from orbit would afford
less warning time--perhaps a total of four or five minutes--than one fired
from a far distant continent, which could be monitored by infrared sensing
devices. A comparison of different systems would of course have to examine
the warning time afforded by a strike from space with that provided by a
Polaris missile fired near the enemycoast or, in the m_uropeanenvironment,
1
with a mediumor intermediate-range missile. In all these cases the
warning time is quite brief. If there is no effective defense, of course,
a variation in warning time from an hour to five minutes makeslittle
difference for the protection of population, although it could well be
iThis comparison is not relevant, however, if it is supposed that a space-
launched weaponwere used for a surprise attack while sub_uarine-based
missiles were reserved for employmentin a later stage of a nuclear exchange.
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critical in ensuring that a retaliatory blow was launched.
Fifth, analysts warn that four to five years lead time are required
in order to produce a workable weapons system and that the United States
should be careful not to be caught off guard by a Pearl Harbor-type
demonstration of Soviet missiles in orbit. But such a contingency is
very remote. For years both superpowers have been judged technically
capable of orbiting missiles, but they have chosen not to for political
and strategic reasons. If one power should decide to put bombs in orbit,
the other could reciprocate quickly, since each continues intensive research
and development of rockets and space exploration. Whether or not the
United States should reciprocate if Moscow decides to launch space weapons
(or build A2M defenses) is another matter, however, for U.S. security might
well be better protected by other types of compensatory measures. Further-
more, as Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton has pointed out:
The present availability of rapid and reliable means
of delivering nuclear weapons makes it very unlikely
that any single innovation in delivery systems will
prove decisive in a military sense. The bomb-carrying
satellite appears to be no exception. Such a vehicle
would not for the foreseeable future be as effective
from the military standpoint as existing types of
ballistic missiles.1
A sixth contingency, despite the logic of arguments such as McNaughton's,
is that the Kremlin might be tempted to station missiles in space as a
quick means of transforming the game so as to regain the bargaining position
enjoyed by Khrushchev in the late 1950's. This attraction could derive from
two sources: first, confidence in a continued Soviet lead in booster and
other space capabilities; and second, the long-standing Russian predilection
for psychologically compelling displays of power. 2 (Indicative perhaps of
Soviet thinking, "deterrence" is rendered in Russian as "terrorization. ''B)
1McNaughton, loc. cit.
2It is not necessarily true, as Herman Kahn has stated, that--unlike military
programs-- "space programs are not psychological. If they do not work objec-
tively, they are noticed." While intelligence analysts and governmental
leaders may downgrade, e.g., the significance of an orbital rocket (par-
ticularly if it is only shown, and not flown), the psychological impact on
mass opinion may be profound. Kahn's elucidation, however, qualifies his
point further: "...it is very likely that equipment developed for space will
be reliable at least in peacetime." On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, N.J. :
Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 486.
3The same thing is true, however, in German.
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While we do not know what reasoning is most cogent to the Soviet
leaders, they probably appreciate that, although terror weaponsin space
may have strong psychological reverberations important in international
bargaining, such devices will also be evaluated objectively for their
strategic import. The fact would remain that U.S. second-strike forces
could not be crippled by a surprise blow from outer space. Further, the
history of the 1950's (not to mention comparable situations in World Wars
I and II) suggests that U.S. industrial capacity can quickly overtake and
outproduce the Soviet Union in any dimension of arms competition in which
America seemsto lag. Whether for these or other reasons, the Kremlin in
1966 seemsto place its reliance on improvementof land- and sea-based
offensive and defensive systems, and to showa serious interest in keeping
major weaponssystems out of outer space.
If the psychological, "quick fix" potentialities of space weaponsmight
appeal to someRussians, a seventh aspect of the problem has intrigued some
Westerners: the prospect of a "limited w_r" in space. This notion
_ i
has been elaborated in the work of a Russian emi6re, but it rings a
familiar chord in the emotions of others in the West who share the assumptions
that (1) an armed conflict between capitalism and Communism is inevitable;
(2) such a war could be fought so that one side "surrendered"; (3) the
geographical bounds of this cow,oat be contained. To these beliefs it must
be said, first, that such a clash is not inevitable, although assertions to
that effect may make it more likely. Second, the prospect that one side or
the other would surrender after being defeated in outer space is extremely
remote. Third, the closer the problems of space warfare are studied, the
less likely it seems that a decisive encounter could be staged there, and
the more likely that the war in space would spread quickly to earth.
_. N. Golovine, Conflict in Space (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962).
For a more sophisticated treatment, stressing the destabilizing as opposed
to the stabilizing possibilities in various types of limited space war,
see Clark C. Abt, "The Problems and Possibilities of Space Arms Control,"
Journal of Arms Control, I, No. i (January 1963), pp. 26-29.
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Direct Military Applications: Other Weapons in Space
In addition to missiles in orbit, military analysts continue to
evaluate the utility of other weapons of mass destruction that could be
placed in outer space. As of 1966, information publicly available does not
suggest any belief that a weapon can be developed which is practical, the
deployment of which would enhance national security beyond the potentialities
inherent in land- and sea-based weapons. A laser ray, for example, might
conceivably be made effective against enemy satellites or incoming missiles.
But even for these purposes the laser has an extremely high energy require-
_]ent. As for beco_ing a "death ray" capable of striking civilian population,
it seems quite doubtful that beam-directed energy weapons will be able to
pierce the earth's atmosphere from outer space, since anything that diffuses
light, such as clouds, destroys its usefulness.
Other kinds of space weapons that could be directed against terrestrial
targets have been conceived, but they are not generally believed (at least
in Washington) to be cost-effective relative to missiles. As for "weapons
systems on the moon and other celestial bodies, most Western analysts seem
to agree that the difficulties in launching a strike toward earth are too
1
formidable to justify attempting such operations.
Research and development continue on systems of active defense that
could intercept and destroy enemy missiles close to their point of firing
instead of waiting for their descent over target. Missile-carrying satellites
or other ASM weapons would have to detect and destroy enemy missile launches.
The difficulty and the cost of developing and maintaining such a system over
enemy territory would be formidable, to say the least, but it would be still
more complex to direct such defenses against Polaris-type launchings close
to one's own shores. An ASM defense in outer space must discriminate not
only between heat emanating from missiles and heat emanating from other
sources; it must also distinguish enemy from "friendly" missiles, whether
land- or sea-launched. 2
iSee the sources cited in Vernon Van Dyke, Pride and Power: The Rationale of
the Space Pro6ram (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), pp. 59-60.
2Some observers, however, continue to share the estimate made by Herman Kahn
in 1960 that by 1969 a breakthrough in sensors and computers to identify
and track hostile objects might return the world to a "situation similar to
World War I, where the defense seemed to be intrinsically superior to the
offense during most of the war." (Kahn, op. cit., pp. 494-495.)
lO9
Studies also proceed on orbital weapons that can identify, neutralize,
and destroy other space vehicles. The feasibility of rendezvous with
friendly space vehicles has been demonstrated. But it is not clear that an
enemy spaceship can be inspected from outside; that it could not escape
rendezvous; or that it could not destroy the inspecting vehicle. If
undesirable contents were found in the vehicle, the question "After
Detection--What?" would remain. Defense Department officials have indi-
cated that it is more feasible to destroy an enemy satellite from the
ground than from another space vehicle, and that the United States already
has this capability. Another problem with either manned or unmanned in-
spection vehicles is that a determined foe could probably overwhelm and
outflank them by sending large numbers of decoys and armed vehicles into
space.
One more type of potential space weapon should be noted here: weather
control. Meteorology for military purposes could be directed f'rom ground
stations and/or by manipulation of weather conditions from space, e.g.,
1
by explosions. The consequences upon terrestrial struggles could be
far-reaching. Weather control as a tactical combat device is probably quite
undeveloped by comparison, say, with bacteriological-chemical-radiation
weapons. But it is similar to them in that such swords can cut two ways,
hurting the user as well as the intended victim. Allowing for vast
advances in the art, meteorology could at best be a countervalue (as
distinguished from a counterforce) weapon; most likely its impact would
extend to neutrals as well as one's allies and own territory. Its use
by one superpower would invite retaliation by the other, as well as reduce
the inhibitions of smaller powers to use whatever germ or other "dirty"
weapons they had at their disposal.
If, contrary to the foregoing expectations, anti-missile or anti-
satellite space weapons should become a reality, it is doubtful that they
will be suitable for mass destruction of earth targets, at least when com-
pared for cost-effectiveness with other, more conventional weapons. This
contention holds particularly for weapons dependent on beam-directed energy,
because of their difficulty in piercing the earth's atmosphere.
iFor some of the possibilities, see Van Dyke, op. cit., pp. 34-36;
Kahn, op. cit., p. 484.
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Military Support Functions
While doubts persist regarding the feasibility as well as the desirability
of direct military operations in space, the accomplishments of contemporary
technology make clearer the role that manned and unmanned space vehicles can
have in supporting military activities on the land, in the sea, and in the
air. Early warning, reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, command and
control--all these tasks can be facilitated by men and machines in space
who relay their findings or their instructions to earth.
Both Moscow and Washington seem to agree that such activities cannot be
ruled out short of general and complete disarmament. In acquiescing in U.S.
photo reconnaissance missions and the MOL (manned orbiting laboratory), and
in carrying out such activities itself, the Kremlin has tacitly endorsed
the State Department's argument that "the test of the legitimacy of a
particular use of outer space is not whether it is military or non-military,
,,1
but wb_ether it is peaceful or aggressive.
Given that world peace rests in part on confidence in stabilized
deterrence, means to strengthen this confidence are welcome from the stand-
point of arms control. For this reason improved intelligence arrived at
through satellite reconnaissance missions is useful for establishing that
neither side is preparing a surprise attack or embarking on other steps that
could upset the balance of power.
Reduced to its extreme form, however, this proposition gives rise to
three corollaries that need qualification. First, if the interests of peace
require greater U.S. knowledge of Soviet missile sites, why should the United
States conceal the location of her missile-launching submarines? 2 Two
asymmetries must be considered: the greater difficulty experienced by the
United States in gaining intelligence data about Russia than vice versa; and
the greater likelihood (at least in U.S. judgment) that Moscow would strike
first than vice versa--hence the greater need for an assured second-strike
force available to Washington. All things are relative, of course, and as the
threat of a Soviet first strike seems more remote, and as Russia herself
1Richard N. Gardner_ "Cooperation in Outer Space," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41,
No. 2 (January 1963), P. 359-
2For discussion, see comments by Roger Fisher, Christopher ,_right, and Jerome Wright
Spingarn in Cohen, op. cit., pp. 85-88.
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acquires a powerful submarine fleet, arms controllers may welcomethe
existence of an indestructible retaliatory force for both superpowers.
In any event the value of mutual observation from outer space will remain;
it will assure each superpower that the other is not mobilizing for the
all-out effort needed to launch a massive land, air, and sea attack.
A second extreme corollary is that the major space powers should share
their knowledge with lesser powers, e.g., so that Washington and Moscow
assured China they were not preparing a war against her. This argument suffers
first from a lack of realism, for it is unlikely that any power would knowingly
contribute targeting information to a potential foe that could not otherwise
obtain this data. But the argument is also somewhatirrelevant. The fact
that both superpowersmay conceivably wish to attempt a pre-emptive blow
against one another makesit important for them to be sure that neither is
planning a surprise counterforce blow. Not until China becomesconsiderably
stronger could she possibly knock out the U.S. or Soviet second-strike
capability. Becauseneither Washingtonnor Moscowneed worry about a Chinese
first-strike, the chances are less that Peking might be attacked pre-emptively.
P_hile China need not fear a pre-emptive attack, she has more basis for
concern that Moscowor Washingtonmight launch a preventive war, especially
one designed to halt development of her nuclear arsenal. Should one or both
superpowers offer to prove their peaceful intent by sharing reconnaissance
data with Peking, China's fears of foreign attack would be somewhatassuaged.
Since she would probably rely on a countercity strategy in a nuclear exchange,
detailed information about U.S. or Soviet missile sites would be of little
direct use to her.
A third corollary argument holds that, since reconnaissance contributes
to peace, the United Nations should carry on or supervise a world-wide system
of satellite inspection. 1 I.br better or worse a number of practical problems
iThis proposal _Tas made by an adviser to President Eisenhower following the
announcement in 1965 of U.S. plans to test a MOL. Several years earlier the
editor of S_0ace Age News suggested that "before multifarious alliances create
teams of observation satellites performing duplicate surveillance _eunctions,
the U.N. should take the initiative in this activity .... Surveillance results
would be available, simultaneously, to all nations. Any outside efforts that
might then ensue would merely duplicate the U.N. 's program--perhaps checking
and verifying its findings .... " The main question of feasibility discussed
by the author are technological, although he does suggest a pro rata tax
assessing U.N. member-nations in proportion to their membership assessments.
See 5_artin H. Wald/nan, "The Practicality of United _[ations Surveillance, :_ in
Frederick J. Ossenbeck and Patricia C. Kroeck (eds.), Open Space and Peace
(Stanford, California: The Hoover Institution, 1964), pp. 210-224.
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preclude such a development for the foreseeable future. As U.N. officials
are quick to concede, the United Nations has neither the personnel, the
know-how, the funds, or the equipment to maintain or even launch a world
reconnaissance program in outer space. To urge that it be given a key role
in an "open skies" operation is only to highlight the limitations of the
world organization and to raise hopes that will necessarily fail of
realization. Any role the United Nations played in outer space arms in-
spection would have to depend on the cooperation of the Soviet Union and the
United States--the very nations whose counterforce potentialities most
warrant observation. Finally, since Moscow and Washington already have a
national reconnaissance capability in space, they do not need international
or even bilateral cooperation to inspect one another. There seems no ob-
jective need for "four ._r two_ men in a jeep" to tour outer space in a way
the international zone of Vienna was policed before May 1955. If, on the
other hand, technical and political conditions permitted one reconnaissance
system to service both the United States and the Soviet Union (and perhaps
other countries as well), there would be not only a certain economy but also
a powerful stimulus to bilateral or multilateral cooperation generally.
The Janus-like aspect of reconnaissance from outer space should not be
overlooked. While "open skies" may help arms control, it can also facilitate
the planning and waging of war. It can provide coverage of terrestrial
targets and movement that is wider, more up-to-date, and more reliable (less
subject to enemy intercept) than would otherwise be available. Command and
control of military forces may be enhanced by global weapons release
1
systems and more secure communications. There is also the possibility that
improved intelligence about an enemy's weaknesses (or growing capabilities)
could tempt a first-strike that might otherwise be restrained by uncertainties.
We must recognize that it is probably impossible to legislate the prohi-
bition of observation satellites and other space activities that can support
terrestrial combat. This loss for arms control is compensated, however, by
the contribution of reconnaissance to each superpower's confidence that its
adversary is not preparing a pre-emptive attack.
iAbt, op. cit., pp. 31-32.
External Political Factors
The thrust of technological and strategic considerations militating for
an accord on arms control have gained momentum in 1966 from a relatively
favorable constellation of external political factors confronting both the
White House and the Kremlin. As the U.S. and Soviet leaderships look toward
the third world, they find substantial incentives and few restraints to con-
clude a treaty on outer space.
There is a kind of one-to-one relationship between the perceived utility
of space arms controls and the balance of technological and military power.
That is, the extent to which national security interests are served by such
measures can be measured against what one believes or anticipates this
balance to be. Whether or not a treaty is actually signed, however, depends
on many factors extraneous to its formal content. Arms control arrangements
can be facilitated or hindered by a number of foreign and domestic political
and economic considerations, and most governments have viewed them in part
as an instrument for controlling the temperature and direction of inter-
national relations.
'i_neU.S. and Soviet governments under President Kermed_- and Premier
Khrushchev indicated a serious desire to moderate their adversary relationship
by elements of cooperation and conflict control. Arms control agreements,
including the 1963 understanding not to orbit weapons of mass destruction,
proved to be a most useful way of achieving these goals. This orientation
continued under President Johnson in 1964, but it dissipated as Khrushchev's
successors attempted late in 1964 to come to terms with Peking, and--even
as they ceased these efforts--escalation in Vietnam faced the Kremlin with
what it regarded as "imperialist bombings of a sister socialist state."
Since February 1965 the war in Southeast Asia seems to be the key factor
impeding an improvement in the U.S.-soviet relations.
Both the White House and the Kremlin would prefer that this source of
tension be lifted; failing that, Washington seeks to compartmentalize the
conflict, setting it apart from its general relations with East Europe and
the Soviet Union. The Kremlin has also shown some willingness to distinguish
its policy toward Vietnam from its dealings with the United States in other
matters. But Moscow's approach to this problem has vacillated wildly in
1965-1966. Thus, in June 1966 Izvestiia proclaimed that the withdrawal of
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U.S. troops from Vietnam was not a precondition for the signing of a non-
proliferation treaty, while in July, Moscowobtained a very sharp denunci-
ation of U.S. policy in Vietnam from the Political Consultative Committee
of the WarsawPact, including a threat to dispatch volunteers if they were
solicitated by Hanoi. Such flip-flops in the Soviet position have probably
resulted from a contradictory series of variegated pressures--the perceived
utility of cooperation with the West, the embarrassmentcaused by escalation
(whether by Communistor U.S. forces) in Vietnam, vulnerability to Chinese
criticism, the opportunity to makea showof Communist-bloc solidarity
behind Soviet leadership, and--though little information is available--the
tugs and pulls of various factions within the Soviet leadership.
Both Moscowand Washington seemto have believed in 1965-1966 that a
treaty on non-proliferation had merit in itself and that it would help to
reduce or at least regulate East-West tensions. Indeed, both governments
have endorsed the view that the intensity of the war in Southeast Asia
makes it more rather than less urgent to reach an agreement on non-
proliferation. The failure to produce such an accord has apparently been
due to Soviet insistence on preventing further nuclear sharing in NATO and
possibly on dismantling sharing arrangements that already exist; Washington,
for its part, has sought to keep open options for further institutions for
nuclear-sharing and, at a minimum, obtain a treaty that does not prevent the
two-key arrangements developed in recent years.
The growing awareness in 1966 that neither superpower is ready to make
large concessions to obtain a non-proliferation treaty has made it more im-
perative to find other areas of arms control where agreement might be easier
to secure. Preventive arms control in space thus becomes a likely candidate.
The onrush of technology already makes such an agreement urgent, so that
neither superpower is tempted to extend the arms race to a new level that
would be more dangerous and expensive but without greater deterrent effect.
At the same time such an accord might be relatively "cheap" in the sense
that it does not force the major space powers to foreswear direct military
functions of ob_ious strategic importance.
A treaty that limits primarily two powers will be simpler than one that
raises serious problems with allies and third parties. Unlike the issue of
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a non-proliferation treaty, an agreement on outer space does not substantially
affect the interests of either superpower's allies. To be sure, any move-
ment toward detente tends to reduce alliance cohesiveness. NATO is particu-
larly vulnerable to such atmospheric changes, because its original raison
d'etre arose from a fear of _ Soviet _ nach _Jcst_n. A U.S.-Soviet
accord on outer space would presumably give added mom_ntum to voices like
those of Adenauer and de Gaulle who proclaim that the Russian bear no longer
presents an active threat to Europe. Indeed, the Kremlin has specifically
exploited the prospect of Soviet rockets launching French satellites to make
more concrete Moscow's ties with Paris. The Warsaw Treaty Organization,
though ostensibly formed in response to Bonn's entry into NAT0, has been
shaped much more than the Western alliance by endogenous forces--mainly--
the efforts of Moscow to retain control in Eastern Europe. Insofar as
the alliance-mindedness of the East European governments is influenced by
external factors, profound alterations and not just atmospheric changes are
probably required, e.g., in the military and political threat posed by West
Germany.
The Western alliance, in sum, may loosen more tbau the Soviet in conse_
quence of a treaty on outer space. But Washington seems more anxious than
Moscow to establish the princiDle of compartmentalization in East-West
relations, and hence may be more willing to tolerate a marginal increase in
centrifugal tendencies within its alliance.
Balancing any loss to Western unity due to a U.S.-Soviet space treaty
is the risk for Moscow that any agreement with Washington will damage its
position vis-a-vis Peking in the competition for leadership of world
communism. Fortunately for arms control, however_ Soviet vulnerability to
Chinese criticisms has reached perhaps an all-time low in 1966. Peking's
aggressive foreign policy line suffered a series of dramatic rebuffs in
1965-1966, culminating in the virtual elimination of the Indonesian
Communist Party. Domestically, the "cultural revolution" in China has
reached such extremes that Chinese statements praising what amounts to a
cult of the Mao Tse-tung personality have been reprinted without comment in
the Soviet press.
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Thus, the United States can move toward a space treaty without undue
risk of offendir_ her West Germanally, and Moscow;Tcan reciprocate without
excessive anxiety about the fulminations of Peking over "collaboration with
imperialism." Themajor danger on the horizon in 1966-1967 is that
escalation of the war to targets close to Haiphongand Hanoi will provoke
deeper Soviet involvement in the war or, short of that, will makethe
political cost of a space treaty prohibitive to the Kremlin's public image.
The superpowers' incentives to movetoward an accord on outer space
are boosted from a desire in both Washington and Moscowto prove to the
third world that their respective foreign policies are peaceful and, more
particularly, that their costly space explorations are for science, not war.
Looking beyond the immediate gains from a treaty on outer space, both
Washington and Moscowprobably calculate that such an accord will facilitate
a broad range of other measures to improve East-West relations. At a
minimumit would help control the tensions arising from the war in Southeast
Asia. It could even set the stage for a more active Soviet role in bringing
that war to the negotiating table. With or without somediminution of the
Vietnamese conflict, a treaty on space could facilitate a ban on nuclear
proliferation 3 because the potential nuclear powers have been calling for
somerenunciation of arms by the nuclear powers themselves as a quid pro
quo 3 and because the willingness of Moscow and Washington to compromise
will probably increase if there is some semblance of a return to the
"spirit" of 1963.
Domestic Politics and Economics
Internal as well as external considerations reinforce the interest of
the White House and the Kremlin to reach an accord on outer space. The
Johnson Administration seeks to please both hawks and doves, especially in
an election year. Sterner measures in Vietnam may help satisfy one group,
but alienate the other. A treaty on outer space would help to win back those
voters who are repelled by intensification of the war in Southeast Asia.
The Soviet leadership does not have to stand election competition like
the American, but--if only to function--it too seeks the support of elite
factions and the public. With regard to questions such as space research,
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military affairs, and foreign policy, sharp divisions exist within the
Soviet industrial, scientific, and military complex--divisions which have
their counterparts within the Party and governmentbureaucracy. 1 The
weight of these factions is difficult to assay, particularly at any point
in time, but it is clear that a struggle continues to influence the
structure of the decision-making bodies and to determine the direction and
nature of investments of humanand material resources.
The Soviet political and military hierarchy has tended to divide into
proponents of "traditional" and "modernist" views, the former stressing the
continued importance of balanced conventional and nuclear forces, the latter
the role of rockets and surprise attack. Onemight expect the modernists
automatically to incline toward the exploitation of advanced military
technology in outer space. But this estimate overlooks one of the salient
reasons underlying the Kremlin's interest in rocketry: the possibility of
reducing military manpowerand other defense costs. 2 It is also possible,
although little evidence is available, that Soviet modernists, because
they appreciate the destructive power of missiles, also see the value of
containing the arms race before it extends to outer space, if only because
present deterrence mechanismssuffice. Thus, Soviet modernists are
probably divided into a group that argues for reliance on land- and sea-
based missiles and a more radical faction militating 1'or weapons in space.
The first position probably continues to attract politicians interested in
economy, military leaders with certain vested interests, and possibly some
scientists and industrial managers lobbying for their own projects. The
second position most likely appeals to military, scientific, and economic
leaders with a specific stake in space weaponry (as opposed to space
technology in general), and to some hard-line politicians who hope for
superiority over the United States through outer space.
iSee e.g., Albert Parry, The New Class Divided: Russian Science and
Technology Versus Communism (New York: Macmillan Company, 1966).
2See N. S. Khrushchev's announcement on January 14, 1960, that Soviet
armed forces would be reduced from 3,263,000 to 2,432,000 men in the next
two years, a reduction which he said was made possible by growing Soviet
rocket and nuclear power. (Pravda and Izvestiia, January 15, 1960).
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Probably the military space lobby plays a relatively small role in the
Soviet power structure, especially if comparedwith the pressures generated
by its U.S. counterpart upon the White Houseand Congress. A broader set
of pressures on the Brezhnvev-Kosygin regime results from the demandsof
manypolitical and military leaders for a harder line toward the United
States, p_ssures which are reinforced by the desideratum of maintaining
Russia's revolutionary face in the world communismand the third world.
Against these elements are ranged another set of demandsfrom individuals
and groups who favor concentration on Russia's internal economicdevelopment,
the reduction of tensions with the West, and less concern for a militant
image abroad. Advocates of such vie_s are probably much larger in number
than the proponents of greater militancy, but they are generally further
removed from the centers of power and their preferences can be more easily
disregarded.
An arms control treaty for outer space would not necessarily raise the
ire of the largest segmentof Soviet hawks, but only the portion specifi-
cally interested in space weaponry. The majority of Soviet hard-liners can
be placated by increases in the quantity and quality of conventional forces
and land- and sea-based missiles, and/or a tougher stance on Vietnam. A
wide range of Soviet opinion--both "hard" and "soft" line--urges greater
attention to heavy and light industry, rather than to military and space
activities. A space treaty would help to reassure public and elite
supporters of detente that the Kremlin still pursues coexistence wherever
possible. More important, such an agreementwould help Moscowensure that
defense spending was stabilized so that greater resources could be devoted
to industrial and agricultural development.
Both the White Houseand the Kremlin seemhighly responsive to budgetary
considerations. Neither will consciously jeopardize national security for
economy, but both are anxious to hold the line on military spending wherever
possible. If economicallocations were not already strained, military
activities in space might seema more attractive investment; but if such
activities do not have any clear strategic rationale and if they divert
needed resources from essential military spending and desirable civilian
economic development, their appeal slackens sharply.
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The NASA budget like that of the Great Society has been cut back
because of the rise in military expenditures due to Vietnam. Early 1966
saw the NASA budget reduced for the first time in history. The only
project canceled outright was the Advanced Orbiting Solar Observatory
(AOS0), but no new major programs were scheduled for the coming fiscal year.
Manned space flight projects, generally considered untouchable, were allo-
cated only slightly less in fiscal 1967 than in 1966, but the cut would
have been more apparent were it not for a steep reductio11 in Gemini funding.
As spending for Vietnam has accelerated to still higher levels in 1966,
the pressures to hold back non-essential military spending have increased,
reinforced by mounting signs of inflation. Looked at another way, the
incentives to invest in new aerospace developments have been reduced by
the fact that the relevant industries are already intensely occupied with
conventional aircraft for Vietnam, with existing missile and space programs,
and with projects for supersonic planes. While some champions of the U.S.
space program lament the lack of a well-defined post-Apollo program, the
head of the Space Sciences Subcommittee of the House Science and Astro-
nautics Committee has questioned the need for a national debate on the
next major space goal beyond the moon. Representative Joseph A. Karth
declared that the war in Vietnam and the needs of the Great Society program
would keep the space budget from expanding _oon. He pi'edicted in August
1966 that the more than $6 billion budget NASA planned to request in
.2
January 1967 "is just financiallynot in the cards for the near future.
The budget for NASA and the Defense Department budget for space activities
are of course distinct entities, but the same mentality that seeks to avoid
unnecessary expenditures in space generally will also strive to hold back
on military spending in space unless it has a compelling strategic motive.
1Aviation Week and S_ace Technology, January 21, 1966; The Washington Post,
December 24, 1965; The New York Times, January 25, 1966, pp. 18, 23.
2Rather than journeys far from earth, Karth urged that emphasis be given
to economic, meteorological, and communication applications from the use
of Saturn rockets and Apollo spacecraft in missions near to earth. See
The New York Times, August 26, 1966, p. 13.
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Indications are that the Kremlin is also struggling to stabilize
defense expenditures. The broad objectives enunciated for the Five-Year
Plan 1966-1970 suggest that Moscowis engagedor would like to engage in
the most serious effort since 1917 to improve consumer living standards
in the near future.1 On the one hand it is true that the Soviet economy
has managedto grow impressively, especially in heavy and military industry,
despite the fact that it has operated in conditions of international crisis
since 1917. On the other hand the marginal advantage of even a few billion
rubles released from military investment could be an enormouswindfall for
the Soviet planner, ever in search of resources to break bottlenecks or to
spur investment. The positive effect of such resources re-channeled into
fields such as the chemical industry, agriculture, and housing maybe
disproportionately large.2 It is precisely these areas where Moscow's
planned goals have not been fulfilled and which it now declares it seeks
to makegood.
The long delay in 1966 in presenting the precise control figures for
the plan also suggests, however, that discussion continues over goals or
meansor both. Diverse objectives are put forward by "metal eaters" and
the proponents of goulash or perhaps gastronome communism. The metal eaters
are themselves divided amongthose who want more heavy industry, military
investment, and various space activities. Conflicting meansare proposed
by those who advocate greater decentralization 3 and those who want more
centralized controls, effected through computerization. Oneobserver has
noted the increased attention to atomic energy applications in the Soviet
press may attempt to "offer the basis for a compromisebetween the defense
lobby and the proconsumereconomists."4
iSee Ekonomicheskaia Gazeta_, Nos. 48-50, December 1965; for a contrary
interpretation, see Timothy Sosnovy, "The New Soviet Plan: Guns Still
Before Butter," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1966), pp. 620-632.
2Gregory Grossman, "The Soviet Economy and the Waning of the Cold War," in
Robert A. Goldwin (ed.), Beyond the Cold War (Chicago: Rand McNally and
Company, 1966), p. 1964.
3Speaking to a Czech audience in July, 1966, Soviet economist Y. G. Liberman
declared: "If the plan is to express real needs, it is necessary for it to
be based primarily on the market--on supply and demand. Any planning without
the market influence is mere administrative planning, if not bureaucratic."
As reported from Prague in Prace, July 26, 1966.
4Paul Wohl, "Soviets place new emphasis on nuclear-power drive," Th___e
Christian Science Monitor, August 22, 1966, p. ll.
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While accurate information on the Soviet space program, muchless its
military component, is not available, one study indicates that Soviet
military and space research and development costs have exceeded those of
the United States since about 1964. Another study argues, however, that
the increasing cost--plus the futility--of military competition with the
United States helped to reinforce Moscow's decision in 1963-1964 to seek
limited measures of arms control. 1 In late 1965 the official Soviet military
budget rose by five percent, allegedly in response to the imperialist
threat, but Western economists have seen it more as part of an across-the-
board increase in the Soviet budget.2
Given these conflicting goals and crosspressures, it seems likely that
if Moscow chooses to enhance its defense posture, it will prefer to do so
not by stimulating a costly arms race in a new dimension, that of outer
space. }_ather, if the Kremlin's military priorities could be rank-ordered,
the following hierarchy seems likely: first, to improve the Soviet missile
\
and submarine force so as to achieve a more credible parity vis-a-vis the
U.S. strategic force; second, to construct anti-missile forces capable of
defending Russia against Chinese if not Western rockets; and third, to
develop an air- and sea-lift capacity to enable Moscow at least to threaten
confrontation with the U.S. gendarmarie in Southeast Asia and other likely
foci of limited war.
If one tries to evaluate the total picture, the interaction of strategic,
political, and economic factors impacting on U.S. and Soviet attitudes
toward space arms control constitutes a very complex pattern. If any
equilibrium or main trend has been established, it may be offset by a shift
in the weight of any key variable. On the whole, however, the outlook for
space arms control is not dim. The salient restraints and incentives
confronting Moscow and Washington will be considered briefly in the final
chapter.
_incoln P. Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens, Jr., Franklyn Griffiths,
Khrushchev and the Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass. : The M.I.T. Press, 1966).
2The New York Times, December 8, 1965, p. i.
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VIII. THEBROADCONFIGUFt&TION:THEOUTLOOKFORARMSCONTROL
The balance of forces in 1966-1967 seemsencouraging for space arms
control--if not by explicit agreement, at least by tacit restraint. If
neither superpower initiates an arms competition in outer space, the other
has few compelling motives to do so. The military, political, and economic
incentives to abstain from an arms race in space are high; the counter
arguments do not appear persuasive for either side, at least in the present
technological, political, and economic environment.
The direct military applications of space--whether for offensive or
active defense purposes--are costly, dangerous, and difficult to implement
and control. They promise little advantage not attainable by increases in
the quality or quantity of earth-based weapons. Apart from weaponsof mass
destruction, satellite weaponsagainst other space ships or as anti-missile
defense appear not very feasible or cost-effective, even for the middle-
range future. As noted, however, _+ .may pro;_ _...._poo_ to outlaw- space
activities such as surveillance that could support combat operations.
Mutual reconnaissance by the space powers, however, may also contribute to
stabilized deterrence and hence to arms control.
The main strategic argument against bombs in orbit is that they are
superfluous. Politically, the deployment of space armaments could
seriously destabilize the mutual trust that adversaries in Moscow and
Washington have developed over the last decade--a sense that neither side
wants to provoke an atomic exchange. If either party deployed such weapons,
the deteriorating effect upon this trust could be severe: At a minimum it
would probably lead to an intensified competition in arms, neglecting the
consequences for arms control; worse, it could cut by a large factor the
time either government is willing to wait before pressing the button in the
face of a threat from the other side. 1
The greatest obstacle to a formal arms control treaty on outer space
may derive from external political considerations. China's influence upon
iSee also Clark C. Abt, "Problems and Possibilities of Space Arms Control,"
Journal of Arms Control, I, No. 1 (January 1963), p. 29.
Soviet policy has probably reached_an all-tlme low, due to Peking' s inner
convulsions and external defeats. The Kremlin declares that it seeks arms
controls in space and other realms despite or even because of war and
tension in Southeast Asia. But if the Vietnamese conflict escalates further,
and especially if Soviet prestige, resources, and manpowerbecomemore
committedp all bets maybe off on arms control. Similarly, the White House
may also find itself less willing or less able to move toward a space treaty
if the war against communismin Asia becomesmore intense, particularly in
an election year, and afortiori if Russia's contribution to the war increases.
Internal political and economic factors in the United States as well as
Russia militate against a major allocation of resources to a military space
race. But these forces may not suffice to goad the White Houseand the
Kremlin into a formal treaty as distinguished from what Khrushchev called
disarmament by "mutual example."
Should the superpowers decide for the present not to conclude a formal
treaty, mutual restraint on direct military uses of space is likely, even
though both will probably continue to exploit the military potential of
com_a_nicationsand reconnaissance from outer space. From the standpoint of
arms control, however, a formal preventive measure would be highly desirable.
Without it, the prospect remains that one or the other space power will
inch its way into military activities, against which the other will llkely
react and overreact. With a treaty, opposed social and ideological systems
will expressly acknowledge their belief in the wisdom of prophylactic
legislation to ensure that at least in somerespects man is the master of
technology and not vice versa. A useful precedent may thus be created for
dealing with other technological and military contingencies by foresignt
instead of hindsight, whenopportunities are already in the historical past.
Finally, if preventive arms controls are inaugurated, the stabilizing
effects will extend not only through outer space but will be felt on terres-
trial politics as well.
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The superpowerswill risk little if they extended their accord to ban
weaponsof mass destruction to prohibit all direct military applications of
outer space.1 Thepotential use of mannedor unmannedspace vehicles for
active defense or for offensive purposes seemquite limited. While some
would argue that this only proves that it is unnecessary to outlaw such
activities, the history of efforts toward space arms control suggests that
it is safer and cheaper for adversaries to reassure one another that they
do not plan to exploit militarily all possible uses of space technology.
If such assurances are not madetoday, tomorrow maybe too late, for one or
both space powers may find themselves with a military space capability which
they did not need or want, but which defies disarmamentonce it exists. The
beneficent results of explicit forebearance can extend beyond the specific
realm of space arms control to improve the general climate of East-West
relations, enhancing the prospects for other measures of arms limitations.
_nile the thrust of the arguments here is to cast doubt on the
military utility of outer space, each space power must still seek to ensure
that it enjoys free passage in outer space and equal rights on heavenly
bodies. There would probably be important military support functions (e.g.,
communications) as well as commercial and scientific purposes served by
national bases on the moon. Perhaps military support activities can be
prohibited and other functions "internationalized." At a minimumeach
space power will want to ensure that it is not denied privileges
monopolized by another. But a U.S.-Soviet condominium is as little desirable
as it is feasible in outer space. If not in the next decade, then surely
in this century, other states will also be "space powers." It is in the
interest of all to ensure that an international regime is established to
exclude direct military activities from outer space and ensure that all
states enjoy the samerights and obligations. In this area, above all others,
the needs of all peoples require collaboration above conflict.
iIn discussing a ban on direct military applications of space, however, it
is probably necessary to exclude missiles launched from earth which pass
through space but are not stationed there. Thus, there would be no ban on
ICl_4's or--a more futuristic prospect--on rockets carrying military personnel
and equipment.
